Reenchantment Without Supernaturalism: A Process Philosophy of Religion (Cornell Studies in the Philosophy of Religion) [Paperback]

David Ray Griffin (Author)

Product Details

• Paperback: 426 pages
• Publisher: Cornell Univ Pr (November 1, 2001)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0801486572
• ISBN-13: 978-0801486579
• Product Dimensions: 8.9 x 6 x 1 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.2 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.5 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (4 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #565,536 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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61 of 65 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars science encounters religion, January 14, 2001

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This review is from: Reenchantment Without Supernaturalism: A Process Philosophy of Religion (Cornell Studies in the Philosophy of Religion) (Paperback)

This is a superb and forceful presentation of the various reasons why the atheism and materialism that emerged with the scientific spirit is so completely inadequate for describing the fullness of human flourishing...including our moral judgments, our aesthetic experiences, our religious perceptions, and even for our scientific pursuits! This book suggests a new and coherent worldview wherein theologians and scientists are no longer suspicious enemies of one another, but fellow contributors to a more integrated understanding of human existence. Moreover, the book's portrait of a God without miracles, while not for everyone, is presented persuasively, so that even a detractor must appreciate the relevancy, adequacy, and coherence of this more liberal religious perspective. Finally, anyone interested in the philosophy of Whitehead will find that this book is not only a glorious and thorough introduction to process philosophy, but that it contributes significantly to the resolution of some of the mysteries and inconsistencies of Whitehead's own thought and that of his interpreters. This is Griffin at his best!

1 of 1 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Fantastic, Challenging Work on Process Philosophy, January 3, 2011

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Joseph Wartick - See all my reviews
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This review is from: Reenchantment Without Supernaturalism: A Process Philosophy of Religion (Cornell Studies in the Philosophy of Religion) (Paperback)

Reenchantment Without Supernaturalism: A Process Philosophy of Religion by David Ray Griffin (hereafter RWS) is a vast work. because of the nature of this book-namely, its place as, essentially, an outlining and explication of a religion-I feel it is necessary to continue discussion of this work past the present review. I'll be doing a series on Process Philosophy.

RWS covers an incredibly broad range of topics. Summing up a work of this scope would take too much space, so I'll give only a brief outline. The central doctrines of Process Philosophy are (quoted at length):

1) "The integration of moral, aesthetic, and religious intuitions with the most general doctrines of the sciences into a self-consistent worldview as one of the central tasks of philosophy in our time" (5)

2) "Hard-core commonsense notions as the ultimate test of the adequacy of a philosophical position" (5)

3) "Whitehead's nonsensationist doctrine of perception, according to which sensory perception is a secondary mode of perception, being derivative from a more nonsensory `prehension'"(5)

4) "Panexperientialism with organizational duality, according to which all the true individuals... have at least some iota of experience and spontaneity (self-determination)" (6)

5) "The doctrine that all enduring individuals are serially ordered socieities of momentary `occasions of experience'" (6)

6) "[A]ll actual entities have internal as well as external relations" (6)

7) "[N]aturalistic theism, according to which a Divine Actuality acts variably but never supernaturally in the world" (6)

8 ) "Doubly Dipolar Theism" (7)

9) "The provision of cosmological support for the ideals needed by contemporary civilization as one of the chief purposes of philosophy in our time" (7)

10) "A distinction between verbal statements (sentences) and propositions and between both of these and propositional feelings" (7)

Whew! And that is just the introduction of a 425 page work!

These doctrines I'll let speak for themselves, but it is immediately clear that Process Philosophy can be identified as a religion, either on its own, or in conjunction with another religion of the world. These doctrines are enough to support a robust naturalistic theism which differs in many ways from classical theism.

Process Philosophy affirms that sense experience is not primary (see esp. 55). It also rejects both physicalism and dualism, calling instead for panexperientialism, which is the idea that everything in the universe-down to the smallest entity, has experience of some sort. In other words, the basic units of "stuff" in our universe are neither ideal (as in some forms of dualism) or material (as in materialism and other forms of dualism), but experiential (94ff).

God, on Process Philosophy, is in the world. It is panentheistic as opposed to theistic or pantheistic. God is not supernatural, but is rather a necessary part of the universe (131ff). God created the world not ex nihilo, but out of chaos, which Griffin argues is the correct reading of the Hebrew Scriptures, particularly Genesis (I disagree strongly here, for it seems like there is much evidence for the use of bara to refer to creation ex nihilo).

I can't resist veering off the summary path here and critiquing this view specifically. The problem with affirming that God created the world out of some existent finite entities (see 216) is that that leaves both God and these finite entities with no explanation for their existence. God, argues Griffin, exists necessarily, but there is no reason I could find given for this. Furthermore, there is absolutely no explanation of how these other finite entities came into being. It seems as though they are asserted to simply exist forever, but this runs into the many problems with an infinite past. I simply don't think Griffin has adequately defended this doctrine of Process Philosophy, and most of it hinges around this idea. I'll get into this more as I continue my series, however.

