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Retribution: The Battle for Japan, 1944-45

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With age comes a bit of weariness, and I confess that huge books with small print have begun to intimidate me just a bit. But some of them are so well-written and so interesting that page-anxiety drops away after the first couple of chapters. So it was for me with Max Hastings' Retribution.

Retribution, which chronicles the final year of World War II's Pacific Theatre, is a companion to Hasting's Armageddon, a history of the European Theatre's final year. The new volume begins with General MacArthur's plans to retake the Philippines and ends with a quick summary of the war's effects on Japanese society and culture. In between, Hastings examines the infiltration of total warfare into everyday Japanese life; the battle for control of the sea corridors, the Burma campaign and the Aussies who fought it (which I found particularly fascinating, knowing virtually nothing about it); the air campaign over Japan, masterminded by Curtis LeMay (also an especially intriguing chapter, particularly for those who presume that the only big bomb damage in Japan were the nuclear blasts over Hiroshima and Nagasaki); the unspeakably horrific Japanese treatment of China and Manchuria; the ferocious battles on Iwo Jima (to which Hastings devotes an entire chapter); and the behind-the-scenes negotiations that led up to Japan's final surrender.

Hastings punctuates his history of the Pacific Theatre's final year with dozens of stories about individual people whose lives were affected--GIs, sailors, Japanese infantrymen and pilots, Chinese "comfort girls," generals, admirals, statesmen--and this is part of what makes his book such a fascinating read. Moreover, Hastings doesn't pull any punches in his estimation of the war's leaders. MacArthur, for example, comes off as one of the most overrated military leaders ever produced by the U.S. Hirohito also comes across badly. Despite the post-war efforts to paint him as a pacifist overwhelmed by sabre-rattling generals, Hastings argues that the Emperor advocated war right up to the end.

Three things in particular struck me in reading Hastings. The first was that bushido, the ancient code of honor embraced by the Japanese military, made life hell for ordinary foot soldiers, who could be savagely beaten by superiors for little or no reason. Apparently such abuse was seen as a way of toughening up the fighting spirit. Bushido also encouraged disdain for military technology on the part of Japanese officers. "Why do we need radar?" one of them asked. "Do we not have eyes that see perfectly well?" (p. 47) This attitude led to a constant technological lag throughout the entire war.

The second was that the Kamikaze strategy adopted by the Japanese toward the end of the war not only failed in its aim of striking fear and panic into the hearts of Allied sailors, but actually had the opposite effect. Sailors were so enraged by what they perceived as cowardly attacks that their ferocity against the Japanese intensified. As one seaman wrote, "seeing dead Japanese in the water was like making love to a beautiful girl" (p. 173). This is a point worth considering, given the current war on terrorism.

Finally, I was amazed to discover that Japanese civilians were so physically and psychologically exhausted by the war that the US occupation forces actually had to protect Japanese soldiers from their wrath when the war ended (pp. 547-48). Even before the end came, some Japanese were privately voicing reservations about the culture of bushido (p. 264). But with defeat came a desire to leave behind the old culture--to such an extent that only Japan, out of all the war's Axis powers, has refused to acknowledge any war guilt or offer reparations (p. 549).

Hastings' book is well worth reading, either straight-through or selectively. One better appreciates just how daunting a task the island-by-island Allied strategy was, as well as how hopeless (at least when viewed in hindsight) Japan's imperialistic aims were.
________
* A message to Admiral Nimitz from Admiral Richmond Turner, commander of amphibious forces during the invasion of Okinawa. Nimitz's skeptical reply: "Delete all after 'crazy'" (p. 375).

I became aware of this book on the brink of its UK pubication. The UK title is: Nemesis: The Battle for Japan 1944-1945. I ended up getting the UK edition. I just didn't want to wait for the US edition, so I got it (and I live in Wyoming!). I'm glad I did. Hastings brings forth all his formidable powers, both in research, analysis and in his writing abilities.
Hastings praises the US Navy (especially the Submarine Service), condemns MacArthur (or more correctly, his oversized ego), Bill Slim is seen as one of the war's great captains (though Hastings believes Burma did little to contribute to the defeat of Japan), praises the courage of the Japanese, but damns their cruelty and their leadership's poor decisions.

