Customer Reviews

Rethinking Human Nature: A Christian Materialist Alternative to the Soul

5 star:		(0)
4 star:		(2)
3 star:		(0)
2 star:		(0)
1 star:		(0)

 

 

Corcoran is a materialist Christian. That means he doesn't believe we have a soul in the classic Christian view of soul. It doesn't mean we are merely animals either. I do love how it makes the resurrection of the body which Paul so emphasizes imperative. I don't know if his way is the only way to get there, nor is it his prime motivation for holding the view. An insightful read that will definitely leave you with questions about your assumptions.

Kevin Corcoran's work Rethinking Human Nature: A Christian Materialist Alternative to the Human Soul is 160 pages long and published by Baker Publishing Group. All references below will be from Corcoran's study.

Corcoran presents a "Christian materialist" alternative to commonly held beliefs about human nature and the soul. He refers to his position as the "constitution view" (CV). Unlike other types of physicalism, CV maintains that the human body is not identical with the human person. Yet bodies constitute persons like marble or wood constitute tables. Another example that Corcoran gives regarding the CV is dollar bills: paper constitutes dollar bills, but is not identical with them.

The word "identical" is used as a technical term in order to reference things being numerically identical with one another and not replicas. Clark Kent is numerically identical with Superman because the former and latter are one and the same object. Other examples include books which are numerically identical or a car that remains identical (the same object) through time. What allows us to make identity claims of an object (X)? What justifies the belief that a thing (X) maintains its numerical identity year after year or second after second? Corcoran discusses the subject of numerical identity as well as the role that persistence conditions play in the belief that X is numerically identical within a spatio-temporal context. He points out that the relevant persistence conditions for X depend on exactly what X is. For example, the persistence conditions of a human body are not the same as those for a banana.

Corcoran also distinguishes between a) substance dualism; b) compound dualism or hylomorphism and c) emergent dualism. He perceives logical deficiencies in each type of dualism. Corcoran labels Plato and Descartes as substance dualists, and Thomas Aquinas as a compound dualist: "According to Aquinas' Compound Dualist view, a human soul is a kind of form, and forms are dynamic states" (p. 36). This view (hylomorphism or compound dualism) also contends that soul and body constitute one thing, namely, a person.

William Hasker is an emergent dualist. Emergent dualism is demarcated from other forms of dualism insofar as it allows for mind to emerge from complex physical systems. Hasker even contends that it is logically possible for mind to exist apart from its generating physical source (i.e. the brain) after the physical death of a biological organism. Corcoran is critical of emergent dualism on two fronts. First, while Hasker posits an intimate and natural connection between body and soul, it appears that he believes mind or soul is not causally dependent on the body (a physical system) since its continued existence in this life or the next does not require causal dependence on a physical system (p. 43). Second, the emergent dualism of Hasker apparently splits the human person or human being "into two disparate entities" (ibid). Therefore, while emergent dualism may be able to set itself apart from substance dualism, it retains problematics seemingly indigenous to substance dualism.

Corcoran also outlines the conditions for personhood in multiple ways: a) the capacity for a certain range of intentionality; b) the capacity for a first-person perspective; c) persons are essentially constituted by means of bodies; d) persons are persons in relation to other persons. He believes that nothing a priori keeps persons from being defined in fully embodied terms. But is Christian materialism able to supply the resources needed to protect the human fetus? Corcoran admits that CV alone cannot provide the metaphysical resources needed to generate moral obligations that serve to protect a human fetus. But he also contends that dualism cannot generate such obligations either.

JP Moreland and Scott Rae (p. 85-87) argue that materialism cannot produce a suitable ethic revolving around personhood. Instead, they maintain that a dualist account of personhood is required to develop a proper moral account regarding abortion, human cloning, euthanasia or fetal research. But Corcoran maintains that one must supplement both dualism and materialism in order to produce a suitable ethic of life. What is needed? Corcoran argues that God's benevolent intentions toward creation are requisite. Without this foundation for an ethical system, the necessary metaphysical resources to protect a human fetus are lacking.

Corcoran introduces the notion of immanent causal condition (ICC) in this work. ICC can potentially account for a thing remaining identical while experiencing gaps in existence. According to ICC, an earlier stage of pre-gap existence must be causally relevant to a later post-gap stage of existence in order for a thing (X) to remain numerically identical. A state (Y) must bring about changes (Z) within an object (A) rather than a numerically distinct object (B) in order for one to speak about ICC occurring within an object. Corcoran insists that ICC is a diachronic condition of a thing which means that it persists through time as a causally relevant mechanism for the biological organism

Corcoran's book is a tightly argued work, it's accessible and he makes distinctions well. There are formal parts to satisfy professional logicians. His work also contributes to discussions on human nature or the study of personhood. I recommend this work for those interested in questions about anthropology and the post-mortem condition for humans. But the approach in this work is more philosophical than biblical.