Customer Reviews

The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology (Ashgate Philosophy of Religion Series)

5 star:		(1)
4 star:		(1)
3 star:		(0)
2 star:		(0)
1 star:		(0)

 

 

At a time when Christian thinkers are offering blistering critiques of naturalism it should not be thought that Christianity has an aversion to all things natural. For example, the Reformed tradition has not shied away from pointing out natural goods such as the goodness of nature, the value of common tasks, and the freedom to imbibe strong drink. However, it has had a tendency, at least during the twentieth century, to shy away from giving three cheers to the "natural" in `natural law' and `natural theology'. Some wonder, "Is this negative appraisal to be considered part and parcel to Reformed theology as such?" Recently, a negative answer is being offered to that question. Apropos the former, several books defending natural law have made their way on to the market. For example, Stephen J. Grabill has written Rediscovering the Natural Law in Reformed Theological Ethics (Eerdmans, 2006), and David VanDrunen has written both the monograph A Biblical Case for Natural Law (Acton, 2006) as well as the much larger Natural Law and the Two Kingdoms: A Study in the Development of Reformed Social Thought (Eerdmans, 2010). Yet, with regard to the latter, contemporary Reformed aversion to natural theology has went largely unanswered. With apologies to John Gertsner, R.C. Sproul, and Arthur Lindsley (Classical Apologetics, Zondervan, 1984), many have wondered if a rigorous Reformed defense of natural theology could be offered against the contemporary nay-sayers. To those who have tried to offer Reformed defenses of natural theology it has been asked of them, "Are you the one, or shall I look for another?" With the arrival of analytic philosopher Michael Sudduth's book The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology (Ashgate, 2009), he may be the one.

Michael Sudduth is highly qualified to write a book on the topic of a Reformed objection to natural theology. With a Ph.D. from the University of Oxford, Sudduth specializes in the philosophy of religion, philosophical theology, and the history of Christian thought. Sudduth has published a number of influential articles on the subject of natural theology as well as religious epistemology. Sudduth's doctoral dissertation was on the topic of the book as well. The back cover of The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology comes with endorsements by the likes of Alvin Plantinga. Richard Swinburne, and Alister McGrath. These high expectations are met within the pages of the book. Sudduth's book also profited from the feedback he received by putting various drafts online and requesting critical comments on the book. The end product is high quality and the reader gets a good value.

Sudduth opens with a useful introduction wherein he offers some initial definitions and conceptual distinctions that he will use, clarify, and qualify throughout the book. The reader is introduced to the term `natural theology' as, in the broad sense, referring "to what can be known or rationally believed about the existence and nature of God on the basis of human reason or our natural cognitive faculties" (1). This sense designates natural knowledge of God, which is to be contrasted with knowledge of God gained from special revelation.

In chapter one Sudduth engages in some valuable spade work in the field of historical theology. Before Sudduth examines Reformed objections to the propriety of natural theology he first looks at the various stances Reformed theologians have taken toward natural theology. The assessment might come as a surprise to those who think that a Reformed objection to natural theology is ubiquitous in the writings of the Reformers and their successors. Rather, what is found is that "the Reformed theological tradition exhibits a deeply entrenched and historically continuous endorsement of natural theology" (9). This survey reveals that "the Reformed tradition consistently affirmed both a natural knowledge of God as well as rational arguments for the existence of God" (40). However, a pluralism within the tradition is seen with respect to the function of theistic arguments.

Chapter two seeks to understand the Reformed objection to natural theology. While chapter one shows that natural theology was endorsed by Reformed theologians, this is consistent with there being objections to natural theology within the Reformed tradition. After all, perhaps the Reformers surveyed were inconsistent with their principles. "Is" does not imply "ought." On the way to understanding the Reformed objection to natural theology, if there is one, Sudduth finds two misconceptions that loom large when considering the significance of any Reformed objection to natural theology. Sudduth looks at these misconceptions as well as lays out some important conceptual distinctions he will make use of as he evaluates objections to natural theology from ostensible Reformed (in a broad sense) thinkers. The first "misconception about natural theology concerns the extent to which Reformed theology has rejected natural theology" (41). Sudduth grants that from within the Reformed tradition there have been objections to natural theology, and even that these objections have been among some of the sharper and aggressive sort, "it is inaccurate to say that the bulk of Reformed theologians have rejected natural theology, or that a revulsion against theistic arguments has been characteristic of the Continental Calvinist tradition" (42). A second misconception arises from those who grant a prominent Reformed endorsement of natural theology while claiming that this endorsement was nevertheless "incompatible with Reformation principles, not that actual theology of the Reformation." The endorsement represented a "scholastic departure from the theology of the Reformation and a capitulation to Roman Catholic theology" (47). However, Sudduth argues that this misconception results from (i) "an overly narrow view of the nature of theistic arguments and (ii) an inaccurate view of the function of theistic arguments within the dogmatic systems of early and high orthodoxy" (48). All of this leads up to the introduction of several helpful conceptual distinctions to make use of when assessing the existence of a Reformed objection to natural theology. One such distinction is between the natural knowledge of God and theistic argument. Sudduth calls the former natural theology alpha (A) and the latter natural theology beta (B). The former arises in a way other than "explicitly formulated arguments" (a la Romans 1) and the latter refers to knowledge "produced by reflection and argument" or knowledge of "a more spontaneous inference from the visible works of creation."

