Reluctant Allies: German-Japanese Naval Relations in World War II [Hardcover]

Hans-Joachim Krug (Author), Yoichi Hirama (Author), Berthold J. Sander-Nagashima (Author)

Book Description

ISBN-10: 1557504652 | ISBN-13: 978-1557504654 | Publication Date: November 15, 2001 | Edition: First

Sander-Nagashima, and Axel Niestle. Participants in the Axis naval campaign provide valuable insight into the fault-ridden German-Japanese alliance.

Editorial Reviews

Review

"...a fascinating story, told in detail, of grand goals and grand failures." -- Sea Power, Norman Polmar, January 2003

"Superb..." -- Naval War College Review, Autumn 2002

About the Author

Hans-Joachim Krug, a veteran U-boat sailor and retired captain in the German Navy, served as technical adviser for the production of the submarine movie Das Boot. Yoichi Hirama is a retired admiral of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force. Axel Niestle is the author of German U-boat Losses in World War II. Berthold J. Sander-Nagashima is a commander in the German Navy.

Product Details

• Hardcover: 414 pages
• Publisher: US Naval Institute Press; First edition (November 15, 2001)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 1557504652
• ISBN-13: 978-1557504654
• Product Dimensions: 9.2 x 6.4 x 1.3 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.7 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 2.5 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (2 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #225,389 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

7 of 8 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars USEFUL TREATISE ON RELEVANT SUBJECT, June 20, 2002

By A Customer

This review is from: Reluctant Allies: German-Japanese Naval Relations in World War II (Hardcover)

This book is valuable for two reasons. First, it treats in detail a long-neglected subject, namely the attempted cooperation before and during World War II between Germany and Japan. Second, it is an object lesson for the US and our Allies today(!) in how "international coalitions" which look like good ideas can fail to live up to their potential. As we fight the Anti-Terror War and contemplate (somehow) the "final containment" of Saddam Hussein, the pertinence to modern thinking of "Reluctant Allies" grows exponentially. A word of caution though: This book is for serious history buffs and can at times be a tough read. Structurally it is somewhat jagged and repetitious, despite its authors' best intentions, because it feels like a melding of separate monographs on the same subject written by different people working separately. The timeline of the discussion in the book is thus occasionally a bit circular, and the exposition often exhibits sudden twists and turns that cover a subject already mentioned in an earlier chapter. For this reason I take away one star and rate it as "only" four stars; but four stars is still good. The Naval Institute Press has done the world an important service by publishing "Reluctant Allies." This book is all about understanding nuance, and the subtleties of cause and effect, in real-world history. It teaches much about appreciating opportunities lost, about the damage caused by fragmented leadership and inconsistent (or ill-defined) objectives in any alliance, and above all about the dangers of delusional over-reaching by totalitarian regimes. Japan knew the worst thing Hitler could possibly do was attack Russia. The German navy knew the Japanese didn't stand a chance if they went to war with America. And yet it all came to pass, and tens of millions died.

1 of 3 people found the following review helpful:

1.0 out of 5 stars Reluctant allies in war,reluctant co-aothors in peace, January 9, 2005

By 

Devl's Advocate "RSHA" (Hölle) - See all my reviews

This review is from: Reluctant Allies: German-Japanese Naval Relations in World War II (Hardcover)

This is a most disappointing book which is supposed to shed some light on the much neglected naval relations between the Kriegsmarine and IJN,

Billed as an co-operative efforts by German submariner, naval historian and their Japanese counterpart (total of 4 authors), the book reads like a disjointed, poorly written, amateurishly researched undegraduate thesis.

When you are expecting some strategic explanations of the lack of co-ordination in the Axis efforts in the Indian ocean, one is treated, ad nauseam, brief and shallow overviews of Japan German naval and diplomatic relations, repeated anew as each author takes his turn.

What the authors have missed completely are the ploar opposites in naval war aims of Germany and japan, and their strategies to achieve them.

Germany's Atlantic strategy aims to knock out Britain before USA joins her in the war, thus ending the nightmare of a 2 front war with the only 2 superpowers, USA and USSR on her flanks. To achieve same, barring an invasion of the British Isles, would ential her imposing an ironclad blockade of all British imports and beating her into submission with hunger. Hence the "tonnage" strategy which aims to sink as much food and fuel oil transports as possible.

For Japan, her aim is to secure the resources in South and Southeat Asia for a long term defense of her conquest, and to fend off the expected US counterstrokes after Pearl Harbour. With the invasion of Hawaii being a no goer, Japan aims for an ironcald ring around her possessions, and fight off all inturisions with force. hence her "big guns" strategy which seeks out to meet, and destroy US carriers and battleships.