In 1633, at the end of one of the most famous trials in history, the Inquisition condemned Galileo for contending that the Earth moves and that the Bible is not a scientific authority. Galileo's condemnation set off a controversy that has acquired a fascinating life of its own and that continues to this day. This absorbing book is the first to examine the entire span of the Galileo affair from his condemnation to his alleged rehabilitation by the Pope in 1992. Filled with primary sources, many translated into English for the first time, Retrying Galileo will acquaint readers with the historical facts of the trial, its aftermath and repercussions, the rich variety of reflections on it throughout history, and the main issues it raises.
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"A fascinating account of how the trial and its cultural significance have been freshly reconstructed by scholars and polemicists through the ages."
From the Inside Flap
"This is must reading for historians of science and a delight for the interested public. From his access to many primary sources in the Vatican Library and from his broad knowledge of the history of the 17th century, Finocchiaro acquaints readers in an interesting manner with the historical facts of Galileo's trial, its aftermath, and its repercussions. Unlike many other works which present predetermined and, at times, prejudiced judgments, this work provides exhaustive evidence to allow readers to develop their own informed opinion on the subject."--George V. Coyne, Director, Vatican Astronomical Observatory
"The tragic condemnation of Galileo by the Roman Catholic Church in 1633 has become the single most potent symbol of authoritarian opposition to new ideas. Pioneering in its scope, Finocchiaro's book provides a fascinating account of how the trial and its cultural significance have been freshly reconstructed by scholars and polemicists down the ages. With a philosopher's eye for fine distinctions, the author has written an exciting commentary on the successive appearance of new primary sources and their exploitation for apologetic and secular purposes."--John Hedley Brooke, author of Science and Religion: Some Historical Perspectives
"If good history begins with good facts, then Retrying Galileo should be the starting point for all future discussions of the post-trial phase of the Galileo affair. Maurice Finocchiaro's myth-busting documentary history is not only a repository of little-known sources but a pleasure to read as well."--Ronald L. Numbers, co-editor of When Christianity and Science Meet
"Retrying Galileo tells the less well-known half of the Galileo affair: its long and complex history after 1633. Finocchiaro has performed an invaluable service in writing a book that explores how the trial and condemnation of Galileo has been received, debated, and reinterpreted for over three and a half centuries. We are not yet done with this contentious story."--Paula E. Findlen, Ubaldo Pierotti Professor of Italian History and Director of the Science, Technology and Society Program, Stanford University
"The tragic condemnation of Galileo by the Roman Catholic Church in 1633 has become the single most potent symbol of authoritarian opposition to new ideas. Pioneering in its scope, Finocchiaro's book provides a fascinating account of how the trial and its cultural significance have been freshly reconstructed by scholars and polemicists down the ages. With a philosopher's eye for fine distinctions, the author has written an exciting commentary on the successive appearance of new primary sources and their exploitation for apologetic and secular purposes."--John Hedley Brooke, author of Science and Religion: Some Historical Perspectives
"If good history begins with good facts, then Retrying Galileo should be the starting point for all future discussions of the post-trial phase of the Galileo affair. Maurice Finocchiaro's myth-busting documentary history is not only a repository of little-known sources but a pleasure to read as well."--Ronald L. Numbers, co-editor of When Christianity and Science Meet
"Retrying Galileo tells the less well-known half of the Galileo affair: its long and complex history after 1633. Finocchiaro has performed an invaluable service in writing a book that explores how the trial and condemnation of Galileo has been received, debated, and reinterpreted for over three and a half centuries. We are not yet done with this contentious story."--Paula E. Findlen, Ubaldo Pierotti Professor of Italian History and Director of the Science, Technology and Society Program, Stanford University
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This book is of course valuable as a collection of primary texts. However, Finocchiaro is not content to be an editor and instead interferes frequently and intrusively, and not always very intelligently. For illustration, I shall comment on Finocchiaro's very obtuse dismissal of Koestler's portrayal of Galileo in the Sleepwalkers.
----Fallaciousness of Galileo's tidal argument for heliocentrism.
"The straw-man fallacy is most obvious in Koestler's account of the tidal argument. What he presented was an incoherent piece of reasoning that caricatures the original; but the presentation proves only the superficiality of Koestler's reading, not the fallaciousness of Galileo's reasoning. There is no questions, of course, that Galileo held that the tides are caused by the earth's motion, and that we now know this is not true. But the falsity of a claim cannot be equated with the fallaciousness of the reasoning from which the claim was inferred ... Koestler's evaluation was also anachronistic and wise after the event." (p. 311)
Finocchiaro offers no historical evidence whatsoever for all these accusations. This is especially ironic since he condescendingly speaks of Koestler's book as having "all the trappings of scholarship (references, footnotes, etc.)" (p. 308). For those who care about the actual historical record rather than Finocchiaro's unsubstantiated assertions, it is clear that Koestler's argument is neither a caricature, nor focused on the claim rather than the argument, nor anachronistic, nor wise after the event. Instead, Koestler is simply repeating a standard, accurate critique of Galileo that was raised immediately by Galileo's contemporaries and has stood unanswered ever since:
"[This argument] was expressed as early as 1633 by a group of French physicists, of whom Jean-Jaques Bouchard wrote to Galileo: 'They draw attention to a difficulty raised by several members about the proposition you make that the tides are caused by the unevenness of the motion of the different parts of the earth. They admit that these parts move with greater speed when they descend along the line of direction of the annual motion than when they move in the opposite direction. But this acceleration is only relative to the annual motion; relative to the body of the earth as well as to the water, the parts always move with the same speed. They say, therefore, that it is hard to understand how the parts of the earth, which always move in the same way relative to themselves and the water, can impress varying motions to the water.'" (Quoted from Shea, Galileo's Intellectual Revolution, p. 176)
----Galileo's rhetorical tactics.
