Customer Reviews

The Rediscovery of the Mind (Representation and Mind)

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Excellently written and argued, the author proceeds at a calm and steady pace, laying out the many flaws in past and current approaches to the 'mind'.
More importantly, equally well layed out is the contruction of his own view of what he calls "biological naturalism". This view is neither a flavor of behaviorilism nor any other kind of reductionist attempt to deny consciousness. Indeed, consciousness retains it's unique position in his model without the kind of apologetic argument or mysticism (of the kind that usually occurs as a result of unwittingly thinking in the Cartesian dilemma mindset).

Most shocking to me was the way in which Searle argued that the mind is not and cannot be an information processing system. As counterintuitive and remarkable as that may sound, it is quite apparently true after reading his arguments. He is not saying that we do not *think*, but rather that equating *thinking* and *information processing* is in error, primarily because the interpretation of symbols, syntax and semantics requires an outside intelligence to make the interpretation, so to say that we are information processing machines makes no sense for it is exactly our own intelligence that we are trying to explain. The devastating impact for AI and cognitive science from this viewpoint is also duly noted in a rather understated way.

Likewise, the 'unconscious' loses it's imagined place as part of the mind, replaced with an equally (or perhaps moreso)complex 'Background' of non-conscious and potentially-conscious components. Also, so many activities of the brain that have been deemed as "mental" turn out to have no basis for such an ascription: it turns out they are anthropomorphisms placed on neurobiological processes that neither have intentionality nor mentality. As a result (my opinion), much of psychology and probably many theories of neurobiology are as wayward as their AI counterparts.

In the end, the 'mind' that one is left with remains utterly rich and complex, with consciousness and all subjective experience intact and valid. However, now bereft of the possibility of computational models and rules and such to understand the brain in an abstracted programmatic way, and bereft of anthropomorphisms of lower-level brain functioning, we find that the brain is an organ - an organ of great ability and complexity that will require an immense effort to understand and appreciate.

Searle approaches philosophy with unusual clarity and thoughtfulness. This book is a convincingly argued account for a philosophy of the mind that is both naturalist and respectful of subjective phenomenal experiences.

The importance of this book's themes is only overshadowed by the extraordinarily lucid style with which Searle approaches his subject matter. By taking actual human experience as his starting point, Searle's argument gains force as well as meaning to less philosphically inclined readers. Searle has a knack for making complex issues in recent philosophy accessible to the less experienced reader while not losing any persuasiveness in conveying his argument.

This book is a wonderful introduction to the philosophy of consciousness for anyone who has not done extensive work in the field and also a complex and intriguing argument that needs to be considered by the most serious philosophers.

In this book, Searle briefly reviews the history of the mind-body problem and presents his solution to it. The text is less filled with archaic or strictly philosophical phrases than most books in this field, giving it a comprehensibility that is too often lacking in the mind-body problem. Searle is a brilliant rhetorician, and every one of his arguments is worded in a convincing way. Also, the critique that he presents of the previous work on the mind-body problem is revealing, since he gives what he calls "common-sense objections" to each solution. Overall, an outstanding book.

Searle presents a good overview of the field of consciousness theories that is worth the price of this book. I rather enjoy his tone (it would be fun to see Searle, Chalmers and the Churchland's debate their views) and many of his views, particularly as presented here, seem coherent.

I believe that his view of the non-existence of the unconscious seems to be incorrect based on the experimental work of Libet and Gazzanadi in particular. He doesn't look at any concrete examples in this area to attempt to explain how many mechanisms that are clearly not accessible to consciousness seem to be communicated to conscious actions.

What a wonderful book! I had tried to access philosophy of mind through David Chalmers and Roger Penrose to no avail. Talk about arcane and inane philosophy! Then, I decided I might try something "lighter." What a difference Searle's dense, but clear, ideas make! This book is a great place to begin (or end) one's enquiring into the philosophy of mind, and a treasure trove of so much that is intuitive. So much in the field of conscious is counterintuitive that it is refreshing to read someone who subscribes to one's intuitive beliefs.

First, like most philosophically-minded individuals, I like to think philosophy of the mind is not so arcane and inaccessible that we ordinary individuals can't get it, e.g., Penrose, Chalmers, et al. At least Searle treats the reader like educated adults without unnecessary obfuscation. Don't misunderstand me: This is dense reading, and hardly a sentence passes without something important being claimed. But, rather than being unintelligible, it is wholly intelligible. For example, Chalmers tries to explain supervenience over 40 pages, Searle explains in one paragraph. Not simple, but clear and unadulterated exposition.

Second, some other readers must have omitted the Preface and First Chapter. This book is intentionally polemical; Searle makes it clear from the outset. He adamantly opposes some of the philosophical and psychological paradigms currently in cognitive science, and he addresses those problems in the first few chapters (and throughout the book). He opposes dualism and materialism of all sorts and admits that he is a "naive naturalist," whatever that is. His arguments are often contentious, as he admits up front. But as tendentious as he is -- there's a lot riding on the premises and conclusions of others, so in the end he has to highly contentious. Fortunately, he's also persuasive.

