'Ratcliffe's book is a terrific survey of the entire debate about the adequacy of folk psychological theories of mind. It is careful, nuanced, fair, and well-argued' - Mark Johnson, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 'Many analytically trained philosophers suspect that something is missing in mainstream philosophy of mind, and would like to investigate the phenomenological tradition. Such philosophers face formidable obstacles, both stylistic and substantive. What they need is a book by someone with a strong grounding in both traditions, and who can explain phenomenology in a way that is accessible to analytic philosophers, and reveal its relevance to their own projects. Ratcliffe has written such a book.' - James Baillie, Philosophical Books 'Ratcliffe certainly knows his stuff and provides us with a powerful and phenomenologically sensitive corrective to certain misleading but sadly prevalent assumptions about the nature of our everyday understanding of action. This is a challenging book that anyone working on these topics ought to read and take seriously.' -Daniel Hutto, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews '...a compelling, well-researched and well-argued piece...This is important work, and Ratcliffe's book deserves the careful attention of researchers connected in any way with the study of other minds.' - Journal of Consciousness Studies
About the Author
MATTHEW RATCLIFFE is Reader in Philosophy at Durham University, UK. He is the author of Feelings of Being: Phemenology, Psychiatry and the Sense of Reality (2008) and co-editor of Folk Psychology Re-assessed (2007).