11 of 11 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Fills a Gap in Answering Objections to Natural Theology, June 27, 2010
This review is from: The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology (Ashgate Philosophy of Religion Series) (Hardcover)
At a time when Christian thinkers are offering blistering critiques of naturalism it should not be thought that Christianity has an aversion to all things natural. For example, the Reformed tradition has not shied away from pointing out natural goods such as the goodness of nature, the value of common tasks, and the freedom to imbibe strong drink. However, it has had a tendency, at least during the twentieth century, to shy away from giving three cheers to the "natural" in `natural law' and `natural theology'. Some wonder, "Is this negative appraisal to be considered part and parcel to Reformed theology as such?" Recently, a negative answer is being offered to that question. Apropos the former, several books defending natural law have made their way on to the market. For example, Stephen J. Grabill has written Rediscovering the Natural Law in Reformed Theological Ethics (Eerdmans, 2006), and David VanDrunen has written both the monograph A Biblical Case for Natural Law (Acton, 2006) as well as the much larger Natural Law and the Two Kingdoms: A Study in the Development of Reformed Social Thought (Eerdmans, 2010). Yet, with regard to the latter, contemporary Reformed aversion to natural theology has went largely unanswered. With apologies to John Gertsner, R.C. Sproul, and Arthur Lindsley (Classical Apologetics, Zondervan, 1984), many have wondered if a rigorous Reformed defense of natural theology could be offered against the contemporary nay-sayers. To those who have tried to offer Reformed defenses of natural theology it has been asked of them, "Are you the one, or shall I look for another?" With the arrival of analytic philosopher Michael Sudduth's book The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology (Ashgate, 2009), he may be the one.
Michael Sudduth is highly qualified to write a book on the topic of a Reformed objection to natural theology. With a Ph.D. from the University of Oxford, Sudduth specializes in the philosophy of religion, philosophical theology, and the history of Christian thought. Sudduth has published a number of influential articles on the subject of natural theology as well as religious epistemology. Sudduth's doctoral dissertation was on the topic of the book as well. The back cover of The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology comes with endorsements by the likes of Alvin Plantinga. Richard Swinburne, and Alister McGrath. These high expectations are met within the pages of the book. Sudduth's book also profited from the feedback he received by putting various drafts online and requesting critical comments on the book. The end product is high quality and the reader gets a good value.
Sudduth opens with a useful introduction wherein he offers some initial definitions and conceptual distinctions that he will use, clarify, and qualify throughout the book. The reader is introduced to the term `natural theology' as, in the broad sense, referring "to what can be known or rationally believed about the existence and nature of God on the basis of human reason or our natural cognitive faculties" (1). This sense designates natural knowledge of God, which is to be contrasted with knowledge of God gained from special revelation.
In chapter one Sudduth engages in some valuable spade work in the field of historical theology. Before Sudduth examines Reformed objections to the propriety of natural theology he first looks at the various stances Reformed theologians have taken toward natural theology. The assessment might come as a surprise to those who think that a Reformed objection to natural theology is ubiquitous in the writings of the Reformers and their successors. Rather, what is found is that "the Reformed theological tradition exhibits a deeply entrenched and historically continuous endorsement of natural theology" (9). This survey reveals that "the Reformed tradition consistently affirmed both a natural knowledge of God as well as rational arguments for the existence of God" (40). However, a pluralism within the tradition is seen with respect to the function of theistic arguments.
