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Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan

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This is a well written and documented attempt to produce a comprehensive account of Japan's decision to seek peace at the end of WWII. This includes the controversial topic of the importance of American use of nuclear weapons. Since at least one prior reviewer has used the "R" (revisionism) word, let me begin with with some brief historiographic background. Revisionism, unfortunately, is one of those words that has lost specific meaning and become a term of abuse. Any substantial work of historical scholarship presenting new information or a substantial new interpretation, like this one, is revisionist by definition and the mere fact that the author has a new point of view is not an excuse to fling abuse. In the debate over the use of nuclear weapons against Japan, revisionism has a concrete, specific connontation. It is used usually to refer to the work of historians like Gar Alperovits and others who argue that the use of nuclear weapons was unecesary, that the Truman administration knew this, and that bombing Hiroshima and Nagasaki was an effort to intimidate the Soviet Union. In this interpretation, the use of nuclear weapons against Japan was the opening salvo of the Cold War, not the conclusion of WWII. Hasegawa is definitely not in this camp and politely, but firmly, consigns the revisionist consigns the revisionist camp to the trash can. The Truman administration employed nuclear weapons with the primary purpose of bringing the war to an end as fast as possible.
The strengths of this book are Hasegawa's description and analysis of the role of the Soviet Union and his attention to the role played by figures, both in Tokyo and Washington, usually regarded as secondary figures. Hasegawa's interpretation is based in part of novel archival research. An important point of departure from what might be called the triumphalist American version that implicitly treats the American decisions as decisive and the Japanese role as essentially reactive. Hasegawa takes pains to emphasize the autonomy of Japanese decision makers. This is not novel. Richard Frank, in his excellent book Downfall, which covers much of the same ground, makes the same point and also emphasizes the autonomy of the Japanese leadership. Hasegawa goes farther than Frank with his extensive description of Soviet diplomacy and the impact of the Soviet decision to enter the war on the Japanese decision to capitulate. Hasegawa makes a strong case that both the Soviet entry and the American use of nuclear weapons were crucial factors in deliberations of the Japanese leadership to end the war. I found this aspect of the book convincing and I think the likely conclusion is that use of nuclear weapons with necessary but probably not sufficient to coerce the Japanese leadership to surrender. In the most controversial aspect of the book, Hasegawa argues that Soviet entry may well have been necessary and sufficient, and that use of nuclear weapons was not needed. This is a major point of difference with Frank, who sees use of nuclear weapons as decisive though he also discusses the importance of the Soviet entry. Hasegawa and Frank's disagreement centers on interpretation of a relatively small number of documents and it is impossible to be sure which is correct, though I find Frank's analysis more convincing. Hasegawa has interesting treatment of the Truman administration, which he presents has more uncertain and divided than usually thought. There is a lot of useful information in these sections of the book. Truman, who had been largely excluded from foreign policy during Roosevelt's life, is presented as periodically indecisive.
An important theme of Hasegawa's interpretation is that the American were willing and did use to bomb to avoid Soviet participation in the occupation of Japan. This is presented reasonably well, but I don't think that Hasegawa does as well as Frank in presenting the secondary reasons why the Truman administration wanted to end the war as quickly as possible. Certainly, they wanted to end the war without an invasion of the home islands. But, they also didn't want to take over a Japan in a state of chaos or given the Soviet behavior in Poland, share occupation with the Soviets. American policy objectives were just not to win the war but to sustain a lasting peace. Occupying a Japan with a functioning cooperative government and without a divided occupation were important goals. Nor, given the clearly duplicitious and aggressive behavior of the Soviets, was it irrational to use the bomb rather than wait to see what would happen after Soviet entry into the war. The Truman administration wanted to conclude the war with a minimum of casulties, to ease the occupation, to eliminate Japanese militarism and imperialism, to be able to democratize Japan, to make Japan a permanent US ally, and to ensure that Japan became an important member of the world economy. These objectives might have been accomplished with different decisions but its hard to argue with the remarkable results obtained by Truman and his advisors.

