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The Return of History and the End of Dreams

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Robert Kagan's "The Return of History And The End Of Dreams" is a sobering, trenchantly written analysis of contemporary international affairs. In it, Kagan takes aim at the largely unwarranted optimism widespread in western democracies following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Many at that time thought the world had arrived at "the end of history," that the future would be confined to one inevitable shape (liberal democracy), that nations in the wake of a new geo-economics and globalization would now just peacefully engage in commerce, with nationalism and geo-political confrontation things of the past.

Kagan looks at the current scene without such blinkers, reminding his readers of the competitive nature of human beings and of the "stubborn traditions" now once again clearly resurgent in many nation states. Far from presenting a world in which the triumph of liberal democracy is inevitable, he draws attention to the resurgence of its increasingly powerful rivals, autocracy (in Russia and China principally) and to a lesser degree Islamist radicalism (in the Middle East). In short, Kagan reveals the allegedly post-modern world to be a place where power politics still obtains and war is not out of court. The post-Cold War world, then, should be understood as one containing a large measure of "backward-looking" geo-political competition, and that the great conflict now taking shape within it, if one has the courage to see, is the one between democracy and autocracy.

Following his demolition of the simple faith in a new international liberal order presumably automatic upon the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kagan goes on to call the western democracies to a new vigilance. As he puts it, "the future international order will be shaped by those who have the power and the collective will to shape it. The question is whether the world's democracies will again rise to that challenge."

This is a perceptive and far-sighted examination on the state of global politics as the decade approaches its end, in the form of an extended essay. A new axis of evil is rising in opposition to the West, one not guided by a shared ideology except in so far as hostility to the rule of law and democracy might be considered ideological. Kagan predicts that the future will see the return of nationalism, growing tensions and confrontation between the forces of democracy and autocracy. What matters is a nation's nature of government, he observes, not its culture, religion or geographic location; and this will determine its international alignment. While not dismissing the terrorist threat, he does not consider it a primary menace as history proves that modernity has never lost against the traditionalism represented by the Islamists. True, but terrorism might have unintended consequences in the formation of alliances and the development of state structures.

It is interesting to compare Kagan's analysis with Margaret Thatcher's Statecraft, published in 2002, in which she assessed the state of the world and possible future trajectories. In chapters 3 and 4 of her book Thatcher looks at Russia and the Asian Giants China (including Taiwan and Hong Kong) and India. Rogue states, religion and terrorism are discussed in chapter 6, with particular reference to North Korea, Islam, Iraq, Syria, Libya and Iran. Another must-read: The New Cold War: Putin's Russia and the Threat to the West by Edward Lucas, already confirms Kagan's view. Russia is pursuing policies that threaten its own citizens, neighboring states and the world at large. Lucas takes a hard look at the ruling elite which emerged almost entirely from the ranks of the old KGB. This dominant class harbors resentment against the West as a whole in an interesting parallel to the hostility of the Brussels Eurocracy towards the USA and Israel. The Russian government now openly competes with the West on the economic and political fronts.

Freedom of expression and the rule of law exist in name only; the state controls all the economic activity, political institutions and media that matter. Putin's term "managed" or "sovereign" democracy really means a malignant form of Czarism. Despite Russia's demographic implosion, pervasive corruption and widespread lawlessness, a new cold war is being waged. Not only has the country displayed thuggish behavior against Ukraine, Moldova, Estonia, Georgia and the UK in the Litvinenko case, it is supplying arms to rogue states Iran and Syria and their terrorist proxies Hamas and Hezbollah. Anna Politkovskaya's A Russian Diary: A Journalist's Final Account of Life, Corruption, and Death in Putin's Russia exposes the mentality and incompetence of the ruling class.

The geopolitical implications are staggering, as the Putin gang eagerly befriends all enemies of the West. Evidence is accumulating that Russia seeks an alliance with the Islamic world and a partial restoration of the Soviet Empire through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) of which China is a member. The Kremlin ignores the long-term threat from China despite the particularly drastic demographic and infrastructural implosion in Russia's Far East. Whatever other evils follow from Russia's abandonment of Western values, it is sure to become a more barbaric society for its citizens and a considerably more dangerous international player. One may confidently expect it to supply Iran with nuclear weapons technology and to support every loathsome thugocracy that defiles the planet.