Not only that, but Process Philosophy upholds the idea that there are two distinct "ultimate realities" in our universe; namely, a personal deity, and an impersonal, "creativity". This is one of the more affirmations of Process Philosophy: that all major religions are true in a qualified sense (247ff). In affirming that all major religions are in some sense true, Process Philosophy also argues that they must all learn from each other to work towards a religion that more adequately reflects reality (more on this later in the series).

Process Philosophy affirms the possibility of an afterlife, but doesn't seem to take it as terribly likely (204ff). Furthermore, it asserts that morality can be done from the point of an "ideal observer", namely, God (314-316).

Thus, Process Philosophy is a religion distinct from the others I have read about in some very important ways. The affirmation of both naturalistic (but not atheistic) science and theism is very interesting. Furthermore, Process Philosophy, according to Griffin, can be allies with the major religions of the world. He favors Christianity as walking hand-in-hand with this philosophy.

I personally don't think this is a live option for most Christian theists, however, because it involves rejection of, among other things: creation ex nihilo, omnipotence in the traditional sense, the ability of God to interfere with nature, the primacy of Christ in world religions, the life after death (though, as above, Griffin says this is possible)... furthermore, it means Christians must accept, among other things: the idea that Christianity is true, but only in some sense compared to to other religions, that God is only the arranger, not the creator (in the traditional sense) of the world, an entirely different ultimate reality that is similar to the impersonal, immutable Brahma as existing alongside of and coequal to God.

So what can the Christian take from RWS? That is a question that will take me some time to think about and digest. I hope the further posts in this series will help outline this more. I think there are valuable insights in what Griffin has to say, but it is more probable, in my opinion, that the Christian will find, not a "Reenchantment" so much as a chance to sharpen their philosophical blades against arguments which undermine the central tenants of the faith.

That said, RWS is a fantastic read. Griffin covers a simply massive range of topics with clarity from the perspective of Process Philosophy. The book is a page-turner. Like a fantastic novel, it exposes new ideas and forces the intellect to work in new ways. It is a work that essentially outlines the creeds of a different religion, albeit a religion which is designed to go hand-in-hand with others. It touches on nearly every area of philosophy of religion, from religious language to natural theology. I highly recommend this book. It is one of my favorites. My only regret is that I find it so off the mark.

3 of 5 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Review of Reenchantment without Supernaturalism by D. R. Griffen, February 6, 2010

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Dale Gillette (Raleigh, NC USA) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: Reenchantment Without Supernaturalism: A Process Philosophy of Religion (Cornell Studies in the Philosophy of Religion) (Paperback)

Review of Reenchantment without Supernaturalism by D. R. Griffen


The title of this very interesting book needs a bit of explanation. In addition to the phrase "without supernaturalism," in the title of his book Reenchantment without Supernaturalism, Griffin also uses the word "Reenchantment" in ways we will probably not find in the local shopping mall. Reenchantment implies a "restoration of meaning" that is needed because of the "disenchantment" brought about by the world that no longer contains meaning or "normative values around which human beings should orient their lives." Since "supernaturalism" is central to his thesis, he very carefully lays out its definition and shows that slight shadings of meaning can make huge differences in theological consequences.

David R. Griffen is a leading, current-day "Process Philosopher." Process Philosophy was developed by the philosophers Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947) and Charles Hartshorne (1897-2000). Griffen gives a definition of the word "supernaturalism" such that "without supernaturalism" implies a virtual impossibility for god to interfere with the freedom of that which god created. Griffin's use of the phrase "lack of supernaturalism" [i.e. without supernaturalism] expresses the condition of freedom [from supernatural influences] of created beings, i.e., that god cannot interfere with freedom of people.
This freedom of created beings [for example, people] was previous expressed by Charles Hartshorne to be such that divine influence could "not possibly suppress freedom in the recipient." [Hartshorne and Reese, 1953, page 275.] The phrase "lack of supernaturalism" thus implies that god cannot interfere with freedom of people.

For many people, there is a need for some sort of "Reenchantment of the world" that is fulfilled by dualism [the doctrine of separation of created beings from the divine being]. For Griffin, dualism is a false and weak attempt to obtain a close relationship with the divine. Additionally, "the endurance of dualism has made conditions favorable for reductionism." One form of reductionism ---the hypothesis that only matter exists--- has failed to provide human beings with needed support to live in the world.

Griffin has made an attempt to provide a framework for Reenchantment [restoration of meaning and normative values] in a world without supernaturalism [that is, a world where god is assumed to never change laws of physics]. [Actually, Griffin expresses it more strongly---in a world where god cannot freely change laws of physics.] The difference between Griffin's approach to restoring meaning and that of supernaturalists is that Griffin's solution for restoring meaning in the world does not have the possibility for supernatural alteration [by miracles], even temporarily, of the natural laws of physics.

In Griffin's model of the world, god is still a "first cause" and possibly a "cause of persistence" of the world (universe). However, in the model, it is impossible to break the natural order, e.g., the laws of physics after the creation.

Griffin's book is very well written and in my opinion, very worth reading. .


Reference
Hartshorne, C., and W. Reese, eds. 1953, Philosophers Speak of God. Chicago, Univ. of Chicago Press.