Retribution is the companion volume to Armageddon. As is typical of Hastings, readers probably won't agree with 100% of his judgements and opinions. But the way he organizes his facts and presents his narrative, he presents a formidable case that's hard to deny.

What sets this book apart from the clear majority of Pacific war books, is that Hastings also has chapters on the war's neglected theaters, China and we see the war as both the Communists and Kuomintang, the Australians and of course, the Soviets. It's not just about the Americans, Japanese and to a lesser extent, the British. American readers may not agree with everything Mr. Hastings writes, but part of what makes him so interesting is that he's brilliantly provocative.

Interested readers should not be put off by Kai Bird's misleading review for the Washington Post, which features on Amazon.com's page for this book, which, incidentally, is published under the title Nemesis in the UK. This is an excellent study of the last years of events in the pacific theatre during the second world war.

Kai Bird says that Hastings "abandons his critical faculties" when it comes to the book's "central theme", namely that the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was wholly justified.

Bird is mistaken on one account and deliberately misleading on another. Hasting's 600 page book naturally deals with the events at hand in chronological fashion and it is not until the very final chapters that he comes to discuss the dropping of the bombs. Reading the book, I did not identify the contents of these 2 chapters as either presenting or encapsulating a "central theme" in it. In these chapters, Hastings addresses both sides of the argument as to whether the decision to drop Little Boy and Fat Man was justifiable. He is of the opinion that it was, but far from abandoning his critical faculties he reasonably presents the opposing argument and then goes on to expose the holes that he sees in it. While he acknowledges that giving the Russians a display of US might was seen as a very useful added bonus of the atomic drop, to put it crudely, he rejects the argument that this was foremost in the minds of the members of the war cabinet and the top brass when planning the drop. He also shows how, far from there being any soul searching amongs decision makers, the atomic bomb drop was more a military project that had been put in place a few years back and was at this point running its course. He points out that the incendiary bombing of Japanese cities by General Lemay's B29s killed more people than did the atomic bombs and ridicules the idea that the deaths that Japanese civilians met at the hands of Lemay's pilots were any less excruciating than those of the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Kai Bird says that Hastings misleads his readers by presenting the decision to drop the bombs as the lesser of two evils - the greater being Operation Olympic, the invasion of Kyushu by the Allied forces, which would certainly have resulted in a death toll far higher than that of the atomic bombs. Only the most wilful of misreadings could come to such a conclusion. Hastings does not present the "decision" to drop the bombs in this light, although naturally he presents the possibility of a homeland invasion as part of the context in which the Americans were weighing their options. As I observed above, part of his argument is that there was no real decision to drop the bombs but rather there was no decision to call a halt to a military project that was then reaching fruition after years of development. Bird goes on to say that Hastings himself acknowledges the fallacy of his supposed argument regarding Olympic when he admits that "an invasion would almost certainly have been unnecessary". What Bird crucially omits to mention is that when Hastings makes this assertion it is in the context of the first atomic bomb already having been dropped. Here Bird is deliberately misleading his reader for what one can suppose are purely ideological reasons. He asserts that Hastings ignores the real issue: that Truman ignored the urgings of Henry Stimson and others to give the Japanese assurances that the position of the emperor in the constitution of Japanese society would not be meddled with by the Americans. With such assurances, Bird believes, the Japanese would have surrendered before the bombs were dropped. In fact Hastings does address this matter and in sufficient detail to allow his reader to understand that this was not so cut and dry and was far more complicated than Bird would have you believe.

Hastings has tracked down many veterans and civilian survivors from all sides in order to give his reader an impression of the war from the bottom up as well as from the top down. US readers of the book may be irked by the amount of coverage he gives to what they might view as British sideshows in the war - Bill Slim's battle for Burma, for example, but given that Hastings is British it is surely understandable that he has chosen to cover in detail the history of the British effort in the pacific theatre with British readers in mind.