Russia is pursuing an energy policy aimed at strangling the liberal democracies by e.g. establishing a gas cartel. An expanded SCO that includes Iran, other Middle Eastern and African states like Libya and Sudan, plus Venezuela is a real possibility. Kagan correctly identifies it as a revived Warsaw Pact. The SCO will lock the Turkic speaking states of Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (plus Persian Tajikistan) firmly in the bear's embrace. The future role of Turkey will be crucial; it remains to be seen how its current pro-religious government will adapt its foreign policy as reaction to the country's certain exclusion from the European inner core. Economic ties to Europe are of course assured but the country might significantly upgrade relations with the Central Asian states and the SCO.

Kagan foresees closer future ties between the USA, India and Japan, rather than a larger role for NATO. Echoing the idea expressed in The UN and Beyond: United Democratic Nations (edited by Anne Bayefsky), Kagan proposes the same type of international organization consisting of democratic states co-coordinating their policies. Perhaps he underestimates the ambition of the Brussels Eurocracy and its resentment of the US. The likelihood of all 27 states uniting is slim, but prospects for closer union of a core group including Germany, France, the Benelux countries, Italy, Spain and a few others are bright. Such a restructuring could be triggered by many factors like the refusal of current member states to relinquish further sovereignty, economic problems or security concerns. While retaining nominal autonomy, the other countries of Europe will undoubtedly accept the Superstate's foreign policy. The loss of the UK will diminish the Anglosphere whilst an alliance with India and Japan might formidably enhance its influence and assure its strategic advantage of continued dominance over three of the world's oceans.

One fact is certain: the USA follows the siren calls of isolationism at its great peril. And the paranoids that tried to demonize the "Hyperpower" will look back on the period of American "hegemony" with affection and nostalgia once the dynamics of the new multipolar world become clear. What distinguishes Kagan's conclusions from the discredited popular notions of the 90s - Fukuyama's fatuous futurology and Huntington's culturally based theory - is that elements of it have already begun to unfold. How comfortable the decade of the Clintons now seems in comparison to contemporary trends. Kagan's book is alarming and unsettling but a much needed tonic for identifying, and preparing for, the coming challenges.

During the 1990s, after the fall of communism, it appeared that democratic capitalism had triumphed with no serious ideological challengers on the horizon. It was famously designated by Francis Fukuyama as "the end of history." Enlightenment had reached its final stage, there was no longer any beyond toward which progress marched. Most of the pundit class believed that China and Russia were well on their way to becoming liberal democracies. The theory was that once their respective middle classes reached a certain level of wealth they would be demanding the legal and political rights that are required of constitutional liberalism.

Robert Kagan does not believe this will happen. Autocracies such as China and Russia will not make the transition to liberal democracy on their own, nor will they change if they are safely embedded in the international liberal order. Kagan argues that the Chinese and the Russians do not view democracy as competitive elections, rather elections are something that asserts the popular will, which becomes the will of the ruling class. The ruling classes are not so much concerned with human rights as they are with satisfying public needs. In both countries a relatively small ruling class controls all the levers of power. Even though they line their own pockets, they have served their populations rather well, compared to the kleptocrats of smaller autocracies. The majorities of their populations actually seem content with this "style" of democracy.

Fareed Zakaria has argued in The Post-American World that autocracies do not hold beliefs other than becoming part of the global economy. They are simply pragmatists who will eventually become stakeholders in the system. Kagan begs to differ: He writes that autocrats believe in autocracy and will continue to reject the demands of meddlesome Western governments and NGOs. The higher cause they believe in is that they are providing economic success for their people and by extension getting international respect.

Autocracies seek to make the world safe for other autocracies as well. Their so-called respect for other nations' sovereignty and policy of noninterference sits well with lesser dictatorships such as Myanmar and North Korea. Autocrats prefer to do business with each other. After the successes of democracy in the 1990s, Russia and China would like to roll back those advances by promoting thier own successes. Kagan thinks that only dreamers would believe that China and Russia could become part of the liberal international order.

