Reconstructing the Cognitive World: The Next Step (Bradford Books) [Paperback]

Michael Wheeler (Author)

Book Description

Series: Bradford Books | Publication Date: January 26, 2007

In Reconstructing the Cognitive World, Michael Wheeler argues that we should turn away from the generically Cartesian philosophical foundations of much contemporary cognitive science research and proposes instead a Heideggerian approach. Wheeler begins with an interpretation of Descartes. He defines Cartesian psychology as a conceptual framework of explanatory principles and shows how each of these principles is part of the deep assumptions of orthodox cognitive science (both classical and connectionist). Wheeler then turns to Heidegger's radically non-Cartesian account of everyday cognition, which, he argues, can be used to articulate the philosophical foundations of a genuinely non-Cartesian cognitive science. Finding that Heidegger's critique of Cartesian thinking falls short, even when supported by Hubert Dreyfus's influential critique of orthodox artificial intelligence, Wheeler suggests a new Heideggerian approach. He points to recent research in "embodied-embedded" cognitive science and proposes a Heideggerian framework to identify, amplify, and clarify the underlying philosophical foundations of this new work. He focuses much of his investigation on recent work in artificial intelligence-oriented robotics, discussing, among other topics, the nature and status of representational explanation, and whether (and to what extent) cognition is computation rather than a noncomputational phenomenon best described in the language of dynamical systems theory.Wheeler's argument draws on analytic philosophy, continental philosophy, and empirical work to "reconstruct" the philosophical foundations of cognitive science in a time of a fundamental shift away from a generically Cartesian approach. His analysis demonstrates that Heideggerian continental philosophy and naturalistic cognitive science need not be mutually exclusive and shows further that a Heideggerian framework can act as the "conceptual glue" for new work in cognitive science.

Editorial Reviews

Review

"After shedding a harsh new light on the Cartesian flaws at the heart of much of mainstream cognitive science, Wheeler carefully and persuasively builds a case for an alternative Heideggerian approach, grounding his arguments in current empirical work in AI. Superbly written with great clarity and energy (not to mention scholarship), this is a very important book for all serious students of cognitive science and its constituent disciplines from AI to philosophy of mind." Phil Husbands, Professor of Artificial Intelligence, University of Sussex

About the Author

Michael Wheeler is Reader in Philosophy at the University of Stirling. He is the author of Reconstructing the Cognitive World: The Next Step (MIT Press, 2005).

Product Details

• Paperback: 432 pages
• Publisher: A Bradford Book; 1 edition (January 26, 2007)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0262731827
• ISBN-13: 978-0262731829
• Product Dimensions: 9.1 x 5.2 x 0.7 inches
• Shipping Weight: 8.8 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (1 customer review)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #1,516,943 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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Most Helpful Customer Reviews

4 of 4 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars An important book for those interested in theory of mind., February 9, 2009

By 

Stewart Kiritz "bookish" (CA USA) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: Reconstructing the Cognitive World: The Next Step (Bradford Books) (Hardcover)

This book requires some philosophical sophistication but not necessarily technical knowledge of robotics or artificial intelligence. It discusses the relevance of a Heideggerian approach to cognition, making the claim that recent work in what Wheeler calls "embodied and embedded" cognitive science is much more consistent with Heidegger's ontology than it is with the dualistic Descartian perspective that underpins much of thinking in cognitive science. Readers of Dreyfus will recall his earlier critiques: "Why computers can't think," or "Why computers still can't think." These two volumes were preceded by a paper in the 1960's called "Computers and Alchemy," one of the first attacks on the early attempts at artificial intelligence advocates to model human thought and action by means of digital computers employing a representational framework ("Good old-fashioned AI", this has been called). Wheeler discusses Dreyfus and convincingly adds support to the position that human intelligence is better explained with Heideggerian underpinnings than dualistic Descartian principles. There is interesting material concerning recent work in dynamic representational systems and robotics. The treatment of Heidegger is fairly cursory, and interested readers are directed to Dreyfus' books on "Being and Time."