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Retreat from Gettysburg: Lee, Logistics, and the Pennsylvania Campaign (Civil War America)

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Kent Masterson Brown has spent more than twenty years researching and writing his 500+ page book on the retreat from Gettysburg. I first met Kent ten years or so ago, and I was aware that he was working on this project then. He has spent years and years on it, and it shows.

This book appears destined to become a standard reference work on the subject. The bibliography is 28 pages long, and he found a tremendous volume of primary source manuscript material that is unfamiliar to even me, who has also been studying the retreat for more than ten years. The work is extremely scholarly in nature, but yet is amply mapped and amply illustrated, making it attractive to less sophisticated students of the Gettysburg Campaign. There are also unpublished photos that I have never seen before that add a lot to the story, including a photo of Capt. George Emack, the company commander who held off Brig. Gen. Judson Kilpatrick's entire cavalry division at Monterey Pass for much of the night on July 4.

Brown's primary thrust is the logistics of the retreat, and he shows that there are many complex reasons why the definitive fight did not take place on the north bank of the Potomac River after Gettysburg. Those who are inclined to criticize Meade may well reconsider their positions after reading this.

Congratulations to Kent Brown for writing a terrific and much needed book that addresses a too-often overlooked aspect of the Gettysburg Campaign in the level of detail that it has long deserved.

This book definitely needs a place on the bookshelves of any student of the Gettysburg Campaign, and also on the bookshelves of any student of army logistics and how they can make or break a campaign.

Highly recommended.

Kent Masterson Brown's "Retreat from Gettysburg" (2005) has been justly praised as the first full-length study of the Army of Northern Virginia as it withdrew from Gettysburg following the failure of "Pickett's Charge" on July 3, 1863, crossed South Mountain, and succeeded in crossing the Potomac River on July 14, 1863. Most histories of the battle devote only a few anti-climactic pages to the retreat and tell the story from the standpoint of General Meade and the Army of the Potomac. These books then either praise or criticize Meade to varying degrees for not being more aggressive in attacking Lee's army. As is well known, President Lincoln was highly critical of Meade and believed that a further attack could have severely crippled the Army of Northern Virginia and perhaps ended the War.

But Brown's study not only tells a detailed story of the retreat, it offers as well a somewhat different account of Lee's Pennsylvania campaign than that offered in recent studies. The books on the Battle of Gettysburg by Sears and Trudeau, for example, explain the Pennsylvania campaign as an attempt by Lee to win a major victory, to fight a battle for the annihilation of the Army of the Potomac, and thus to bring the war to an end. Brown argues that the primary focus of the campaign was different. He sees it primarily as a large-scale raid in which the Army of Northern Virginia invaded Northern soil to secure food for the troops, forage for the horses and mules, and essential supplies for the Army. Southern soil had been decimated by two years of heavy fighting, and the Confederacy lacked an adequate supply system to keep the army moving. Thus Lee wanted to tap the rich, untouched soil of Pennsylvania for supplies to keep his Army a fighting force.

And forage Lee's army did. Brown has unearthed and utilized a vast array of documentary evidence showing the extent of southern foraging. The foraging of food, supplies, and clothing began when the vanguard of the Army of Northern Virginia crossed the Potomac and proceeded with great force during the two weeks portions of Lee's Army spent unopposed in Pennsylvania before the Battle of Gettysburg. The foraging and gathering continued during the battle and, indeed, during the long retreat. The retreat was difficult in part because the Army of Northern Virginia had thousands of wagons which formed a train extending for 50 miles as it crossed the mountains. These wagons had to be protected, no less than the troops, to keep the army together. There were some losses to Union calvary but on the whole Lee and his army managed to get the goods they took in Pennsylvania across the Potomac and to make use of them to alleviate pressure on Southern soil and transportation systems.

