Mr. Kinzer sure has good timing.
Reset: Iran, Turkey, and America's Future came out just as Turkey and Iran dominated the news. Turkey in particular has drawn more attention than it has in many years. Kinzer's
Reset is a great read for anybody interested in the region and the importance of these two countries for U.S. foreign policy.
Kinzer's argument is that both Turkey and Iran have experience with democratic politics and would make better allies for the U.S. than our current Middle East partners - Israel and Saudi Arabia. He summarizes the history of politics in Turkey and Iran, as well as our foreign policy mistakes (particularly the overthrow of Iran's only truly democratic government, chronicled in Kinzer's excellent
All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror).
Reset is written for the general public and policymakers, so Kinzer covers just enough history to inform readers unfamiliar with the region. This might make it a bit shallow for scholars who have a good grounding in the politics of these countries (or those who have read Kinzer's
Crescent and Star: Turkey Between Two Worlds). Nonetheless, he does manage to throw in some anecdotes and facts that will probably surprise even longtime Middle East watchers (this was the first time I had heard any details about Iran's "grand bargain" offer to the Bush administration in late 2001).
Kinzer is not a foreign policy specialist and I found his policy prescriptions somewhat naive. As much as I would love the U.S. to initiate a strategic realignment and ally with Iran and Turkey, this is would be incredibly difficult. The domestic politics in all three countries make this unlikely - in the U.S. for example, the
The Israel Lobby is simply too strong. Through U.S. government securities and oil, Saudi Arabia has too much influence over our economy to make such a move politically feasible in the current recession. Moreover, Kinzer provides few details as to how we would actually go about normalizing relations with Iran.
Kinzer cites the example of
Nixon in China, but there are differences. First, there was a major geostrategic imperative, namely to balance against the Soviet Union. Second, Nixon has "street cred" as an anti-communist crusader, so he possessed at least some political cover from the natural critics of Communist China, namely those conservatives like Ronald Reagan. Finally, U.S. foreign policy could be conducted in at least some secrecy before the post-Watergate reforms. Kissinger made secret trips to China through Pakistan, something inconceivable in the age of Twitter (imagine Hillary Clinton trying to visit Tehran secretly by going through Riyadh).
Ultimately, I hope many Americans read this book and gain a more nuanced understanding of the Middle East and U.S. foreign policy. The U.S. does need to reset its policy in the region, and I do hope U.S. foreign policymakers heed Kinzer's advice. However, Kinzer doesn't provide a detailed roadmap, and as such I'm skeptical that we'll be wise enough to actually
Reset our policy.