Interestingly enough, one of the most provocative and consequential foreign policy statements made by John McCain was in Kagan's neoconservative mold. McCain proposed that international organizations should only allow democracies as its members, as in a league of democracies, setting themselves against such countries as China and Russia. This would be the end of dreams and possibly the beginning of a nightmare. Although Kagan's point is well argued, I am more inclined the agree with Zakaria in that greater efforts should be made to make these important players part of the system rather than enemies of the system. The ideology of autocracy is inherently weak because power is too concentrated. Better to weaken it from within.

Brilliant; history has not ended, it is alive and well and in most part ignoring and even rejecting the "exceptionalism" of America and writers such as Fukuyama.

In brief, Kagan presents the logical facts about why international turmoil will continue unabated. Yet, he's still stuck in the idealism of Kant and Montesquieu who argued, "The natural effect of commerce is to lead toward peace."

But, commerce is competition which becomes riddled with cheating and bullying. From steroids in sports to bribes in business, competition leads to cheating which leads to fisticuffs and, when enough people are involved, to war. Kagan astutely recognizes the ills of the last century; he doesn't sumble until he gets to the future.

This may be the most relevant book issued this election year. One of it's central ideas is already part of Sen. John McCain's campaign platform, and an issue for discussion in the Financial Times. Ignore Kagan's sense of reality and Bush's blundering bozos will look like picnickers playing in the park compared to what comes next.

"In a world increasingly divided among democratic and autocratic lines, the world's democrats will have to stick together," Kagan advises. It's a proposal McCain has voiced with his 'League of Democracies'. Kagan likely originated it; McCain copied, which at least shows he's capable of recognizing good ideas.

Yet, there's another "reality". At this point (May 2008), Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton can't form a 'League of Two Democrats' let alone two democracies. Many Republicans have a similar problem in forming a "league" to elect McCain.

What does it prove? It proves life is challenged more by chaos than by all the clever philosophies from Plato to Kagan, who writes, ". . . they regarded democracy as the rule of the licentious, greedy, and ignorant mob".

They were right. Now it's called chaos. Success is the ability to recognize useful patterns within chaos. The world is not an orderly formula which everyone obeys, like some "Universal Theory" Albert Einstein sought so vainly. It's chaos, confusion, conflict and contusion which the wise learn to analyze and the foolish continue to lament.

Aye, there's the rub. How do you implement perceptive insights and good ideas in a world of chaos?

Kagan goes right up to this point, then hesitates rather than plunge into uncertainty. He's an American idealist, ready to build the 'city on a hill' as the perfect answer, a man governed by reason, inspired by perfection but somewhat above reality.

It is a brilliant essay. It's as current as this year's U.S. elections, as timeless as history itself and as relevant as anything else you may read this year.

But, chaos rules. You'll understand after reading this book.

Kagan (2008) takes his title from Francis Fukuyama's The End of History (1992).
According to Kagan, the fall of Soviet Communism and the apparent hegemony of the United States lead some thinkers such as F. Fukuyama to believe that history had come to an end, and that specifically the ideal of liberal Western democracy had replaced narrow national interests of the past. But Fukuyama, Kagan says, was dreamy and wrong.
Kagan reminds us, forcefully, that nationalism trumps ideology in the long run, although there may be brief periods, historically speaking, when the flashbulb of ideology blinds us (or a nation's people).
Country-by-country Kagan catalogs the strong, strategic, historical, national focus of Russia, India, Japan, Iran, and the United States. He does not let America off any less than he does, say, China. (In this regard he skips over the nations of Europe, lumping them as one, the EU, naïve nancies.)
At the end of his book Kagan argues for a worldwide association or confederation or - dare it be said - a league of nations, of liberal democracies, counties that embrace democracy, free markets, women's rights (an unexpected tenet for a neo-conservative), and so on. An interesting idea, and maybe a good one, but isn't Kagan at the end of his book guilty of the same ideological naivety as his straw whipping boy, Francis Fukuyama?
By different routes, Fukuyama and Kagan come to the same conclusion: "the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government." (Who wrote that? Fukuyama or Kagan (alphabetic order; no hints).
Fukuyama in his 2002 book, Our Posthuman Future, modified his argument (never acknowledge by Kagan), writing that "there can be no end of history without an end of modern natural science and technology". Perhaps Robert Kagan will also sequel his book with something appropriately titled, such as The Return of Ideology.