For Brown, the Battle of Gettysburg was a serious tactical loss for the Confederacy, resulting in a defeat and in the loss of men that could not be replaced. But he argues that the Pennsylvania campaign had a strategically more ambiguous result because Lee achieved many of his objectives. His army spent much of the summer in Pennsylvania and took the food, the beef, the horses, and the supplies that were a prime objective of the campaign. Brown concludes that "Gettysburg cannot be viewed as the turning point of the Civil War or even a turning point of the eastern theater of war after Lee's remarkable retreat." (p. 390, citing the work of Gary Gallagher who has taken a similar view of the aftermath of the battle.)

The story of the retreat itself is told with remarkable detail and clarity. Brown gives the reader a full picture of Lee, Stuart, Imboden, Pettigrew, and many lesser-known leaders in the Army of Northern Virginia that played essential roles in the long, difficult retreat through the mud and the mountains, most of it in driving rain. There are closely-drawn pictures of the many ill and wounded soldiers in the Army of Northern Virginia and of the African-Americans, slave and some free, who accompanied and provided essential services to Lee's army. The maps in the book are well-chosen, clear, and illuminating. The book is also graced with many rare photographs and drawings.

Brown gives the reader the retreat almost exclusively from the Southern standpoint -- by following the Southern army -- but this hasn't been done before for the retreat. It deepens the reader's understanding of the campaign and of the army. I understood better after reading this account why General Meade had to hesitate in his pursuit -- he was unsure of Lee's intentions and the condition of his own army and supply system demanded attention -- and why Meade was probably correct in not attacking the strong southern defenses at Williamsport. Still, the Army of Northern Virginia was highly vulnerable to attack during the evening of July 13 early on July 14 while it was crossing the Potomac. The Union cavalry mounted a strong late attack at this point, resulting in the death of Southern General Pettigrew. Possibly a more effective reconaissance and a stronger Union infantry presence during the crossing could have inflicted greater damage.

Brown has written a thoughtful and well-documented history of the retreat from Gettysburg and of the Pennsylvania campaign that has much to teach the serious student of the battle and of the Civil War.

Robin Friedman

This could be the most important Civil War history published in 2005. This ignored subject is usually covered in a few pages at the end of a Gettysburg history. We all know the AoNV managed to get back to Virginia, that it was a horrible experience and that the AOP was unable to force a battle that it could win. Kent Masterson Brown has taken these few facts, coupled with extensive research and built a story of escape, pursuit and human suffering with few equals in American history. Somehow, a complex series of stories come together in a compelling narrative that engages and then astounds the reader.

This story starts with the failure of Pickett's Charge and ends about two weeks later, with the AoNV safe in Virginia and Meade forever dammed for "allowing Lee" to escape. In between is hell. Rain, mud and floods on a scale that rival the more famous "Mud March", coupled with thousands of sick and wounded men being transported to safety or death. Tens of thousands of animals create an incredible amount of filth and draw every fly for miles. This book allows us to "see" what this meant in very personal human way that adds to our understanding.

Interspersed are battles with the Union Cavalry, worn out, badly beat up from Gettysburg but still "game" and spoiling for a fight. Meade must determine Lee's intentions, mount an effective counter and supply his army while caring for thousands of wounded. The author details these problems and allows us to understand what this means. For the AOP, pursuit was almost as bad as retreat was for the AoNV. Short of everything, burden with the dead and wounded from Gettysburg and working blind, they group their way south not really ready to close in for a kill but hopeful. In the end, Lee has time to entrench, the Union Corps commanders advise Meade not to attack and Lee crosses the Potomac ending our story.

Of note is the treatment of blacks, both slave and free, in the Army of Northern Virginia. This topic generates controversy but is present in a straightforward factual manner that adds importance to the book. Much of the personal in the AoNV's supply trains were black and most units had a number of slaves with them. Kent Brown tells the story of these men, during the retreat without sensationalism. He makes no effort to minimize the essential services they provide to the army and their masters either. Their story is woven into the very fabric of the retreat and together produces a compelling honest book.