Chapter two seeks to understand the Reformed objection to natural theology. While chapter one shows that natural theology was endorsed by Reformed theologians, this is consistent with there being objections to natural theology within the Reformed tradition. After all, perhaps the Reformers surveyed were inconsistent with their principles. "Is" does not imply "ought." On the way to understanding the Reformed objection to natural theology, if there is one, Sudduth finds two misconceptions that loom large when considering the significance of any Reformed objection to natural theology. Sudduth looks at these misconceptions as well as lays out some important conceptual distinctions he will make use of as he evaluates objections to natural theology from ostensible Reformed (in a broad sense) thinkers. The first "misconception about natural theology concerns the extent to which Reformed theology has rejected natural theology" (41). Sudduth grants that from within the Reformed tradition there have been objections to natural theology, and even that these objections have been among some of the sharper and aggressive sort, "it is inaccurate to say that the bulk of Reformed theologians have rejected natural theology, or that a revulsion against theistic arguments has been characteristic of the Continental Calvinist tradition" (42). A second misconception arises from those who grant a prominent Reformed endorsement of natural theology while claiming that this endorsement was nevertheless "incompatible with Reformation principles, not that actual theology of the Reformation." The endorsement represented a "scholastic departure from the theology of the Reformation and a capitulation to Roman Catholic theology" (47). However, Sudduth argues that this misconception results from (i) "an overly narrow view of the nature of theistic arguments and (ii) an inaccurate view of the function of theistic arguments within the dogmatic systems of early and high orthodoxy" (48). All of this leads up to the introduction of several helpful conceptual distinctions to make use of when assessing the existence of a Reformed objection to natural theology. One such distinction is between the natural knowledge of God and theistic argument. Sudduth calls the former natural theology alpha (A) and the latter natural theology beta (B). The former arises in a way other than "explicitly formulated arguments" (a la Romans 1) and the latter refers to knowledge "produced by reflection and argument" or knowledge of "a more spontaneous inference from the visible works of creation."
In chapter three Sudduth looks for a possible project objection to natural theology (B) in the direction of the doctrine of the innate idea of God. The Reformed tradition has affirmed a knowledge of God that is innate or naturally implanted in the human mind (natural theology (A)). This affirmation is thought by some to count as an objection to natural theology (B). This view of the natural knowledge of God has been thought to be incompatible with theistic argument if not render it superfluous or otherwise unnecessary. Furthermore, "since the nineteenth century there has been a trend in Protestant theology to take the naturally implanted knowledge of God as intuitive or immediate" (58), a view which was thought to oppose natural theology (B). So Sudduth wonders if there's a good project objection lurking here.
Sudduth looks at two ways the immediate knowledge of God might prove to be problematic for natural theology (B), The first is that it renders natural theology (B) unnecessary. That is, that immediate knowledge of God is sufficient. Since it would appear that on this view anything important that could be known about God by way of natural arguments can also be known immediately. "Hence, even if natural theology (B) is epistemically efficacious, it is epistemically superfluous" (59). This is a project objection to the relevance of natural theology (B). This view is dubbed "the SI thesis." But there looms a more radical immediacy thesis. This take on the immediate natural knowledge of God "would be that God is naturally known only in an immediate manner" (59). So natural knowledge of God is exclusively immediate, which entails a project objection to natural to natural theology (B) since natural theology (B) assumes that some knowledge of God is inferential. This view of immediate knowledge (exclusive immediacy) is dubbed "the EI thesis." Ultimately, Sudduth concludes that there is no objection to the project of natural theology, even if these objections land against specific models of natural theology.
Chapter four considers two more immediacy models of the natural knowledge of God (natural theology (A)), that of John Baillie and Alvin Plantinga. These two thinkers develop their view in dialogue with the Reformed tradition even though they may not themselves be robustly (confessionaly?) Reformed. Baillie argues that knowledge of God is revelational and that there is no unaided natural knowledge of God. Furthermore, "Baillie challenges the idea that all of our knowledge of God is exclusively inferential" (79). But Sudduth points out that this misses the point in that natural theology (B) is only claiming that there is inferential knowledge or warranted beliefs about God, not that it is the best kind or religiously superior kind of knowledge or warranted belief in God. So we don't get a project objection out of Baillie.
Plantinga's view receives a similar assessment. Inference is not found to be excluded by Plantinga's proposal, in fact, there are several plausible ways inference can be considered to play a role in producing some knowledge of God or warranted theistic inferences. Sudduth offers some further accounts of how inference could mesh with immediately warranted theistic knowledge or beliefs. For...
Read more ›
Help other customers find the most helpful reviews
Was this review helpful to you? Yes
No