I read Kai Bird's review of this excellent book only as I was coming to the end of the work and was dismayed by Bird's charges. I defy anyone to read Hastings work and then conclude that Bird's review of his book is objective

Relatively few people are alive today who experienced any aspect of WWII as a teenager or older. Fewer still live in countries where the WWII experience can be freely discussed, as in the United States and UK. The Soviet Union considered the war to be a people's war and only recently have stories of individual experiences been forthcoming. In Germany, less and less attention is paid to the horrendous crimes of the German people. France dramatizes its miniscule, if even existent, role. And in Japan, as Hastings points, out widespread denial is still the norm. As a result, accurate knowledge of WWII and its horrors and few glories is rapidly fading from human consciousness - and with that forgetfulness comes the danager of new and even more horrible wars.

Max Hastings writes highly readable military histories. He eschews footnotes and the minutia of academic writing in favor of a friendly narrative style. There is considerable depth, however. In its 550 pages, Hastings covers a war that spanned the years 1931 - 1945 and a bit beyond. It covered a larger geographic area than any other conflict in history, though most of the area was the Pacific Ocean.

The book opens on the saddest possible note: the dedication is to Max Hasting's son who apparently died at age 27 in 2000. And on that sad note, the deaths of millions and unspeakable cruelties at the hands of the Japanese are chronicled in the following pages.

In twenty-two chapters, Hastings treats every major aspect of the war against the Japanese by the primary combatants: the United States, Britain, China and late in the game, the Soviet Union.

Hastings begins with a look at the motivation and goals of the United States. President Roosevelt had announced the goal was unconditional surrender. In recent years, revisionist historians have claimed that this policy prolonged the war. Throughout the book, Hastings demolishes these arguments over and over again. It is quite something to see: Hastings has a clear mastery of the subject.

He then goes on to describe the various battlefronts and he is equally at home here. He uses dozens, if not hundreds, of interviews and memoirs to create his descriptions of battles like the British Burma campaign, the Battle of Leyte Gulf and so on, all the time weaving in the machinations of the main players in the Japanese, US, British and other governments. It is a very effective approach. His descriptions of the battles on Iwo Jima, Okinawa, the sea war at the Battle of Leyte Gulf and the kamikazee campaign leave no room for doubt as to why the Americans feared the blood cost of an invasion of Japan.

This is a critical history and Hastings heaps it on. The vastly overrated Douglas MacArthur is cut appropriately down to size, though Hastings does laud his post-war stewardship of Japan. Hastings criticizes the revisionists, apologists and anti-Americans who condemn the United States for its actions, such as the use of nuclear weapons. He spares nothing in his criticism and outright condemnation of Japanese leaders, past and present for the widespread atrocities.

I devour history and there are few well-written histories, so I found myself dealing with "Retribution" as if it were a great thriller and couldn't wait to get from one page to another. I truly wish that books like this were require reading in America's schools so chilren would grow up with an understanding of why they enjoy such lavish freedom. It did not come free and Hastings gives new life to the tens of thousands of Americans who died in the Pacific and Asian campaigns. It is a sobering book and one that I hope will be widely read.

Jerry

The British author Max Hastings normally a creditable job in covering his campaign de june, but this time as with "Armageddon" he attempts to cover larger campaigns and issues of WWII and doesn't succeed. The British slant is present as usual, this time playing up the British campaigns in the CBI theater as important to Japan's defeat. Well, hardly. The fastest the British moved was in steaming to Hong Kong to re-occupy their former colony at war's end before the Americans got there, an item Hastings doesn't mention. Siam was lost to them due the OSS support of the "Black Thais", and that couldn't be allowed to happen again.

The strong points have been covered well in other reviews, but allow me to add a few facts into the debate over the necessity of dropping the atomic bombs. Yes, the Japanese Foreign Office had made an offer (in response to a query) to surrender through the Soviet Union in early July but it was clearly unacceptable to the US. These cables and their decoding through Magic were discussed at length (see Richard B. Frank, "Downfall"), and although the clear Japanese text is sometimes seized upon to prove the revisionists' case that Japan would have surrendered without the atomic bombs being dropped or suffering an invasion, the analysis made at the time clearly held such a possibility to be highly improbable. Nonetheless, we see it again and again by those, often from the now-defunct British Empire, who wish to vilify the US. You can see some of this in the other reviews, including the one done by the Washington Post writer. As Hastings said, "The myth that the Japanese were ready to surrender anyway (without the atomic bombs being dropped) has been so comprehensively discredited by modern research that it is astonishing some writers continue to give it credence."