Most histories of the Gettysburg campaign effectively end on July 3, 1863. At most, a few sentences are added at the end indicating that Lee made his way back to Virginia. Even the sophisticated reader has had little opportunity to learn just what happened after the battle. This book changes all that. In great detail, almost every moment of the retreat to Virginia is described. The author makes great but appropriate reliance on primary sources to provide not just the only but the definitive study of these critical few weeks of the war. The book is generally well written, sometimes vivid. However, the author does spend more time than is necessary listing every pound of corn, every mule, every wagon foraged by Lee's army. This makes several pages of the book a numbing read and this data would have been better left to the appendix. This is, however, a small problem in an otherwise outstanding book. A must read for any serious student of the Civil War.

I have read many books on the Gettysburg Campaign but never before have I been as enlightened as I have been after reading Kent Masterson Brown's Retreat From Gettysburg.
Brown's well researched book vividly describes the purpose of the Campaign and dismisses many fallacies such as Lee had no Cavalry with him and that Stuart was off gallivanting in the Pennsylvania Countryside. Stuart's orders are clearly defined and followed as are the roles of many of the other major participants, such as John Imboden who Lee entrusted with an important and critical responsibility .
The Author puts the reader in the midst of the Confederate retreat and one cannot help but feel the suffering and pathos of the wounded solders enduring such horrific conditions. Brown also tells the story of the effect on the civilians in the towns along the route.
The book also points out the obstacles faced by Meade and how he dealt with a command structure that was decimated by the recent battle in trying to ascertain Lee's intentions after July 3rd.
The important Battle of Falling Waters is finally told in detail and not just dismissed as in many prior books with a few lines casually referring to it as a rear guard action.
One of the things I found most helpful is Brown's ability to connect events with an implicit time line, along with excellent maps throughout a well written narrative.

Kent Masterson Brown's treatment of the Army of Northern Virginia's retreat of the after the bloody battle at Gettysburg is meticulously researched, and fills a notable gap in the literature on the campaign. The story focuses on the retreat of the ANV, and the strategic decisions made by the Southern leaders, rather than that of their adversary the Army of the Potomac. To some degree this is as it should be; Lee arranged the retreat masterfully and restored the balance of power between the armies in a matter of days, while Meade, commanding the Union AoP, was content to cede the initiative, and eventually allow his enemies to escape.

Meade was unable to capitalize on the tactical victory at Gettysburg in a way that more thoroughly relentless, risk taking generals such as Grant or Sherman would have. Brown speaks to both the skill of Lee's command in arranging the retreat as an aggressive rear-guard action (keeping Meade uncertain of his intentions), but also the hesitancy and trepidation with which Meade pursued him. One of the great what-ifs of the war imagines a more aggressive Union commander attempting a counter-punch to break the retreating ANV decisively.

Brown argues that Lee's ability to manage the logistics of the retreat, namely to return to Virginia with enormous stores of livestock and supplies foraged from Pennsylvania, turned the Gettysburg campaign from a tactical defeat into a minor victory. But this argument I believe entirely overstates the importance of logistics and supply. Although it's true as Brown argues that the escape of the ANV with its supply trains full allowed the army to continue the war re-sustained, the loss of such a large part its the manpower and the officer corps at Gettysburg would eventually prove decisive. But the argument that the logistical aspect of the campaign turned a strategic disaster into a strategic success is certainly provocative, at the very least demonstrates fresh thinking about the campaign.

A masterful, compelling book.

I am behind the curve ball here as I write this review after so many good ones have already been written. Like most of the other reviewers, I enjoyed reading this book and learned quite a good deal about this aspect of the Gettysburg campaign that haven't been touched previously. I thought the author wrote well, did his research and gave the Civil War historians all over a great service. The way many of us looked at Lee's retreat and Meade's pursuit have changed forever after we read this book.