Third, as a "naive materialist," Searle argues that the simultaneous firing of neurons and existent mental states (hence the phenomenon "consciousness" is irreducible to anything further) are causally interchangeable, because they are the same phenomenon. Ergo, consciousness is not epiphenomenally, nor occurrently, nor simultaneously, but epistemically, empirically, and ontologically foundational (each a different property of the same phenomenon). This is an important, and liberating, concept, forcefully argued throughout the book. What's inimical about all the other concepts Searle fights is their use of the homunuclus fallacy and their anthropomorphizing of physical processes.

Fourth, he make the claim for a number of other intuitive, contra counterintuitive, claims. For example, the "unconscious" just does not make any sense. It almost seems like a contradiction, and according to Searle it is. As Gertrude Stein once said, "There's no there, there." Again, I've always thought this to be linguistically intuitive, now he makes a broad-based argument against its existence even morphologically (and several more things like "universal grammar" "binary intelligence," etc.).

Finally, I believe this book is necessary reading by all interested in consciousness and the mind. Even if one doesn't agree with his arguments and their conclusions, it's highly important to know and understand them. And because Searle is so accessible, he's a refreshing, indeed cogent, alternative to some of the myopic, convoluted, and constipated thinking going on in the field.

It is probably worth the price of admission just to read Searle make the (one would think) obvious point that we really are conscious, and that the attempts by materialists of one type or another to define away the irksome problem of subjective experience ("qualia") are absurd. Indeed, much of what Searle lays down in the way of premises is quite promising, in that you might think, after reading the introduction, that you are going to be treated to a really fresh and exciting attempt at solving the mind-body problem.

Unfortunately, the book pretty much goes off the rails as soon as Chapter 2 starts, and one quickly begins to wonder whether there were any rails there to begin with. Searle starts chapter 2 with the classic "silicon brain" thought experiment, in which doctors replace your neurons, one by one, with silicon chips that perform, by premise, the exact same functions. Searle now enumerates the possible outcomes of this experiment. 1) Nothing happens. 2) Your behavior remains the same, but your "awareness" slowly shrinks, that is, you gradually turn into a metaphysical zombie. 3) You remain fully conscious, but gradually lose control of your body, until you are trapped, fully conscious, in a paralyzed body.

So what's wrong? Everything! Case 1 (nothing happens), is clearly the most plausible outcome of the experiment, yet it represents one position Searle wishes to destroy in this book. This bodes poorly for him. The outcome in case 2 is incoherent upon a little reflection. How can one be consciously aware of the loss of conscious awareness? Searle illustrates this outcome as follows (page 66): 'You find, for example, that when the doctors test your vision, you hear them say, "We are holding up a red object in front of you; please tell us what you see." You want to cry out, "I can't see anything. I'm going totally blind." But you hear your voice saying in a way that is completely out your control, "I see a red object in front of me."' Somehow, Searle has envisioned a scenario in which you lose the ability to experience visual qualia, but you apparently are still able to enjoy the subjective experience of your own inner monologue. How can this be? Further, Searle has described a subjective experience (that of going blind) that might supposedly accompany the loss of the ability to have subjective experiences. Where before you saw and experienced redness, now you presumably see and experience blackness or nothingness. This is dualism plain and simple; Searle has place the patient firmly in the cartesian theatre, his earlier denunciation of dualism notwithstanding.

So far, these are all forgivable faults. But now we come to case 3 (you retain your subjective experience but become physically paralyzed), where Searle takes seriously an outcome that is plainly in direct contradiction of his stated premises! Searle clearly states that the neuron replacement procedure preserves the physical behavior of each neuron completely - how then is there any room left for the physical behavior of the person as a whole to change?

From there Searle goes on to another thought experiment, wherein he talks about the task of redesigning a conscious robot that happens to be miserable with one that exhibits precisely the same behavior, but without the pesky consciousness that causes it to be unhappy. He seems to be trying to establish the clear possibility of metaphysical zombies, but he doesn't stop to inquire how the designer of the unconscious robot would know that his efforts had succeeded if, after all, both models of the robot must exhibit precisely the same behavior.

This failure to take seriously the implications of imagining conscious and unconscious individuals who behave identically is a common thread throughout the book. It would be disappointing in a undergraduate paper on the topic, but it is nearly inexplicable in a book by a man of Searle's stature. What was he thinking? Was he thinking?

