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Redcoats and Rebels: The American Revolution Through British Eyes

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Christopher Hibbert's "Redcoats and Rebels" is a book that would probably not have been published a quarter-century ago: it takes the most sacred of all political events, the American Revolution, and shows it through the eyes of the losing side. By the time this wonderfully readable history is finished, you are not impressed by the British side: they made one dumb mistake after another. But at least now a reader can be aware of precisely why the Americans won, and why George Washington is still to be admired. He lost battle after battle after battle after battle: and yet he won the war. He kept the army together, against all odds, and with the invaluable aid of the French, put together a coup de grace that ended the British political dominion over the newly born United States. This is a book for all lovers of political and military history, and in that, a very old-fashioned book. But anybody wanting to understand the American Revolution, the single most important armed struggle in our history (and I include the Civil War), has to take into account Hibbert's book.

Redcoats and Rebels is a succinct history of the American Revolution as told primarily from the British perspective. Like the United States, Great Britain has lost only one major war in the last three centuries, and such a singular defeat begs for close examination. Christopher Hibbert, a renowned professional historian, provides the British perspective on the war with his typical pithy style and insights. While there is nothing radically new in this book, Hibbert succeeds in providing a narrative with great insight into the decision-making processes and senior leadership on both sides. Redcoats and Rebels is suitable for either general audiences or specialists who desire background on the British high-level conduct of the war. However, American readers may notice certain sensitivities that have not faded with time and Hibbert fails to ask the hard questions about why Britain lost its American colonies.

Redcoats and Rebels consists of 25 short chapters, each covering a specific phase or episode in the war. In addition to illustrations, some simple but decent maps and a detailed bibliography, Hibbert provides an interesting appendix on the post-war careers of the major participants. Overall, the narrative is well written and flows smoothly. These pages are obviously written by a professional historian.

Ultimately, Hibbert points to three reasons for the British defeat: poor leadership, the difficulty of the terrain and the tenacity of the American rebels. Hibbert is particularly scathing throughout the book in his criticism of the senior British commanders who fought the war: Howe, Clinton, Burgoyne and Cornwallis, as well as the senior political leadership in London. Although the British won battle after battle, their leaders seemed to lack the killer instinct to finish off the Americans when they had the upper hand. The fact that Howe could sit in Philadelphia and not attack Washington's tattered army only 20 miles away at Valley Forge in the winter of 1777-1778 seems almost miraculous. One British officer at the time lamented that, "our generals and admirals don't seem to be in earnest about this business." Although Hibbert only touches on the subject of British motivation, it seems evident that most of the senior British leaders had serious doubts about the war and that a certain fatalism crept into decision-making. Hibbert's criticisms of British generals, who often seem more concerned with lavish dinners and mistresses, is not always fair since Howe and Burgoyne both demonstrated tactical competence. The second factor that determined defeat, according to Hibbert, was the rugged and expansive nature of the American terrain, which always provided the rebels with places to escape British offensives. There is no doubt that the British army in America was too small for the task; Hibbert notes that the British estimated that they needed 50-75,000 troops to subdue the rebels but never had more than 35,000 troops available at any one time. As the Americans found in Vietnam, the British could control any terrain they occupied but their forces were just too small to fight war on such a continental scale. Previous campaigns against rebels in Ireland, Scotland and England had not had to contend with such major terrain obstacles or distances. Finally, Hibbert credits the tenacity of the Americans - particularly Washington and Greene - with protracting the war until British resolve dwindled.

One major area that Hibbert only skims around is the issue of strategic objectives in America. Did Britain really have a chance to achieve a military victory and if so, what strategy offered the best chances? Hibbert does hint at the British strategic dilemma when he notes Cornwallis' efforts to raise loyalist troops in the south. With limited troops, Cornwallis could either protect the loyalist areas in a defensive strategy or pursue the rebel army in an offensive strategy. Without sufficient loyalist troops, the British effort in America was probably doomed, but a strategic defense that protected loyalist areas would inevitably yield the initiative to the revels. British commanders were split on the horns of this dilemma; Howe and Clinton were more or less content to hold the loyalist base in New York, whereas the more aggressive Burgoyne and Cornwallis made (fatal) efforts to catch and destroy the rebel armies. Hibbert's narrative also exposes the essentially one-dimensional approach of British strategy in containing the rebellion; the British relied too heavily on their own professional military and under-utilized the enormous political and economic tools at their disposal. Indeed, the main factor inhibiting the rebel war effort was always lack of hard cash yet the British made only modest efforts to go after this weakness. Politically, the British might have made more concessions earlier to encourage loyalist sympathies, but their envoys were never serious about compromise.