A brilliant analysis that not only fills in the many blank spots that existed with regard to the end of the war in the PTO, but also for the first time offers a complete and concise narrative of the decision making process simultaniously going on at all three major players. Hasegawa convincingly argues that it were not the atomic bombs that made Japan surrender (they were even resigned to receiving more of the same - testament to the effectiveness of LeMay's conventional bombing campaign, which in Tokyo alone killed more people in one night than died at Hiroshima ), but the prospect of Soviet occupation and the specter of communism. Faced with that alternative, the emperor rather preferred to surrender to the Americans.
Truman tried to keep the Soviets out by dropping the bombs early but failed to appreciate that a modification of the unconditional surrender terms regarding the status of the emperor might have accelerated Japan'surrender more than the bombs would do.
A must read for anyone interested in the history of WWII and/or the atomic bomb.

I was quite surprised to find a lot of interesting information in this book that I had no idea about. I am not very familiar with the pacific campaign in WWII nor about the political complications that existed between the three/four parties mentioned in this book, but in the end I'm very please I read this book and have a new outlook on the Soviet involvement with the end of the war in the pacific. While many like to believe that the two A-bombs were the main reason for Japan's surrender and acceptance of the Potsdam Proclamation the reality of the matter is that the Soviet entry into the war played the largest role. Reactions in Japanese high officials diaries attest to the fact that while the A-bomb was a surprise the invasion of Japanese controlled territory by Soviet forces was a great surprise and the event that finally forced the Japanese to rethink their stance in the war. Even after both A-bombs were dropped there were still those in Japan that wanted to keep fighting but the fact that they could no longer negotiate through the Soviet Union made them reconsider and listen to those who wanted peace at whatever price. All in all a good investment for a new point of view on the war in the pacific and a very interesting and gripping story of how the war came to an end and what role(s) Roosevelt, Truman, Stalin, Hirohito, and many others played.

A thought-provoking book that examines the frantic political and diplomatic efforts in three capitals (Moscow, Washington and Tokyo) as World War II closed down. The description and explanation of the race by the USSR to control the Kuril Islands, a strategic area still in dispute today, was especially enlightening to me. While I continue to think Truman's use of the two atomic bombs was more consequential to the political decision of the Japanese elite's accepting of U.S. surrender terms than is the view of Professor Hasegawa, I am convinced by the professor that the concurrent shock impact of Stalin's final military moves is the major key to understanding the ultimate wrenching decision made in Tokyo.

Cold War expert Professor Tsuyoshi Hasegawa does an exceptional job of addressing the still-asked questions about the end of World War II. At 60 years and counting, the guilt and hand wringing continue vis-'-vis America's use of atomic weapons against mainly civilian targets in Japan. Were "Little Boy" and "Fat Man" really necessary? What about the Soviets and their eleventh hour invasion of Manchuria, Korea, and Sakhalin?

Hasegawa rightly answers these questions, but he perhaps downplays a little too much the impact of the atomic bombs in ending the war. He cites one official source that acknowledged a persuasive jolt from the Hiroshima bombing, even if it turned out to be in combination with the Soviet invasion -- a one-two punch, if you will. In any event, Hasegawa argues convincingly that neither alone was decisive and that the Soviet offensive produced more dread than the destruction of Hiroshima. Also, his condemnation of the atomic bombings carries even more weight with respect to Nagasaki. Given the hindsight of Hiroshima, it was dubious to resort to this second bombing. Like the first, it would prove to be indiscriminate in its effects and, as Hasegawa contends, it was politically motivated.

Hasegawa's "Racing the Enemy" offers a broader view than the usual line about the atomic bombs ending the war. However, one ought not to fault President Harry Truman too much, for he no doubt faced a moral dilemma. Either way, atomic bombing or invasion, the buck would stop with him being responsible for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people, the majority noncombatants. Historian David McCullough raises an important question in his biography of Truman: "How could a President, or the others charged with responsibility for the decision, answer to the American people if when the war was over, after the bloodbath of an invasion of Japan, it became known that a weapon sufficient to end the war had been available by midsummer and was not used?" What transpired after it was used is another story. Without the benefit of hindsight, however, the decision-makers could go only by the results of atomic bomb testing in the New Mexico desert, described by project chief Major General Leslie R. Groves as "successful beyond the most optimistic expectations of anyone."