"To support his claim that in oral argument Galileo used the shortsighted and ineffective rhetorical tactic of ridiculing an opponent and making an enemy out of him, Koestler quoted [Querengo]: '... What I liked most was that, before answering the opposing reasons, he amplified them and fortified them himself with new grounds which appeared invincible, so that, in demolishing them subsequently, he made his opponents look all the more ridiculous.' The technique that Querengo liked best is actually a very sound, wise, and proper one; it really amounts to being concerned to avoid the straw-man fallacy; that is, before criticising an opponent, it is a sign of serious critic to first strengthen the opposing argument as much as possible and interpret it in the most charitable manner; by so doing, one's criticism will really undermine the argument, rather than destroying one's own caricature invented to make one's own task easy. Despite what Querengo says, in such a situation the opponent is not made to 'look all the more ridiculous' but rather is portrayed as someone who holds plausible arguments and good reasons, which are nevertheless invalid and incorrect. However, Koestler completely overlooked this aspect of Galileo's tactics and instead focused on other aspects that were indeed less effective and more shortsighted. But again, what that shows is Koestler's superficiality and penchant for straw-man reconstructions rather than a real flaw in Galileo's behavior." (pp. 311-312)
The "superficiality" lies entirely with Finocchiaro, who provides no evidence that these platitudes from his Philosophy 101 lectures have any historical basis whatever. Indeed, his reconstruction is even blatantly inconsistent with the very quotation that occasioned it, as Finocchiaro himself admits ("despite what Querengo says..."). If this extravagant reconstruction is accurate, then why not offer some examples of passages where Galileo is concerned with avoiding the straw man fallacy? None are forthcoming. Examples of the contrary, however, abound. An illustrative one is Galileo's famous tirade about Babylonians cooking eggs in slings. To maintain that tirades such as this display "sound, wise, and proper" concern to avoid the straw man fallacy is patently laughable.
----Fallaciousness of Galileo's tidal argument for heliocentrism.
"The straw-man fallacy is most obvious in Koestler's account of the tidal argument. What he presented was an incoherent piece of reasoning that caricatures the original; but the presentation proves only the superficiality of Koestler's reading, not the fallaciousness of Galileo's reasoning. There is no questions, of course, that Galileo held that the tides are caused by the earth's motion, and that we now know this is not true. But the falsity of a claim cannot be equated with the fallaciousness of the reasoning from which the claim was inferred ... Koestler's evaluation was also anachronistic and wise after the event." (p. 311)
Finocchiaro offers no historical evidence whatsoever for all these accusations. This is especially ironic since he condescendingly speaks of Koestler's book as having "all the trappings of scholarship (references, footnotes, etc.)" (p. 308). For those who care about the actual historical record rather than Finocchiaro's unsubstantiated assertions, it is clear that Koestler's argument is neither a caricature, nor focused on the claim rather than the argument, nor anachronistic, nor wise after the event. Instead, Koestler is simply repeating a standard, accurate critique of Galileo that was raised immediately by Galileo's contemporaries and has stood unanswered ever since:
"[This argument] was expressed as early as 1633 by a group of French physicists, of whom Jean-Jaques Bouchard wrote to Galileo: 'They draw attention to a difficulty raised by several members about the proposition you make that the tides are caused by the unevenness of the motion of the different parts of the earth. They admit that these parts move with greater speed when they descend along the line of direction of the annual motion than when they move in the opposite direction. But this acceleration is only relative to the annual motion; relative to the body of the earth as well as to the water, the parts always move with the same speed. They say, therefore, that it is hard to understand how the parts of the earth, which always move in the same way relative to themselves and the water, can impress varying motions to the water.'" (Quoted from Shea, Galileo's Intellectual Revolution, p. 176)
----Galileo's rhetorical tactics.
"To support his claim that in oral argument Galileo used the shortsighted and ineffective rhetorical tactic of ridiculing an opponent and making an enemy out of him, Koestler quoted [Querengo]: '... What I liked most was that, before answering the opposing reasons, he amplified them and fortified them himself with new grounds which appeared invincible, so that, in demolishing them subsequently, he made his opponents look all the more ridiculous.' The technique that Querengo liked best is actually a very sound, wise, and proper one; it really amounts to being concerned to avoid the straw-man fallacy; that is, before criticising an opponent, it is a sign of serious critic to first strengthen the opposing argument as much as possible and interpret it in the most charitable manner; by so doing, one's criticism will really undermine the argument, rather than destroying one's own caricature invented to make one's own task easy. Despite what Querengo says, in such a situation the opponent is not made to 'look all the more ridiculous' but rather is portrayed as someone who holds plausible arguments and good reasons, which are nevertheless invalid and incorrect. However, Koestler completely overlooked this aspect of Galileo's tactics and instead focused on other aspects that were indeed less effective and more shortsighted. But again, what that shows is Koestler's superficiality and penchant for straw-man reconstructions rather than a real flaw in Galileo's behavior." (pp. 311-312)
The "superficiality" lies entirely with Finocchiaro, who provides no evidence that these platitudes from his Philosophy 101 lectures have any historical basis whatever. Indeed, his reconstruction is even blatantly inconsistent with the very quotation that occasioned it, as Finocchiaro himself admits ("despite what Querengo says..."). If this extravagant reconstruction is accurate, then why not offer some examples of passages where Galileo is concerned with avoiding the straw man fallacy? None are forthcoming. Examples of the contrary, however, abound. An illustrative one is Galileo's famous tirade about Babylonians cooking eggs in slings. To maintain that tirades such as this display "sound, wise, and proper" concern to avoid the straw man fallacy is patently laughable.
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