In chapter three Sudduth looks for a possible project objection to natural theology (B) in the direction of the doctrine of the innate idea of God. The Reformed tradition has affirmed a knowledge of God that is innate or naturally implanted in the human mind (natural theology (A)). This affirmation is thought by some to count as an objection to natural theology (B). This view of the natural knowledge of God has been thought to be incompatible with theistic argument if not render it superfluous or otherwise unnecessary. Furthermore, "since the nineteenth century there has been a trend in Protestant theology to take the naturally implanted knowledge of God as intuitive or immediate" (58), a view which was thought to oppose natural theology (B). So Sudduth wonders if there's a good project objection lurking here.

Sudduth looks at two ways the immediate knowledge of God might prove to be problematic for natural theology (B), The first is that it renders natural theology (B) unnecessary. That is, that immediate knowledge of God is sufficient. Since it would appear that on this view anything important that could be known about God by way of natural arguments can also be known immediately. "Hence, even if natural theology (B) is epistemically efficacious, it is epistemically superfluous" (59). This is a project objection to the relevance of natural theology (B). This view is dubbed "the SI thesis." But there looms a more radical immediacy thesis. This take on the immediate natural knowledge of God "would be that God is naturally known only in an immediate manner" (59). So natural knowledge of God is exclusively immediate, which entails a project objection to natural to natural theology (B) since natural theology (B) assumes that some knowledge of God is inferential. This view of immediate knowledge (exclusive immediacy) is dubbed "the EI thesis." Ultimately, Sudduth concludes that there is no objection to the project of natural theology, even if these objections land against specific models of natural theology.

Chapter four considers two more immediacy models of the natural knowledge of God (natural theology (A)), that of John Baillie and Alvin Plantinga. These two thinkers develop their view in dialogue with the Reformed tradition even though they may not themselves be robustly (confessionaly?) Reformed. Baillie argues that knowledge of God is revelational and that there is no unaided natural knowledge of God. Furthermore, "Baillie challenges the idea that all of our knowledge of God is exclusively inferential" (79). But Sudduth points out that this misses the point in that natural theology (B) is only claiming that there is inferential knowledge or warranted beliefs about God, not that it is the best kind or religiously superior kind of knowledge or warranted belief in God. So we don't get a project objection out of Baillie.

Plantinga's view receives a similar assessment. Inference is not found to be excluded by Plantinga's proposal, in fact, there are several plausible ways inference can be considered to play a role in producing some knowledge of God or warranted theistic inferences. Sudduth offers some further accounts of how inference could mesh with immediately warranted theistic knowledge or beliefs. For example, some "theistic beliefs may be warranted in part by way of inference" (87). All of this is consistent with the model of immediate natural knowledge Plantinga may be taken as offering. Sudduth addresses some further refinements to Plantinga's position, but then end is the same, "In the final analysis, neither Baillie nor Plantinga provides a model of the natural knowledge of God on which we can base a project objection to natural theology (B)" (95).

Chapter five continues to look in the direction of immediate knowledge of God as an objection to natural theology (B). Recalling that his critiques of both the SI and EI theses have relied upon the contributions inference can make to our natural knowledge of God, Sudduth then summarizes the role inference plays, even if we allow that some natural knowledge of God is immediate, as follows:

"[I] Inference can augment, refine, or confirm the immediate natural knowledge of God" (98).

Sudduth elaborates on this by pointing out how inference augments, refines, or confirms the immediate knowledge of God. For example, inference can `augment' by providing "knowledge of theistic propositions that are not immediately known." Inference can `refine' by filling out what is known, and inference can confirm by providing "knowledge of theistic propositions that are immediately known" (98). Sudduth then draws a distinction between strong and weak versions of [I], which turns out to be highly relevant to his aim. Sudduth then wonders at what grounds a Reformed theologian might have to affirm either EI thesis. Not surprisingly, Sudduth does not "see much hope for a well-grounded Reformed account of immediate knowledge of God that entails the denial of either" of the strong or weak versions of I(105). For these reasons, Sudduth maintains that we will need to look elsewhere for a good project objection to natural theology (B) other than any alleged immediate knowledge of God.

