Jeff Lustig is a recently retired California State University, Sacramento political theorist who has previously served at length as head of the California Studies Program based at CSUS. As such he has had a front row seat for the derogation of California's political system. A couple of pieces of hard and immediate political reality have led him to address the California morass in Remaking California, Reclaiming the Public Good. First, once again, months after the legal deadline the state's legislature and its governor have failed to pass a budget, necessitating, inter alia, that bills be not paid but exchanged for IOU's, a situation that seems incapable of rational resolution. Second, California's mover and shaker class, fearing that its business interest is likely imperiled by the state's inability to do its business, is increasingly calling for a recasting of the state constitution.
Lustig and the contributors he has chosen give us a thumbnail sketch of the state's history. California was a recognized leader among US states from its gilded founding through at least the 1960's; its infrastructure, its education (especially higher) system and its booming postwar (postwar may be a term we no longer need) economy surpassed all others. But California has one of the more unusual constitutions in that it is relatively easily amended by popular initiative. There is no requirement that initiatives be vetted to shed light on how they will interact with the overall body of California law or on what their long term effects will be. Thus, beginning in 1979 when the massive property tax cutting Proposition 13 took effect, halving local tax receipts, the state began a virtual orgy of changing, piecemeal and without coherence, the way governments at all levels within the state function. That initiative, touted as a way to keep residential property taxes from rising to the point of hardship for many homeowners, shifted financial responsibility for primary and secondary schools away from locales and to the state. At the same time it stealthily and over time diminished the state's ability to maintain a stable property tax on real property owned by business interests. While that was going on the legislature, which had relatively recently become "full time", found itself subjected to term limits, severely limiting the ability of Assembly members and Senators to learn meaningful expertise in matters of substantive governance. This in turn led to significant increases in the power of not-term-limited lobbyists. Add to this the realignment of the economy as California saw the collapse of once labor intensive and relatively well paying industries ranging from aerospace to fishing. And then add massive demographic changes such that many California primary school classes have majorities of students who are English learners (while the actual voters remain predominantly Anglo and old). Multiply that by the impacts of the current great recession and then leaven the whole stew with a unique system that requires a two-thirds supermajority to enact a budget. This in turn gives a minority party the power to completely shut the whole process down with as few as a majority of one third (one sixth) of the legislators, that is because if the minority party controls a third of the body and a majority of its caucus has the discipline to compel its members to vote the party line and not consider the merits, and that perennially happens in California, no budgetary matter can be enacted. It thus becomes fairly obvious that sooner or later something's going to have to give.
Lustig posits that what will give is the ineffective current constitution, redone by a constitutional convention. He and his contributors analyze possible impacts of such a recasting of the foundation of California law. Specifics range from recreating the legislature, perhaps to a unicameral body, to reforming the executive branch, eliminating virtually all elected executive officers save the governor, to overhauling the procedure for selection of judges to, finally, to publicly funding elections in an attempt to lessen the ability of wealthy candidates to buy high office. This last is especially cogent to today's Californians, who are watching the spectacle of Whitman (that'll be Queen Meg to you, boy) spending north of $150 million (of the billion and half, give or take, she spirited away from the e-bay ether) to battle has been, and been, and been Jerry Brown for the title of governator.
Lustig does not give us much insight into the parameters of such a battle. While he argues convincingly, and most analysts agree, that Proposition 13 is a huge obstacle to reform he does not confront the fact that most of those pushing for major constitutional reform start by saying that that particular piece of the constitution will not be on the table. It is an interesting legal question whether or not constitution conveners could be limited to considering only select parts thereof. He also does not grapple with where a reconstituted California might ultimately come out. Presumably the small number of extremely powerful, and venal, people who benefit from the current situation will not go gentle into that good night.
But this compact, thoughtful book frames the debate that will have to occur if California is to return to its one-time status as a polity whose primary objective is the common weal.
