Regime Change in Iran: Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran, November 1952 - August 1953 [Paperback]

Donald N. Wilber (Author)

Product Details

• Paperback: 111 pages
• Publisher: Abm Komers (August 31, 2000)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0851247180
• ISBN-13: 978-0851247182
• Product Dimensions: 8.1 x 5.9 x 0.4 inches
• Shipping Weight: 7 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 5.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (2 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #1,881,218 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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3 of 4 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars The CIA Report on What We Did in Iran, June 5, 2006

By 

John Matlock "Gunny" (Winnemucca, NV) - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

This review is from: Regime Change in Iran: Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran, November 1952 - August 1953 (Paperback)

In 1952/53 the CIA instigated an overthrow of the Government of Iran. It was successful, from the standpoint of the CIA anyway, established closer relations between Iran and the US. And of course led to the subsequent events in Iranian history.

The American agent in charge of the operation was the author. Dr. Wilber, who died in 1997, was sent to a meeting in Nicosia with the British and in consultation with them a plan was developed. Subsequent to that plans success Dr. Wilber wrote this report in 1954 to record the successful change of Government in Iran. This report, originally classified SECRET is part of the Clandestine Service History series of the CIA.

Upon reading the report, it is fairly easy to see why Iran does not consider the US to be among its friends. In listening to remarks from our Government, to see what gets printed in the newspaper and broadcast in the national news is to get a fairly superficial view of the situation in Iran. Understanding the background information contained here gives you quite a different perspective than you get from the news.

5.0 out of 5 stars Review of CIA's account of TRAJAX, November 13, 2010

By 

Hume's Mind - See all my reviews

This review is from: Regime Change in Iran: Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran, November 1952 - August 1953 (Paperback)

Regime Change in Iran: Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran, November 1952 - August 1953

Studying the history of Iran-U.S. relations one inevitably hits upon the 1953 coup, a topic often scanned over with scant detail in many accounts in Iranian history written from the American perspective. This account is unique not because of it's authorative nature nor the details on the inner works of the coup but the fact that this is the CIA's account of its role in these events that was until its 2000 leaking to the press a classified account. The author, although not a member of the cast of agents who were actively in Iran working during the coup; nevertheless, was selected to write this "while the memories of the personnel involved in the activity were still fresh."
"Regime Change" reads rather like a frank dictation of the events, casting light on an obscure event that with Kermit Roosevelt's own "Counter Coup", the man who the chief CIA agent in charge of executing the plan originally created by the author, felt like a one side affair. In the short and concise account, the nitty gritty of the operation is revealed by the author, giving the researcher a more comfortable primary source to extract from compared to more celebratory account given by Kermit Roosevelt.
The structure is strictly formatted, reflecting it's origin as a draft account under an Intelligence Agency's own writing requirements. Although censored excerpts are found periodically throughout, the account manages to coldly and clearly represent the mindset of the operatives focused on combating the specter of communism that was the raison d'être for the intervention in domestic Iranian politics. Clear points are made too in depicting how much internal aid the Iranians themselves gave in the overthrow of the Prime Minister Mossadeq.
Overall, the account settles at least from what has been declassified the question over how much leverage the U.S. wielded over its overthrow of an Iranian Premier, a fear that would come to haunt the U.S. as Iranian students 26 years latter stormed over embassy gates in a frantic attempt equalized this perceived inequality of control over national destiny that the U.S. undoubtedly exercised in 1953.