Customer Reviews

Red Storm Over the Balkans: The Failed Soviet Invasion of Romania, Spring 1944 (Modern War Studies)

5 star:		(5)
4 star:		(2)
3 star:		(3)
2 star:		(1)
1 star:		(0)

 

 

... is a very well researched though not as "unknown" battle as the author may indicate - at least not among German speaking people - where particularly the spring 1944 battles at the gates to Romania and in the Targul Frumos area are perhaps better and more widely known.
That the town of Krivoy Rog (Twisted Horn) is located at the River Dniepr instead of the Don River (page 34) may be a minor oversight as well as that Soviet 6th Tank Army's 5th Mechanised Corps was given in most of the maps "Guards" status which they were not. This corps was furthermore under the command of general-mayor M. V. Volkov since November 1942, and not commanded at any time by general Alekseev which was the C-in-C of 5th Guards Tank Corps (page 338). Furthermore, Mk. V tanks were erroneously described as Tiger tanks when they were in fact Panthers (page 212).
Nevertheless, Colonel Glantz - perhaps the one single most important historian of the 1941-45 Russo-German conflict -has once again provided an excellent work that well deserves reading and represents a detailed and important bridge between the Soviet winter 1943/44 Korsun- Shevchenkovskiy and the (second) Yassy-Kishinyov Offensive Operations. Highly recommended!

Being an avid student of the Russo-German war and having a few hundred books on the subject, ranging from detailed German unit histories to books with a wide scope like those by Earl Ziemke, I eagerly anticipated the arrival of this book as it promised to fill a gap in my knowledge of the Eastern Front. I was also worried, because I have all the books by Glantz and they can be divided into three categories: boring and unreadable (whenever he focuses on Russian sources; example: The Battle for Lvov), extremely interesting and well written (because they offer new information and new insights; example: Zhukov's greatest defeat) and books that offer a bit of both (example: When Titans Clashed). This latest book, I am afraid, falls into the last category. After reading it my first impulse was to rip out the first 150 pages. Being a book lover I did not do this of course, but still... In this first third of the book Glantz describes, no sorry, lists, units, commanders (boring the reader to tears) and actually describes what is on the maps!! Any editor worth his salt should have told Glantz to stop babbling and refer the material to an appendix or (in case of the battle dispositions) refer to the maps.
On the plus side: mainly thanks to German sources, the book does offer new information about the Red Army's failed spring campaign, which in the end is why I am still glad that I bought the book. If, like me, you want to know more about the fighting around Targul Frumos or the Dnjestr bridgeheads, I am afraid you will have to buy this book. Hence three stars (just sufficient).
However, I really hope that for Glantz' next few books somebody with common sense will sift through the material and make Glantz realise that, ultimately, a book should not only contain lots of information but first and foremost be READABLE! As a writer about the war myself as well as a voracious reader I think I know what I am talking about. Glantz can give me a call any day of the week for some free advice.

Jack Didden

OK, up front we all admit that David Glantz knows more about WWII on the Eastern Front than any other person alive. That said, this is operational military history at its worst. An endless barrage of corps & division numbers, grouping letters, directions of attacks & campaigns, etc., etc. The whole thing reads like an over-long after action report prepared by a junior officer who never took a liking to writing coherent narrative essays. There is no political context discussed in this book, nor is there discussion about weapons, weaponery, personalities, etc. Sure, its authoritative, but does that mean it has to be such a drudge to get through? I put this book down half-way through and read 4-5 other books before I worked up the patience to tackle this to its finish.

Glantz was not well-served by his editors here; they chose the provocative title and Glantz throughout maintains this as some sort of 'lost' campaign that 'he found'. As the prior reviewer from Vienna stated, it's not so 'lost'. Targul-Frumos has been the subject of lectures and papers at US military academies and in technical journals from both sides since the late 1940's. So Glantz does overstate that point.
What Glantz does achieve is a unique synthesis of the diverse sources and he analyzes them skillfully. He puts it all together and gives it context that no other Eastern Front historian had yet done, just as he did with 'Operation Mars'. Unfortunately, the reviewer from Vienna is right about the small number of mistakes and, indeed, there are a few more than he cited. Editors let Glantz down there as well. They exist to pick up those little typos or tiny mis-statements. Like Glantz's other books, it reads a little dry, but I overlook that and give him five stars for the skill and value of his presentation and analysis. Not perfect but VERY needed.

David Glantz has written another great book about one of the forgotten battles on the Eastern Front. According to Glantz the Russians failed to take Romania in the spring of 1944 because the forces were overextended, failed to combine arms, and Konev and Malinovsky's fronts did not cooperate with each other. The Germans succeeded because they were able to concentrate their forces and attack at the right time and place. Glantz concludes his book by stating that the Soviet operations in the Balkans disprove the notion that Stalin and his generals attacked on a single front at at time since the Balkans operations only occurred weeks before the Soviet summer offensive in 1944. The only weakness of Glantz's book is that he fails to mention how muddy and damaged airways may have prevented the Red Air Force from supplying close air supprt and preventing German counterattacks. Otherwise this is an excellent book that specialists, who study the Eastern Front, would enjoy.

Glantz's books differ quite significantly in quality. Of the eight I have read, this was the worst. The writing is relatively poor, and features a lot of repetition, with little flow or tension. It feels rushed. The book is crying out for a good editor to really clean it up. The history, of course, is excellent as always. But I would recommend his operational studies of Mars and Kursk before this one. They are both excellent.