Chapter six looks elsewhere; the direction of the doctrine of the noetic effects of sin. Sudduth says the most common objections to natural theology (B) are based off this doctrine. Roughly put, the Reformed confess total depravity, the doctrine that sin has affected every aspect of man's being. The noetic effects of sin refers to the affects sin has on the cognitive aspects of man being. The way this doctrine could supply resources for an objection to natural theology (B) are several. These don't entail a project objection. It may be that some true propositions are known, but the noetic effects of sin would affect a true systematic unregenerate natural theology. However, this leaves open interesting prospects for a regenerate natural theology (B).

Chapter seven continues to attend to the question whether the noetic effects of sin can get us a project objection to natural theology (B). In the last chapter it was seen that the doctrine of the noetic effects of sin as construed by some theologians in the Reformed tradition did not give us good grounds to deny that fallen unregenerate persons did not possess some natural knowledge of God. Either this view was denied (Calvin) or rested upon an idea of knowledge of God that was not propositional. Sudduth thinks the doctrine of the noetic effects of sin, and the possibility that there is a project objection lurking in the neighborhood, deserves further analysis. To do this he "draw[s] on insights from contemporary epistemology to examine the prospects for a case against propositional natural knowledge of God based on the noetic effects of sin" (127). The ensuing analysis is an excellent example of doing analytic philosophy of religion, or even analytic theology. Sudduth makes us of his multiple models approach to natural theology to respond to this objection.

Chapter eight lays out and defends the dogmatic model of natural theology. Sudduth begins by explaining the epistemic effects of regeneration as applied specifically to the theistic belief forming cognitive processes of the regenerate. This is relevant since Sudduth's model "presupposes that natural theistic arguments are the product of human reason as it operates in the regenerate mind" (145). Regeneration would be relevant from both externalist and internalist vantage points, undoing the problems they faced in chapter seven. Another presupposition of the dogmatic model is that "natural theology (B) presupposes the wider context of dogmatic theology where the Bible is regarded as the primary source of knowledge about God. Natural theology represents rational reflection on God's general revelation in the created order from the viewpoint of God's special revelation in sacred Scripture" (148). This brings out a crucial difference between the pre-dogmatic model and the dogmatic model. The former does not presuppose the content of special revelation and "is an autonomous system based solely on the resources of human reason and constituting a justificatory preface to the system of revealed theology" (150). This separation of natural theology from theology based on Scripture concerned several Reformed thinkers, such as Lecerf, Kuyper, Bavinck, and Berkhof. The Reformers did not think human reason could construct a scientific system of theology based on natural revelation alone. This objection to natural theology (B) would be a model-specific objection then, targeting the pre-dogmatic model rather than the dogmatic model.

Sudduth provides several ways to understand the claim that natural theology depends on Scripture. This includes meta-level dependence where Scripture justifies the "project of developing theistic arguments," or provides functional guidance "bear[ing] on the proper and effective use of theistic arguments." The relevant range also includes more substantial ways in which natural theology could depend on Scripture. These plausible lines of dependency, argued for more fully in the chapter, show how natural theology (B) is carried out in the dogmatic model. This model is carried out most successfully by the regenerate Christian. While granting that non-Christians may be helpful at points or even have warrant to believe some theistic propositions, they fail to formulate a systematic doctrine of God.

Chapter nine looks at another popular objection to natural theology (B), the "most prominent kind of objection to natural theology (B) in the western philosophical tradition since the eighteenth century" (167). The objection criticizes the logic of theistic arguments. This objection could provide a project objection to natural theology (B) by showing that theistic arguments fail to be epistemically efficacious. For example, some have argued that natural theology arguments fail as logical demonstrations or proofs of the existence of God. Sudduth cites several Reformed theologians to this end (e.g., Bavinck, Lecerf, Berkoff, Hoeksema, and Gordon Clark). These thinkers agree with and even appeal to David Hume and Immanuel Kant in this line of argument about the failure of theistic arguments as logical demonstrations. Logical demonstrations consist of a valid, non-circular deductive argument with premises that "have strong epistemic credentials." For a premise to have strong epistemic credentials it must be "immune from doubt, error, or revision, or they are universally held by all rational cognizers who consider and understand the premises of the argument." Sudduth refers to these premises as "rationally compelling" (171). Given these considerations, the objection to natural theology (B) from their failure as logical demonstrations can be formulated as:

"(1) A proposition p is logically demonstrated just if it is a valid, non-circular inference from true and rationally compelling premises,

and

No theistic argument can satisfy the conditions of demonstration stipulated in (1),

we can infer:

(3) No theistic argument constitutes a logical demonstration of the existence of God" (171).