The rest of the book is a shambles as well. Searle's thesis is apparently the statement "brains cause consciousness". However, this is never really supported except insofar as it is repeatedly asserted. Nor is it ever explained what view this uncontroversial statement is in opposition to. Does anyone claim that brains don't cause consciousness? He repeatedly turns to analogies to other biological processes such as digestion to drive home his contention that consciousness is an ordinary biological phenomenon, without addressing the obvious objection that while there are universally accepted tests by which 3rd persons can agree on whether digestion is taking place, no such test exists for the phenomenon of consciousness. Clearly there is something very different about consciousness (after all, no one studies the philosophy of digestion), but Searle insults his readers' intelligence by blithely pretending that there isn't. The dusty old Chinese Room argument is trotted out a few times - this is perhaps the greatest example of Searle's failure to really consider the implications of his thought experiments deeply. He doesn't, for instance, ask what his Chinese Room would have to look like if it were capable of taking, as input, a chinese language version of "The Rediscovery of the Mind" and returning, as output, any of the reviews on this page.

Harrumph! Harrumph I say! For a far better book I recommend "Consciousness Explained", by Daniel Dannett. Despite the book's failure to deliver what its title promises, it is far more rewarding than Searle's work.

Searle advocates Biological naturalism" as a valid theory, exposing the misdirectedness of the ever present mind-body problem as being entwined in the western philosophical tradition. Even though Cartesian Dualism has long been predominantly set aside, Searle argues, many of its concepts and vocabulary cloud current theorizing on the subject. Searle argues strongly for recognizing the Subjectivity of consciousness as a 1st-person ontology in itself, unexplainable by an objective epistemology, since its very nature is opposed to that method of investigation. By recognizing this Subjectivity as a property of the brain, and allowing that the mental and physical of the mind-body opposition need not be exclusive, Searle describes consciousness as a property of assemblies of neurons, in the sense that liquidity is a property of H2O moleculse. Unimaginable at the molecular level, but undeniable through a wider point point of view.
The clarity of Searles writing alone makes it worth the read, and his ideas address, if not solve, many of the most interesting topics in the philosophy of mind. Highly recommended to anyone interested in that field.

Elimativist materialism (the view that consciousness can be reduced to brain states) is untenable because we all know that consciousness is quite real. Property dualism is also untenable because it treats the brain and consciousness as seperate things. So, what is a poor philosophic bloke to do?

John Searle, making arguments similar to Colin McGinn and Thomas Nagel, argues for a "biological naturalism" that sees consciousness as part of the brain - but a part of the brain that is quite baffling because of several irreducible properties. Consciousness studies and the philosophy of mind have been quite unsuccessful, Searle says, because in their view that real things must be objective (in a third-person sense), these fields are quite at a loss for what to do about the irreducibly first-person thing called consciousness. So, even though we all know that consciousness is very real (otherwise, what is doing the knowing?) our third-person model of objective science has a lot of trouble dealing with the idea of consciousness.

The best chapters of this book, to me, are the early ones. Particularly, I enjoyed Searle's astute diagnosis of the problems the study of consciousness has encountered, and how it seems to make the same mistakes over and over again. Particularly useful to me and my purposes was the appendix to the second chapter: Is There a Problem About Folk Psychology? It is a mock dialogue between Searle and a believer in the idea that all "mind talk" would be better replaced by "brain talk." Searle uses straight talk and wit to show this position to be absolutely ludicrous.

The later chapters tend to focus on Searle's objections to seeing consciousness as a computer, arguing basically that the mind must be more than this becuase to compute, one must need to recognize the valid inputs and know how to use them. (Speech is more than sybols. It requires an individual to decide what syntax, semantics, etc, to use. That is more than a regular computer can do.)

This view has become, I think, less controversial than when Searle advanced it. Jerry Fodor has espoused similar objections in his The Mind Doesn't Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology and recently, Jonathan Hawkins has argued for a very different view of intelligence (as predictor rather than computer) in his On Intelligence.

Throughout, Searle's arguments are sharp, his writing is crisp, and he is quite creative in his use of (sometimes humorous) thought experiments. This is an excellent place to start when getting into Searle's view on the philosophy of mind. Also, though, I would still recommend Colin McGinn's very similar case in The Mysterious Flame: Conscious Minds In A Material World.

This book gives a good picture of the structure of the mind and of its irreducibility.
It explains clearly what's the stumbling block of all scientific and philosophical problems with consciousness: the fact that the mind is only a subjective first-person experience.

But the most interesting part, for me, was his convincing attack against cognitivismn (the theory that the brain is a computer and the mind a computer program).

Nevertheless, I found his book 'The Mystery of Consciousness' more interesting, more profound and more specific, because it laid bare the accuracies / errors of other author's who wrote about the same important items.

I've found this book excellent as a start point for rethinking the way to study the brain and the mind. Searle states very clear the different aspects of his sketicism against the currently installed ideas and opens the path to a much more interesting way of thinking about the our brains and our mind.
I recommend reading this book in order to start studying the amazing and interesting world of the mind and it also allowed me to research other books related to areas covered by Searle and shed more light in a yet young science and philosophy of the brain and mind.