This guy is simply the best military writer i've ever read.
At my age, i need a magnifying glass for the maps. That's my one objection, but i assume younger people will have no problem. This is another Glantz special: an utterly fantastic detailed miltary description of the initial Soviet attempt to invade Romania. These books must be a godsend for the companies that make wargames. After reading Glantz books, i feel like becoming a wargame designer myself! If you're into the movements of armies, corps, divisions, this book is heaven. The maps are great (though i wish they were bigger!)
If you want to read about the "personal" or "human interest" side of war, don't buy this book, there's nothing in it for you. It's also not for the casual military reader, it's very detailed.
I only wish some of Glantz' other publications werent so darned expensive; i'd own them all.
He's simply the best military writer i've ever read.

Definetely this is not one of the best book of Glantz. There are several reasons for this failure.
At first glance the title is somehow deceiving ("Red storm over Balkans"), but we recovered when reading the subtitle ("the failed soviet invasion of Romania"). Since The Balkans countries are those teritories south of Danube, the correct title, according to the content, should be the subtitle.
Despite the claim of being a "forgotten battle", the truth is far from that, the battles discussed were well known, for example, in Romania.
After a short introduction the author focused in the next chapters on different battles and encounters between Soviet and German&Romanian forces in Romania during april-may-june 1944 (including the then provence of Moldova).
Speaking about romanian forces, apart from quoting Axworthy's book, the readers will not find any other romanian books to serve as documentation. Too bad for Glantz who is well known for his scrupulous research and from different sources.
The russian offensives and german/romanian defence operations are well described, but we deal a lot with a huge details about units/subunits or long tables.
As usual we can find a lot of photos with soviet troops/commanders, probably this is price for researching freely the russian archives.
Concerning the maps they are satisfactory and help orient the reader about different locations depicted in the book.
If you jump to the conclusions - which are good - you can save some time. Otherwise your patience is tested, the text being at the upper part of not being readable.

Just another well written piece by Daniel Glantz. Detailed, informative and augmented with maps and photos. This little known operation gets the attention it finally deserves.

In the first two chapters, an overview of the Winter 44 campaign in southern Ukraine as well as the battle action in the northeast corner of Romania, which will last until the first week of June, is given to prepare the reader for the upcoming detailed accounting. The key Front commanders of the Russian side is Konev and Malinovsky while on the German side will be Woehler, Manteuffel and Knobelsdroff. There are many others mentioned from both sides but these are the key officers. A decent bio is given for each person as well as having a photo. This accounting is Russian-centric and there is more information given about the their commanders and their forces as compared to the Axis side. Though there are repeated attacks covered, there is basically only two general areas of fighting: Along the southern Dnestr River and in the Tirgu-Trumos area.

Battle action starts in early April and will run until early June with Konev's 2nd UF repeatedly attacking along the Tirgu-Frumos axis that will include battles at Podu-Iloaie, Iasi, Tirgu-Neamt, Pascani and of course Tirgu-Frumos sectors. Also in April, Malinovsky's 3rd UF, after liberating Odessa, will attack the German defenses along the Dnestr River between Tiraspol and Grigoriopol. It will also cover the battles for Orgeev and Dubossary. At the start of the campaign both Front commanders are confident of success but the determination and knowledge of mobile warfare by the Germans will frustrate and deny the Russians their victory. The main German forces were 6th and 8th Armies.

The detailed operational coverage is excellent, comparable to the author's Leningrad or Kursk books but not as good as his two new Stalingrad books. As usual the author will describe the basic plan, give the step by step action of the battle or campaign and then analyze the results. For anybody who has read and liked Glantz will like this book for its format and style is exactly like his other books. Interspersed with the author's dialog are many fragments of after action reports which helps the reader get a feel of what the commanders were experiencing. High praise is given to Grossdeutschland Division and 24th PzD which consistently throughout the entire period stopped the Russians at every encounter. After the first week of June, Konev calls off his failed offensive for Operation Bagration is about to start and his Front will no longer have priority but he will regroup and start his offensive again in August. While in this early phase, Mr Glantz does a good job of showing the Germans defending the line against a far superior force by using fanatical resistance and expert use of reserve forces. It will be a matter of time that the Russians will wear down the Germans.
In Conclusions Mr Glantz states that the two Russian Fronts had the potential to defeat the inferior German forces but due to their overconfidence and lack of coordination between the two Fronts victory alluded them.

There are ten tables and 32 maps. Most of the maps appear to be authentic war maps; some were quite busy and a magnifying glass will help. The maps are essential for better understanding of the battle narrative. (Rolf Hinze's new book, "Crucible of Combat" is due to be published and part of his book covers these two campaigns. I'm anxious to see if his maps and battle coverage will add to the coverage of this book.) There is a useful Appendix with Russian directives. There is also a series of Orders of Battle and photographs of most of the key players. A 16 page Notes section, a 5 page Bibliography and a Index completes the book.

For 1944, these campaigns were extremely important for German forces for it stopped two Fronts from advancing, gave them a little breathing room and gave them a shot of pride when it was most needed. In addition to providing great details of the operations, the profiles of the many Soviet commanders is also interesting and informative, giving credit to many lesser known officers. Though there are couple minor miscues, Mr Glantz takes these campaigns seriously and does a fine job of reinacting ithem. If you have an interest in this relatively little covered Russian offensive or an interest in the operational ground phase of battle then you should consider this book. Its highly recommended.