Sudduth refers to this arguments as the DAF argument. So considered, does the DAF objection provide a project objection to natural theology (B)? It would seem not. As explained throughout the book, natural theology (B) need not be considered as offering arguments that are logical demonstrations in the DAF sense. Sudduth responds to the DAF objection further, bringing more insights of analytic philsophy to bear, as well as clarifying the nature and task of natural theistic arguments.

Chapter ten continues to look at Reformed objections to natural theology (B) based off the logic of theistic arguments. The objection considered here is that theistic arguments can only prove a "God of the philosophers," not the God of the Christian scriptures. Sudduth refers to the God of the philosophers as the GOP objection and claims that of all the objections to natural theology (B), this one is usually considered the most decisive. What is going on in the GOP objection is that the God proved by theistic arguments is formal and empty, and so is not the God as described in scripture. There is some descriptive inadequacy such that arguments for the `God' referred to in natural theistic arguments is some being other than the God referred to in the Bible. After discussing the concept of definite description, and parsing out several ways of just how to phrase the GOP objection, Sudduth settles on the most interesting and forceful way to state the objection:

"[DIM-B] The traditional theistic arguments taken together do not provide adequate inductive support for the existence of a being under any definite descriptions that either (i) pick out the same divine being picked out by the descriptions of God in Scripture or (ii) fix reference to the same being named `God' in Scripture" (193).

This way of putting the GOP objection is best because "the fate of natural theology (B) depends on the truth of [DIM-B]" and not any of the other analyses of the descriptive inadequacy objection GOP replies on. The cumulative case of theistic arguments features prominently in Sudduth's response to the various descriptive inadequacy objections. Sudduth thinks this feature of natural theology arguments is an important but frequently overlooked one.

Chapter 10 ends with another objection that is picked up in chapter 11, the final chapter. The objection is the last objection considered and continues to press the objection to the logic of theistic arguments. Whereas Trinitarian descriptivism failed to provide much of a worry for natural theology (B), another objection may prove stronger. This objection is that natural theology (B) fails to prove a robust theism, settling for, at best, the god of deism or pantheism. This is known as the robust theistic descriptivist objection. The reasons given for why natural theology (B) cannot prove a robust God are taken largely from Hume and Kant. Reformed who offer this objection "have appealed to two principles concerning causation and causal inferences: (i) the restriction of causation to experience and (ii) the necessity of proportioning causes to their effects" (203). Sudduth examines these charges.

Sudduth first addresses the argument that restricts causal inferences to experience, claiming that it is unjustified to move from effects to causes beyond our experience. Sudduth points to some Reformed thinkers who have relied on Hume and Kant and then subjects this principle to critique. Of course, reliance on Hume and Kant here is problematic. Fundamental to Christian theism is the concept that God has caused certain things (e.g., creation of the world). Furthermore, not only does Sudduth reject the radical empiricism the objections from Hume and Kant presuppose, point out that modern science has made this crude empiricism "no longer sensible," but he points out that this objection leads a "theological skepticism that easily undermines theological discourse and knowledge" (206). The second objection deals with the principle of proportionality. The idea here is that "we must not ascribe to a cause anything beyond what is minimally required to account for the effect" (207). If I come home and see a hole in my wall, I am justified in attributing the hole to a cause, say, strong enough to cause the hole. I am not justified in concluding that it was a major league pitcher throwing a split finger fastball through my wall. So the design argument, even if we grant it shows supernatural design, cannot lead to the God of robust theistic descriptivism: a single, spiritual, eternal, infinite, all-knowing, all-powerful, unchangeable, and the source of good. At this point Sudduth offers several responses to this line of thought. One of his responses makes use of cumulative case arguments, the conjunction of which renders robust theism more probable than, say, the God of deism. Pulling from many arguments, we can get rational support for a robustly described God.

The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology is very well done. The conceptual distinctions offered are very valuable and definitely move the discussion forward. Reformed thinkers would do well to make use of natural theology arguments in all its varied functions. Reformed thinkers would do well to add Sudduth's book to their library and delve into it for it contains many valuable insights from a variety of disciplines (historical, philosophical and . . . apologetical(?)!).

A brilliant work where Sudduth shows how natural theology is consistent with Reformed theology and need not be guilty of any of the plethora of sins that it has been accused of by the Reformed epistemologists and presuppositionalists. An essential resource for anyone studying theological and apologetical methodology.

My only complaint is that I wish it wasn't so pricy! A paperback version seems to be very much in order to get this into the hands of natural theology's detractors.