On the other hand, Hastings said, "It is now widely acknowledged that Olympic (the invasion of Japan) would almost certainly have been unnecessary." Maybe, but incorrectly. Yes, Japan was facing declining food availability, but had been for some time. A greater question was whether the American public would be willing to accept the casualties an invasion would would bring. If not, then a negotiated peace would be necessary, and in this respect is it noteworthy that post-war Japan has successfully fought off almost all attempts to assign war guilt to Japan or even to accept responsibility for their aggression and murderous occupation policies. US citizens blithely purchase Mitsubishi products even though the company employed slave labor during the war. Mitsubishi even sought to question whether Japan had invaded China, but somehow its automobiles are purchased by Americans who are willing to give Japan a pass on its crimes. Perhaps Mitsubishi should use the slogan, "From the Company that gave you the Japanese Zero with slave labor."

It is also interesting to note that none of the capitulation initiatives until after the dropping of the Nagasaki bomb originated in Japan. The Japanese Foreign office only responded to initiatives from other countries during June and July. In addition, the Potsdam Declaration issued on July 26th, effectively spelled out the Allied terms of surrender that were unacceptable to the Japanese military. Their only hope was to make American casualties so unacceptable to the American public that they could obtain better terms. The validity of such a strategy would later be proven by the Chinese in Korea and the North Vietnamese in Vietnam.

The reader should also consider that Togo's message to Sato on July 17th requesting he continue contacting the Soviets said, "Please bear particularly in mind, however, that we are not seeking the Russians' mediation for anything like an unconditional surrender." An historian can easily understand what this meant.

The intelligence estimate generated for the Combined Chiefs of Staff at Potsdam concluded, "... for a surrender to be acceptable to the Japanese Army it would be necessary for the military leaders to believe that it would not entail discrediting the warrior tradition and that it would permit the ultimate resurgance of a military in Japan." Neither the Combined Chiefs nor Truman were willing to discuss terms on that basis. And there has been no evidence since that time to contradict that intelligence estimate. One must remember that the Foreign Office did not rule Japan -- the military did with the silent consent of Hirohito. It was only when Hirohito finally issued his rescript that the war could be brought to an end, and first he needed to be convinced to take such action. He was looking at possibly negotiating a peace in October or later after the Americans started taking unacceptable casualties (for them) as reported by Bergamini and supported by his later statement to MacArthur that the atomic bombs gave him an excuse to surrender earlier than that. Note: he needed an excuse, and losing a few million of his subjects was not sufficient for him to ensure compliance from his military.

The reader must also note the chronology. The Hiroshima bomb was dropped on August 6th, but that didn't catalyze much surrender activity. The Russians declared war on Japan on August 8th, and opened their attack on Manchuria on August 9th, the same day the Nagasaki bomb was dropped. Towards midnight on the 9th, Hirohito called a meeting of the Supreme Council and attempted to get them to accept capitulation. The most that came out of that meeting was a cautious sending of peace feelers through Sweden and Switzerland. On the 10th, Japan suggested it would surrender "... on the understanding that it (the surrender) does not comprise any demand which prejudices the perogatives of the Emperor as soverign ruler." On August 14th, Hirohito decided to issue his rescript by radio announcing the cessation of hostilities. The Americans took this as a surrender, although in the Japanese language version they simply "Ceased to Fight" rather than surrendering. Fighting continued at various locations through August 25th, and the final instrument of capitulation was signed on September 2nd.

With respect to the Soviet attack on Manchuria on August 9th, no doubt that helped Hirohito make up his mind, but it is folly to say that the Soviet attack was the deciding factor. There has been an enormous amount of Monday-morning quarterbacking based on a few statements that were and are still open to interpretation, and the opinions of high officials in the Truman administration who did not understand what was going on in Japan are hardly proof of Japan's intention to surrender without the military's concurrence. In this situation, Hastings is not kow-towing to the American Legion -- he is presenting the most likely case.