Carefully researched and yet refreshingly easy to read, Prof. Hasegawa's "Racing the Enemy" contributes much to solving the riddle of the end of World War II. However, as good as it is, Hasegawa's book alone is not the last word. No single source says it all and "Racing the Enemy" should be read with other fine histories of the War in the Pacific Theater of Operations. It is a welcome and needed addition to current scholarship, in my opinion, and offers much to the serious student of the War. Rev. Dennis J. Mercieri, alumnus of Holy Apostles Seminary in Cromwell, CT, and Gulf War veteran

Prof. Hasegawa's painstakingly researched work shines new light on the diplomatic games played as the War in the Pacific came to an end. Reading archival documents in English, Russian, and Japanese, many available for the first time, he is able to shed light on the rationale behind the dropping of the A-Bomb and Japanese efforts to end the war through Soviet mediation. The documented evidence Prof. Hasegawa presents is truly shocking, and shows the debates within all three governments regarding how the war would end. While some might disregard this book as 'revisionist', disregarding any new research and evidence that might question accepted narratives, anybody who is truly intersted in reading top-notch scholarship on one of the most important events in modern history should not let this book pass by. Prof. Hasegawa is one of the most respected Cold War historians in the world, and this book only cements his scholarly reputation.

Certainly Poland was critical in deteriorating Russian-American relations, but this book shows that the Cold War's origins can also be found in the end of the war with Japan.
I am an advocate of Richard Frank, whose book "Guadalcanal" is one of my very favorites, and whose "Downfall" I enjoyed a bit less. I find it surprising that Hasegawa, who seems to have read Frank closely, missed Frank's point that the Strategic Bombing Survey revealed the vulnerability of Germany's (and hence Japan's) railroad system. The Japanese could have died in a hurry due to atomic bombs, or died slowly due to starvation...while their leaders indifferently ruled.
Two points which Hasegawa doesn't address are: Why would the Japanese ever trust STALIN of all people (to honor the non-agression treaty)???? And, was Hirohito simply afraid for his life (or influenced by Imperial family members who were)?
A great book. Interesting revelations on almost every page!

I think that this book is certainly researched thoroughly and he takes a great deal of time to step by step cover what many books involving this war only touch upon at this stage: the political chess game leading up to the eventual capitulation of the Japanese.
The only downfall that I find is that it appears from time to time in the text that Hasegawa sometimes falls into the trap of having the luxury of the passage of the last 62 years to judge the actions made by the individuals in power rather than judging it from the perspective of the time.
Still, it is a very interesting and thought provoking read.

This is a thorough and scholarly work allowing the reader to view the end of WW II in the Pacific through multiple important lenses, rather than the America-centric one so many of us learned in school. It was informative to see the three or four-sided dance between the US, Soviet Russia, Japan, and [sometimes] China. For this, the book is a very valuable contribution. I also appreciated that there were photographs showing many of the major players whose names and roles I was less familiar with.

That said, the main contention of the book is that Japan would have surrendered earlier had Truman & Byrnes played the 'end game' differently. That, if the Potsdam Proclamation had included a statement allowing the preservation of the Emperor as a constitutional monarch, Japan might have surrendered without the atomic bomb or the Soviet invasion. Hasegawa contends that Truman did not do so because he wanted to use the atomic bomb essentially to impress the Russians and keep their territorial demands in the Pacific down or keep them out of the war entirely.

Given that 3 members of the Big Six committee deciding about surrender in Japan remained opposed to surrender AFTER Soviet entry and the bombs, that the Army Minister committed ritual suicide, and that there was a military revolt that briefly took over the Imperial Palace, I think this argues directly against Hasegawa's main thesis.

Since my father fought in World War II, I have always taken a keen interest in that period of history. I have often wondered what he thought and felt during that time. Like most vets of that era, he hardly ever talked about what had happened. This book, "Racing the Enemy" sheds some new light on that period of history. The battles are easy to document, but what drove people to fight is not always clear. This book shed new light on the intrigue during that very complicated time of almost a hundred years ago.