Finally, the question of war mobilization is also addressed in part by Hibbert. Fundamentally, Britain never committed the army and navy resources to achieve a decisive military victory in America, but that does not mean that these resources were lacking. Hibbert notes an interesting point about the King's dilemma in raising new army formations: enlisted manpower was cheap and readily available but the officers could draw half pay for ten years after their units were demobilized. Instead, the King relied on hiring large numbers of Hessian mercenaries in order to avoid the overhead costs associated with the enlargement of the British Army. Although the British only had to fight the Americans for the first three years of the war, large army and navy forces were retained in Great Britain in order to deter French and Spanish intervention, but this deterrent effort was a failure. Essentially, Britain opted initially to fight the war on the cheap but was forced into a gradual military escalation that kept the war going but could not win it.

History that reads like an adventure novel. Great stuff. Being a Canadian living in the US, and looking forward to citizenship here, I found this book to be a fascinating perspective on the Revolution. Unlike some reviewers, I did NOT come away with a pro British feeling. In fact I was rooting for the rebels, and very much feeling that, if I had lived in that era, I would have been right there with them. So, it seems would some free thinkers in Britain at the time. The personal details about the participants makes the story come alive. Stimulated by this, I will read more about this period from other points of view, as one must do with all history. But, as a way to get into the picture, I think this is hard to beat. I guess my only complaint would be that the supporting maps could have been better laid out, with more details showing where, geographically, things were happening.

This reviewer made an erroneous initial assumption about "Redcoats and Rebels": He thought that since RR was authored by a Brit that the final product would be a snide, avuncular, anti-American treatment of the Revolutionary War. Wrong! Nothing could be further from the truth. Author Hibbert is far tougher on his fellow countrymen than on the American colonists. With the author's able retrospect, one could almost state that the British effort was doomed from the start. Among the factors burdening the British Army were the following: >Uncertain military leadership made worse by some truly surprising infighting. >Difficulty raising a sufficient number of troops to fight a foreign war in a large, distant colony > Very poor communication among the commanders (John Burgoyne, William Howe, Henry Clinton) once they encamped in America > The mistaken impression that many American Loyalists would rally under the Union Jack. Relatively few did. > What this reviewer would term concentration on the "good life". General Burgoyne took 30 carts (!) of personal goods on his fateful trek to Saratoga. And during the fateful Winter of 1777-1778, General Howe remained closeted in the comforts of Philadelphia-with his mistress! Not 30 miles away, Washington's men were enduring the cruel season at Valley Forge. Why didn't Howe attack? > The Brits allowed themselves to be trapped in a war of attrition in which they won most battles but were sucked dry. >Lukewarm support for and even opposition to the war effort in Parliament. Author Hibbert lays bare all of these factors squarely for the reader to absorb. The author has little use for the squabbling, halting British leadership; only Charles Cornwallis receives his due. Yet Cornwallis was hung out to dry by his boss, General Clinton, to be trapped on that peninsula on the York River: "Cornwallis surrenders at Yorktown". A review of R&R would not be complete without due mention to the MAPS! Most military works treat such as historical stepchildren; here they are quite useful, placed strategically throughout the text. Also, poignant quotes head each chapter. The most remarkable is from American General Nathanael Green: "We fight, get beat, rise and fight again". If the author truly believes, as he seems to, that England lost the War as much as the Americans won it, that is fair enough for this reviewer. R&R is highly rated historical reading for anyone seeking a fresh view on the Revolutionary War.

Redcoats and Rebels by Christopher Hibbert is an outstanding book on the American Revolution. The book is written through the British point of view. One interesting thing about he the book is that Hibbert is not all that glowing in his description of the British generals. Although he is British, Hibbert often speaks of how the men wished they had a leader that would get things done as Washington did. He describes the battles in a clear and interesting way. One part I liked was when he relates the shock that the British had in April of 1775. He tells of how the men were met with fire from the Patriots for the first time."We were fired at from all sides, but mostly from the rear," states one officer. One thing that is often brought up is that all the Patriots were for the longest time was a mob of farmers, and peasants. In a since this is true, yet they were just as skilled in war fair as the British, if not more. The American Revolution has always had a great appeal to me. This book is great for any one who is interested in American history, or one who just enjoys a well written book.

This book is an excellent read for anyone interested in a different viewpoint of the war. While other related material describes the British actions in a few sentences, this book offers more detailed explanations.

The book reinforces the drastic mistakes that the British made during the war, providing the reader with a more thorough understanding of the reasons for them. One thing the book made me realize was that even with these mistakes, there is little question that America was destined for independence. As the war progressed, the British realized that there were not as many Loyalists as initially thought and the rebellious spirit was very much alive.

I do agree with the other reviewer who criticized the maps. It would have been helpful to see a little more detail. Also, the introductory biographies for the British characters could have been shortened.

I liked this book so much I bought it three times over the past few years - one for myself, one for a friend, and a third to replace the first one after it was lost.