The negatives of the book are many, and it is riddled with mistakes. Major Archimedes Patti is listed as Sebastian Patti as an example, and I could fill the review with like errors. It is as if Hastings's researchers were incompetent, but Hastings took their information unquestioningly because small mistakes would not invalidate his arguments and points of view. Maybe not, but the book as is cannot be considered definitive history. One should be warned that many historical details are inaccurate so the reader will not use this book's details as points of reference.

With respect to Hastings's arguments, his constant use of disparaging adjectives to describe MacArthur was jarring. Perhaps Hastings overlooked the fact that MacArthur's forces suffered the lowest casualty rates of any major allied commander. And if MacArthur was wrong in not bypassing the Philippines, what rationale on earth was there for the British campaign to retake Burma? Had Slim's army never moved an inch after Imphal, the war's outcome would have been the same. More tellingly, MacArthur can be faulted for fighting the South Pacific campaign at all. The case can be made that the decision came in the Central Pacific, and the US should have bypassed everything to the south and west of the Marianas and gone straight to Japan. But MacArthur fought the enemy in front of him as he was told to do, initially to defend Australia, then to take the fight to the enemy.

In conclusion, this is an interesting book that will add to discussions of US Pacific strategy and Japan's demise. Please read past the "the British were the experts, the Americans bumbling amateurs with a gift in economic production" attitude. Depictions such as, "Hurley (US General Patrick Hurley) was a buffoon, loud-mouthed and verging on senility" when Secretary Stimson characterized Hurley as "...loyal, intelligent and extremely energetic ... pleasant and diplomatic in his manner..." and a "very fortunate" choice (by General Marshall), seem woefully out of place and should be ignored. The question then becomes, what does the reader ignore? The answer only comes after reading more books by other authors on the subject.

By mid 1944, it was becoming obvious that Japan would be defeated, but the path to victory led straight through a minefield of destruction and suffering.

Master historian Max Hastings' "Retribution: The Battle for Japan, 1944- 45" dramatically chronicles the final year of the war against Japan.

Mr. Hastings takes the reader to the scenes of bloody, epic struggles -- wading through jungle mud in Burma and MacArthur's beloved Philippines --burning out snipers embedded in the volcanic fortress of Iwo Jima -- raining thousands of incendiaries on tender box Japanese cities from LeMay's B-29 Superfortresses -- and swarming through Manchuria on board Stalin's countless T-34 tanks.

Mr. Hastings, author of Armageddon: The Battle for Germany, 1944-1945, and Warriors: Portraits from the Battlefield, has skillfully woven interviews, letters, diaries and memoirs into the story of Japan's part in World War II.

Masterfully moving between the vast saga of the war against Japan to individual snippet's, Mr. Hastings sprinkles in the interesting tales of the ordinary soldiers, sailors, airmen, and civilians caught in this epic conflict.

But not everyone is praised for their efforts; the author is especially critical of key political leaders such as Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin and Chiang Kai-shek. Towering military figures -- especially General MacArthur, and Lord Mountbatten -- are scrutinized and exposed.

The author portrays Lord Mountbatten, "as a poseur with a streak of vulgarity, promoted far beyond his talents on the strength of fluency, film-star good looks, and his relationship to the royal family."

All students of World War II are familiar with the legendary ego of General MacArthur. Hastings writes, "It was MacArthur's good fortune that, after presiding over the initial disaster in the Philippines, he served in a theater when American material dominance became so overwhelming that his misjudgments and follies were redeemable."

The author describes Generalissimo Chaing Kai shek's, "absolute ruthlessness, vividly exemplified by his destruction of the Yellow River dikes in the path of a Japanese advance, exposing six million people to flooding and starvation. He was indifferent to his own armies' casualties, save where these threatened his power base." Though his regime was infested with corruption, Chiang should be credited with the ouster of the warlords. He knew no Chinese army could defeat the Japanese, and chose to surrender territory while waiting for better odds. Chiang was conserving his army for the battle with the Chinese communists that was coming after the war.

However, the author offers praise and recognition for Admiral Nimitz. Hastings glowingly writes, "Nimitz, a supremely professional naval officer, neither sought nor received a due share of fame for his stellar performance in the Pacific ... "a natural diplomat, sober and controlled."