But I cannot help but to believed that the author have drawn a wrong conclusion about the campaign. Call me a traditionalist but outside of saving his supply trains and the fruits of his forging, Lee left Pennsylvania with very little else. His army was in tattered, he have forever lost any sort of strategic initiative and he will be on the defensive until the war's end. His successful retreat enabled him to fight on but not to victory. Only because Meade's army was equally damaged as Lee's did he escaped. But Meade's army was rebuilt, reinforced, resupplied and regroup. Lee's army after Gettysburg was the shadow of its former greatness and that too was grinded down. Brown is wrong and rest of us who happened to be "traditionalist" in nature is right, Gettysburg was the last major hurrah of Lee's Army of Northern Virginia. Never again will Lee threaten the Army of Potomac with devastating defeat of any kind...tactical ones yes but nothing that will change the course of war. Best way to look at this would be this: if in late July of 1863, God came to Lee and gave him a choice between having his army back before Gettysburg in exchange for all the supplies he has taken from Pennsylvania, he would take that exchange in a heartbeat!!! Nothing could replaced what was lost at Gettysburg, not all the cows, horses, wagons and other material that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania have to offer could do that.

This book is great piece of work on the subject but the author drew a wrong conclusion. Retreat is an army in defeat, not of victory and no matter how rosy it turned out well for General Lee, he lost something far more important at Gettysburg then anything he could have saved in this retreat. I am bit surprised the many of the reviews written on this book haven't caught on to this yet.

Most accounts on the Battle of Gettysburg give limited coverage to R.E. Lee's retreat from Gettysburg.. The text notes "The idea for the Pennsylvania campaign arose many months before. It was born in a desperation caused by the looming collapse of the Army of Northern Virginia if it remained in war-ravages central Virginia without adequate food and supplies for its men and fodder for its horses and mules." Consequently, from the moment that Lee reached the Maryland side of the Potomac River the countryside was scoured by Confederate quartermasters and commissaries of subsistence for food, fodder and supply. Interestingly, "The effort to obtain food, fodder, and equipment would never stop; even the three days of battle at Gettysburg did not interfere with it." The author, Kent Masterson Brown, addresses in detail the acute logistical problems attendant to Lee's army's retreat from Gettysburg with the critical supplies that had been foraged.

The text is broadly arranged into three sections: 1st disengagement at Gettysburg and crossing the South Mountain range; 2nd travel to Harrisburg and Williamsport; 3rd defense of Williamsport and Falling Waters, Virginia then travel to Staunton Virginia. "A slow, fighting retreat sounds simple in theory, but it is extraordinarily difficult in practice, particularly with a large army burdened by enormous trains." The trains were more than fifty-seven miles of wagon and ambulance trains plus ten of thousands of livestock. The text gives excellent, brief narratives of Lee's army's travels to the Potomac River, the cavalry attacks on the trains plus the engagements of the rear guard troops as Meade attacked.

Most interesting is Brown's accounts of attending to the sick and wounded. Those that could walk accompanied the trains while other wounded rode in ambulance wagons if available. However, for those seriously ill or wounded or who lacked transportation, surgical teams were ordered to stay with them. For example, of the 1,300 wounded in Johnson's Division, 446 were left behind. Ever effort was made to care for the sick and wounded whether they could travel or had to be left behind. Protecting the trains was exceedingly difficult; the escorts suffered along with the helpless wounded.

The entire army was in Hagerstown by the morning of 7 July. The author notes that"The movement of Lee's army from the morning of 5 July until the afternoon of 6 July was one of the most critical episodes of the retreat from Gettysburg, although it was far from being filled with battle action." "Lee's slow march and bold rear guard on 5 July had a profound effect on Meade and his lieutenants." Next Lee had to set up strong defenses until he could make arrangements for crossing the Potomac River. Using the ferries at Williamsport was exceptionally slow so that Lee's defenses must hold until he could build a pontoon bridge at Falling Waters. By 10 July the Williamsport defense line was almost ready, but Lee had limited time to cross the Potomac. The last person crossed the pontoon bridge on 14 July. The text narrates Meade's attempts to engage Lee and prevent his army from crossing the Potomac. However, the text concludes that "....there was nothing Meade could have done to prevent Lee from winning the race to the Williamsburg defense line or holding it."