The book is written from the perspective of a British historian, but it is remarkably balanced - much more so than most American books on the subject. In fact, the primary advantage of the book is that it doesn't fall into the trap of diefying George Washington and the founding fathers, thereby allowing a balanced approach to many issues. It gives considerable time to both the northern campaign in the Hudson Valley(ending in Saratoga and the southern campaign (starting in Charleston and ending in Yorktown), not just focusing on Washington's army and the "Valley Forge" experience.

The book shows the parallels between the British experience in American and the American's experience in Vietnam. Like the Americans in Vietnam, the British received most of their intellegence and perspective from the appointed governors or the loyalists who lived in the cities. They persuaded the British government that most Americans were loyal to Britain, but they needed the British Army's protection from the few rebels who terrorized the remainder. "Protect us from the rebels," they argued, "and most Americans would be free to show their support for the Crown". As Cornwallis found in his expeditions from Charleston, once the British departed from the loyalist enclaves in the occupied cities they found the population to be very hostile. The various reasons for that hostility shows that the British war for the "hearts and minds" of Americans was lost before the first shots had been fired at Lexington and Concord, and had little to do with taxes.

(1) The British had expected frontiersmen to be grateful for the protection the British army provided from Indian attacks. The opposite was true. British efforts to encourage Indians to attack rebellious settlers backfired on them. The governor of Virginia's proclamation to that effect delivered that conservative colony firmly into the rebel hands, and sent him fleeing to the safety of a British warship.

(2) The further inland the British ventured from the coast, the more the British ran into Scottish and Irish immigrants (or their close descendants) who had either been kicked out of their homeland or fled due to their anti-British loyalties. Many of these settlers hated the British and were more than happy to support independence.

(3) Finally, economics played a part. Many left Britain to escape its oppresive class system and poverty of the lower classes. They endured bondage as endentured servants to pay for passage, and then hardship as they cleared the forests to build farms, houses, and barns, and defend them against attacks by Indians and outlaws. Yet huge areas of America were subject to the Crown's land grants to British nobility, who argued that the settlers should be paying rent for living on the land. Those settlers were hardly willing to support a regime which believed they should be paying rent to some rich absentee landlord in England for land made profitable by the sweat of their own brow.

(4) The arrogant and condescending manner of British governors, officers, and enlisted ranks directed toward the Colonists made them many more enemies in America than official British policies ever did.

If there were any one book I would recommend with respect to the American Revolution, this is it.

Christopher Hibbert has written an engaging narrative that tells the story of the Revolutionary War from the British perspective. At first this may seem like a useful addition to the historical literature, however there is less to this book than meets the eye.

The problems with Mr. Hibbert's book were described by John Shy, Professor of History Emeritus at the University of Michigan, in a review published in the New York Times in 1990. Professor Shy points out that Mr. Hibbert makes factual errors that he should have been able to avoid given the sources cited in the book's bibliography. More fundamentally, there is a problem with the way in which Mr. Hibbert writes military history. The best practitioners of military history write with reference to the broader political and social questions war raises. This approach is particularly crucial in approaching the Revolutionary War, which was as political a conflict as a war can get. This is not the approach of "Redcoats and Rebels". What Mr. Hibbert has given us instead is another account of the battles and personalities of the Revolutionary War with little attention paid to broader issues of politics, society, or diplomacy that shaped the British side of the war. To correct these flaws Mr. Hibbert would have had to give serious attention to British wartime politics and the political dimensions of British strategy in America. His failure to do so makes this a fundamentally flawed book that is of questionable value even for the general reader. This book does not provide a deep understanding of the war.

Readers interested in the Revolutionary War should turn to works of David Hackett Fischer, (Paul Revere's Ride and Washington's Crossing), Charles Royster, or Don Higgenbotham.

Christopher Hibbert, in his book Redcoats & Rebels, has given us a perspective not generally seen in American history - the American Revolution through British eyes, and what a picture it is!

I found this book to be engrossing and written in a style unlike some history books - it reads more like a novel than a "textbook". The book is written from the British perspective, but I did not find it to display any preference for the British or the Americans. Instead, I found the book to be simply an accounting of the events during the revolutionary period.

Hibbert's research is outstanding, and his writing style is, in my opinion, fantastic. I'm looking forward to reading other books by this same author.

I highly recommend this book to anyone who wants to learn about the American Revolution or anyone who wants to see a perspective not usually seen here in America about the war.

Military libraries strong in early American military history will love this survey, based on a range of sources that provide character sketches and eyewitness accounts of the War of American Independence. Each of the major battles and fights is considered with an overall focus on the war and it's larger political and economic impacts on both sides, making this a fine blend of specialty in-depth examination and wider-ranging analysis. Any library strong in early American military history needs this.

Diane C. Donovan
California Bookwatch