Moving to the campaigns, Mr. Hastings argues that the island- hopping race between MacArthur and Nimitz was too wasteful. The author suspects The Philippines campaign was a personal goal of MacArthur and militarily was not necessary.

In "Burning A Nation: LeMay", he explores the debate on how to execute the campaign against the Japanese home islands. Truman offered, "The best psychological warfare to use on these barbarians [is] bombs." The author quotes General LeMay's summation, "Bomb and Burn `em till they quit."

Concerning the lack of remorse over Japanese civilian casualties, Mr. Hastings speculates that there was little compassion for Japanese suffering during the wholesale fire- bombing of cities, in part because of -- Japanese treachery committed at Pearl Harbor -- cruelty shown to allied prisoners -- Japanese insistence of dying to the last man.

With the surrender of Nazi Germany, there was a mad scramble on both sides for the final battle -- Operation Olympic, the invasion of Japan.

Vice-Admiral Abe "begged that the surviving German fleet, and especially its U-boats, should be sent to Japan."

The Japanese frantically assembled defensive forces consisting of 450,000 servicemen, 10,000 largely obsolete kamikaze aircraft, rocket planes, human torpedoes, suicide boats, and 4000 teenage 'dragon divers' (all vigorously denied by MacArthur).

On August 9. 1945, very late in the war, Stalin saw his chance to snatch Manchuria away from the crumbling Japanese. Tank armies numbering 1.5 million men, poured across the border from three directions, on a 2,730 mile wide front.

Progress was excellent because the best Japanese formations had already been stripped away for other campaigns. As the T-34 tanks struck deep into Manchuria, isolated Japanese units fought hard -- suicide squads and kamikaze aircraft stormed the tanks, but were shrugged off after furious fighting.

Curiously, this was almost a replay of the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 -- only in reverse. Japanese troops for the first time began to surrender.

The last battle of World War II was fought over the Japanese fortress at Hutou, Manchuria -- "the most elaborate defensive system in Asia." On top of tall river bluffs, Japan had constructed five "Verdun-like" fortresses with walls and ceilings nine feet thick. "The whole system was almost five miles wide and four deep, supported by some of the heaviest artillery in Asia, including 240mm Krupp guns and a 410mm howitzer." states Mr. Hastings.

A bitter Chinese civilian summed up the invasion, "The Russians were supposed to be our liberators, our brothers, but we quickly learned to regard them as enemies. They masqueraded as revolutionaries, but in truth they were no more than wolves."

"Retribution" contains 11 very good maps and 74 interesting photographs.

World War II history books were the first serious books I began reading as a kid. I've probably read over 100 titles ranging from autobiographies (like William Manchester's "Goodbye Darkness" or Saburo Sakai's "Samurai") to "big" history (like Shirer's "Rise and Fall of the Third Reich") and everything in between (especially a lot of those great Ballantine Books from the 1960s and 1970s). The value I see with Max Hastings effort, "Retribution," is that while it supplies well written history, it also reminds us of the past. The book clearly demonstrates that war is brutal, ugly, and vicious and even this "Good War" from the "Greatest Generation" still proves there's no nice way to do it.

I would quibble with Hastings' recurring need to snipe at various historical figures like Douglas MacArthur, William Halsey, Patrick Hurley, and others. He frequently finds fault with decisions that appeared to make a battle worse and that the decision makers should have known better at the time, but because they were vain, arrogant, or incompetent, more people suffered as a result.

For example, Admiral William Halsey has been second guessed for his pursuit of what turned out to be a Japanese decoy force at Leyte Gulf. Halsey directed his naval forces after that decoy, leaving vulnerable other American forces in the area. Those remaining American forces had one helluva fight on their hands when the main Japanese naval force attacked, but they managed to more than hold their own and drive off the Japanese assault. Every history book I've read going back to very early titles published shortly after the war, commented that Halsey at the very least got fooled by the decoy and should have provided better communication to other American commanders in the area. Hastings comments that Halsey should have been relieved of command, but since things turned out okay and it was so close to the end of the war, Halsey's superiors let it go.