Once across the Potomac River, The Shenandoah Valley served as the corridor for Lee's army's evacuation. The problem now was to take care of the sick and wounded and get them to the General and Receiving Hospital at Staunton, Virginia. Staunton was soon overrun with sick and wounded soldiers. The text provides a brief but excellent account of this phase of the retreat.

President Lincoln blamed Lee's escape on Meade's slow response. While Meade undoubtedly could have done better, Brown notes Meade's army "was in a desperate condition, many artillery batteries could not accompany their corps while his horses and mules pulling many of the guns and caissons were so exhausted and weakened by excessive campaigning and lack of forage that they collapsed...." Throughout Lee's retreat, Meade had critical supply problems that limited his response.

The author concludes "Although the battle of Gettysburg was indeed a Confederate loss, the invasion of Pennsylvania may not have been. In fact, Lee successfully brought his army and all its trains across the Potomac River. In the process, he managed to get out of Pennsylvania and Maryland more than forty-five miles of quartermaster and substance trains filled with impressed stores." One can only speculate on how, or if, the Army of Northern Virginia would have survived without these supplies. Lee's very successful retreat maintained the balance of power in his theatre of operations.

This is an excellently researched work; Kent Brown uses much previously untapped source material. This book is the major source of information on the retreat from Gettysburg and will be of interest to all serious students of Civil War History.

A magnificently detailed retracing and account of Lee's retreat from Gettysburg, which began on the evening of July 4. Brown spends the first couple of chapters briefly describing Lee's invasion into Pennsylvania and the battle at Gettysburg itself. Before Lee could actually move his army south he had to make sure all his units were in position on the west side of town along Seminary Ridge and that the dead and wounded had been collected. This accomplished, and employing Clausewitz's dictum that "in order to keep morale as high as possible, it is absolutely necessary to make a slow fighting retreat," not an easy thing to do, troops began making a slow march to the southwest and the Potomac River at Williamsport.

Brown's intention is to be as meticulous as possible and he's consulted hundreds of sources from the OFFICIAL RECORDS to newspaper accounts to soldier's diaries and everything in-between in achieving that purpose. He often cites diary entries to give his narrative strong personal appeal: the observations of participants (and local citizens along the pathways) make very human the agonies and travails of this retreat. Excellent maps are also included. Brown's writing style is always at the forefront and is magnificent in it's authority and elan. It's a very moving story while at the same time historically precise and clear. Someone only generally interested in the Civil War might be put off by the sheer amount of detail here (though still would be moved by the human drama), all those with a more intense interest in the war or in the Battle of Gettysburg will find this book indispensable and a major addition to their Civil War libraries. Highly recommended.

Retreat from Gettysburg is an excellent account of the retreat of Robert E Lee's beaten but not despairing Army of Northern Virginia from Pennsylvania to Virginia in July 1863.
This gallant army lost 28,000 casulaties and was bested on the
field by Meade's Army of the Potomac in the Civil War's most
famous battle: Gettysburg (July 103),
As Brown elucidates a fighting retreat is a difficult achievement for an army calling on the best of soldiers and commanders.
Lee and the ANVA retreated with thousands of wounded men being tortured in wagons; thousands of slaves, captured livestock and Union prisoners all made the journey from the field of bloody hell to relative safety on the southern shore of the Potomac reached on July 14th.
Lee's campaign enabled the starving Confederate army to be fed and have their animals fed enabling them to fight again another day. But what a cost! Lee was never able to replace his fallen warrors. The Southern cause would not receive foreign money and
support (the British had banned slavery and would never support a southern slavocracy),
Of all the dozens of books I own on Gettysburg this book is the only one dealing with the retreat. Brown quotes extensively from diaries and memoirs penned by participants in the campaign.
His book includes pictures and is well written in a popular style easy to read.
Without a thorough understanding of the retreat the student of the Civil War will never understan the Gettysburg campaign.
Kudos to Brown. One hopes this book will win him a deserved wide readership appealing to Civil War buff as well as the general reader. Excellent work!