From Library Journal
Western failure in post-Cold War Yugoslavia is perhaps the best reported of any such tragedy. While former policy analyst Bert adds few surprises to what is already known, his excellent command of published sources permits a good case for more controversial judgments. He argues that Europe's "unbounded faith" in resolving the situation through ineffectual diplomacy reflected America's failure to offer a "strong alternative," that the Clinton administration compounded a weak inherited policy by an "unstructured...[and] even chaotic" initial style of decision-making, and that the "object lesson" of Croatia's successful 1995 offensive against the Serbs impelled NATO's use of force and, ultimately, the Dayton accords. For Bert, Bosnia is an example of the "intractable" diplomatic/military problem that demands Americans abandon false analogies and overblown rhetoric. For academic collections.?Zachary T. Irwin, Pennsylvania State Univ., Erie
Copyright 1997 Reed Business Information, Inc.
Why did the former Yugoslavia's collapse--and the ensuing wars--leave the U.S. and its European allies generally passive and impotent? Bert, who was a Wilmington College political science and Asian politics instructor and Defense Department analyst, offers a wide-ranging analysis of key factors, including the nature of the wars in the former Yugoslavia, limited security interests vs. strong humanitarian interests in Bosnia, and misperceptions by leaders (and citizens) in the U.S. (and Europe) about the Balkan wars. Bert criticizes U.S. administrations' inaction until the mid-1995 NATO bombings of Bosnian Serb positions but stresses the complexity of the decisions they faced. Because "the new post-Cold-War world presents extremely difficult choices to foreign-policy makers," he argues, policymakers must abandon old assumptions and prepare for "a much 'messier' world where limited conflicts will be fought for limited and often shifting objectives . . . with strategies that are difficult to formulate, costs that are uncertain, and entrance and exit points that are not obvious."
Mary Carroll