My take on this is simple: You're always the smartest guy in the room when it's not your job. Hastings often acts like that annoying backseat driver, Monday morning quarterback, . . . (insert your favorite cliche here) throughout the book, offering these tidy, smart smacks on the wrist of the historical reputation of men who are dead now. Most of the older history books I've read didn't go that far. They noted as descriptively as possible what happened and what people thought they knew at the time and left it at that. Hastings frequently has to weigh in with his wisdom. My concern here is that if this is the only book you'll ever read about this area, you'll come away with a negative opinion of a lot of folks and I don't think that's warranted or fair. Hastings cannot accept the "fog of war" as a legitimate explanation and instead prefers to make attributions to perceived character defects.

This weakness noted, I find "Retribution" to be an accurate, detailed, interesting and complete examination of the last year in the Pacific theater of World War II. You will both understand the "big picture" and you will also have a great deal of emotional connection to all the people, whether Allies or Axis. In particular his chapters on British, Australian, and Chinese actions offer excellent summaries of these nations contributions in what is typically seen as an American-Japanese conflict. Finally, his careful narrative of the American atomic bombing decision is one of the most thoughtful and balanced perspectives I've read. This is a strong book.

This was quite a read and I must say that it has been sometime now that I read a work in which I gleaned so much information from. Like another reviewer here, I am getting a bit long in the tooth, and when I first picked this book up I was a bit discouraged at the weight, length, fine print, etc. But, like the other reviewer, once I read the first few pages, I was hooked.

Retribution, The Battle for Japan, 1944-45 by Max Hastings is the study of and chronology of the last year of the war in the Pacific. As with Hasting's companion work, Armageddon, the author has given us a sweeping overview of who, what, where, when and, most importantly, why, events were the way they were, and has done it quite well. While certainly addressing the overall "big picture," this writer/historian has placed special emphasis on the view of the common soldier and sailor, the grunt on the ground, the blue jacket on the sea and the air crews, all whom did their part. One of the more unique features of this book is that the author has given all sides of the war, not only the allies side, but that of the Japanese also. Another feature I loved, and learned so much from, was the author's coverage of the war in China, Burma, Thailand, Russia, Australia and the involvement of each of the countries and the extent of their involvement. He has also recorded extensive interviews with members of the civilian population, on all sides, caught up in this horrible conflict. The entire work is filled with page after page of the personal stories of the men and woman who were directly involved in these world changing events.

The author has addressed problems in this work that are still with us today. Having read quite extensively in this area, I found little to criticize as to his facts and the conclusions he came to. I feel the hard core reader and student of WWII will probably not learn many new facts, per se, but do feel the author does a wonderful job of putting everything in perspective. As an example; the author dose make a very good case for the justification of dropping "the bombs," but on the other hand, well presents the arguments that are still raging against their use, and when they were used. Also, this writer is certainly no fan of Gen. Douglas MacArthur, and does have some rather harsh things to say concerning a number of the military leaders on both sides, and from all countries involved. This may well offend some fans of these men, but again, the author well documents his opinions. Of course, like any work of history, by any historian, one should not take just their word for it completely, and certainly should seek out the opinions of others before the mind is made up, as it were. Each individual must study, read and form their own opions as to some of these controversies, keeping in mind at all times that hind-sight is great and it is much easier to judge now than it was then. We must look at the entire situation through their eyes, and not ours, and not judge decisions made them, using the values and criteria of today. While the author has indulged himself to some extent in this, he has been quick to point it out when he did it.

This book not only addresses the actual battles during this time period, but gives us a great look at the political situation which was going on behind the scenes, and how they effected the front line and support troops who where actual there. From a personal point of view, I found this to be fascinating.

This is a very readable book. There are a couple of things to remember though. This is a British author, therefore the syntax and vocabulary is a bit different and does take some getting use to. Secondly, no work of this size and scope will be completely with out error in minutiae. If you are one of those that has problems and is willing to write an entire work of because the author recorded that the 76th Battalion did such and such on 4 August, and it was actually the 77th Battalion that did it on 3 August indyrsf, then you may have trouble. I am certainly no expert, far, far from it; even I spotted a few flaws. Of course I do not recall a single history book after years of reading that I did not find as such. These few flaw, and they are few, should not in anyway distract from the overall work. If you are that hung up on such matters, you should research and read the after action reports yourself.

Now as to the opinions the author has come to; you may or may not be in agreement each and ever time. I personally found this to be a good thing as it stimulates further research. I will say though, that the author has back up his opinions quite well. Of course as I am in agreement with almost all of them and I suppose that it is easier for me to say.

A ward of warning: Some of the action and events described here are quite graphic. Atrocities committed by both sides are documented, but those committed by the Japanese are of particular note. It should also be noted that the author is quite anti-communistic and anti Soviet. I.e. Stalin. I had to laugh at a friend recently who read the same book and made the statement that Hasting is quite left wing in his writings and opinions. This could not be farther from the truth and I really had to question if the man had actually read this work or the author's other works.

All in all this was a great read. I enjoyed ever page and do recommend it highly.

First off, let me say that having Kai Bird review a book about the Pacific War is akin to having George Soros give a considered judgment on a book about the Bush administration. What was the Washington Post thinking? Kai Bird is not a historian of the atomic bomb; he is an impassioned critic of anything and everyone connected with its development and use. For my part, I find Mr Hastings's view of the a-bomb deployment to be one of the more valuable features of this history. He deserves great praise for not buying into the second-guessing of Harry Truman's decision to drop the bomb on Hiroshima.

I do have two complaints about the book. First, though he resists the temptation to condemn the United States for using the atomic bomb, he does follow the usual academic and media ritual of equating Allied war crimes with Japanese, even to the extent of blaming MacArthur for the Japanese rape of Manila. (MacArthur should have bypassed Manila? Really? Why not bypass Berlin or Tokyo while we were at it?) Second, like Hastings's otherwise magnificent histories of the Normandy invasion and the fall of Germany, this one is absurdly Anglocentric. The British sideshow in Burma gets 36 pages; the infitely more significant US submarine campaign merits only 15. Similarly, Hastings is relentlessly critical of the American fighting man and of American military leaders like MacArthur and Chennault. (Calling Chennault "this considerable charlatan" is about the stupidest assessment of a WW2 figure I have ever read.)

Overall, I would recommend Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire as the better history of war's end in the Pacific. Still, Max Hastings has a formidable gift for discovering, interviewing, and quoting the men and women who were caught up in these events, and his book is worth reading on that account alone. Blue skies! -- Dan Ford

This is true history, presented in a manner unvarnished by revisionism. Amazon's preferred critic (Kai Bird) of this tome is mistaken on many fronts. First of all, Mr. Bird is incorrect in stating that "Retribution's central theme [is] that the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were wholly justified and necessary ...." To the contrary, this is not the "central theme" of this book. The issue of the atomic bombings does not come up in this book until page 444 of the 551 pages (hardbound edition). If there is a central theme to the book, it is certainly not the atomic bombings. Second of all, Mr. Bird endorses "the myth that the Japanese were ready to surrender". All I can say is, well, if the Japanese were ready to surrender, why the heck didn't they surrender until after (1) the 3 fire-bombings of Tokyo (and the fire-bombings of many other cities), (2) the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, and (3) the atomic bombing of Nagasaki? It actually took LeMay's Tokyo flyover of 1000 B-29s after the atomic bombing of Nagasaki to convince the Japanese to finally surrender. Furthermore, any modern interpretation of the events of 1945 (as endorsed by Mr. Bird) COMPLETELY ignores what Max Hastings states in his book at pages 314-315 (hardbound edition), to wit: "In the circumstances then prevailing - an essential caveat for any historian to emphasize - the B-29s were bound to be employed." Mr. Bird simply does not allow for "the circumstances then prevailing" to explain behavior at the time, but only allows for his own modernistic interpretation of past events. Max Hastings' comments at page 282 (hardbound edition) should also be noted, to wit: "In the last phase of World War II, impatience overtook the Allies at every level. From presidents and prime ministers to soldiers in foxholes, there was a desire to `get this business over with.' The outcome was not in doubt. The Axis retained no possibility of averting defeat. It therefore seemed all the more irksome that men were obliged to continue to die because the enemy declined to recognize the logic of his hopeless predicament. Any means of hastening the end seemed acceptable." Mr. Bird simply does not allow for circumstances at the time, whereas Mr. Hastings' history does.