Although the title clearly references Fukuyama's book, it's important to point out that Kagan isn't attacking Fukuyama here. Just in the same way that The End of History was a product of the end of the Cold War, The Return of History is the product of the world in 2008. Kagan's book is much less ambitious in the sense that Fukuyama really went out on a limb with his book and made a lot of predictions. While the fall of the Soviet Union undoubtedly remains one of history's most monumental events, time has not been kind to Fukuyama's argument.

The central thesis to Kagan's book is that great power politics and nationalistic ambitions did not die with the Soviet Union. Russia under Putin, China, and other autocracies stand opposite the U.S., Europe and other democracies in a struggle for dominance of the international system. Making a reference to Huntington, Kagan argues it is not a country's "civilization" that determines its path, but rather its form of government. Russia and China reach out to and reinforce autocratic governments regardless of where in the world they are, just as many East European and Asian democracies align themselves with the U.S. and Europe.

In just over 100 pages, Kagan produces a spot-on analysis of the world in mid-2008. He doesn't offer up sweeping predictions or theories, but rather a snapshot of sorts. One of the most interesting aspects of this book is looking at how Kagan's thinking has evolved since his last brief book, Of Paradise and Power. In that book, he spoke of the differences between the U.S. and Europe that were very pronounced during the lead up to the Iraq war. It's clear that Kagan is capable of providing informed and relevant analysis of world events as they constantly change. I'll be sure to read anything he produces in the future.

Kagan's Book represents an important addition to the academic literature on American grand strategy and the emerging contest between democracies and authoritarian states. What is most striking is how clearly Kagan illistrates that our present era has many parralells with past world orders. Whilst it may be startling to a generation reared on the end of history thesis, which Kagan plays off, this conflict would be readily apparent to statesman and political leaders in the 19th century. This sobering and at times painful account, painful because it implicitly sets out the missed opportuntites of the 1990s and leaves one wondering how things could have been different (see Donald and Frederick Kagan). What is most striking is that Kagan eloquently illuminates an essential truth, which is increasingly drowned out: Those who espouse an American grand strategy absent moral considerations and without regard to regime type dont seem to understand the country they live in, because America is a country dedicated to certain universal values that empowers and obliges us to intervene and act in regard to our ideology and beliefs since the founding of the Republic.

All in all a great read that eloquently sets out the preeminent challenge of our generation: The marriage of national interest and our deepest beliefs: spreading democracy- because the survival of democracy at home implicitly rests, as Kagan argues on the success of freedom abraod. A must read for those who believe unilateral American disarmament, detente, arms limitation agreements, diplomacy (without regard for cost or morality), and failure in Iraq is without broader and devastating consquences for American diplomacy.

What a strange time to doubt the justice of our regime and cause.

Much of Mr. Kagan's analysis is correct; however, he still wears the "blinders" of the William Kristol group, and the world-view he is associated with. I will not demean them by referring to them as "neo-cons"--as their opponents do. I think their hearts are in the right place, and that their love for America, and its freedoms, cannot be questioned. However, I feel that Mr. Kagan's analysis over-emphasizes Russia's resources, and its competencies. I think Vladimir Putin is an amazing, and very dangerous leader, and that we should never, ever, take him for granted; however, he rules a dying, tragic Russia, more likely to be engulfed in an Islamic wave than to cause serious problems for the West.

Still, Russia is a great, wounded lion, and it can always decide to take down America with it, in a Slavic version of "Goetterdammerung".

China is as much a foreigner in the Middle East as we are, and, although it has proven itself infinitely more skillful diplomatically than America has (big surprise there, hah!), it still has several enormous--and potentially, insurmountable---problems: first, in its west, it has large muslim provinces that are at various stages of boiling over into open successionist war---how will its killing those people---as it murdered the Tibetans just before the Olympics---look to its muslim prospective oil-generating "partners"? Second, India is its traditional rival--and has fought two losing wars already with China (neither of which India should have lost if it had just used its best (non-politically-connected)officers (India has the best trained large army (and navy) in the world). India must of course oppose further Chinese influence in the region, and must of course oppose any attempts by China to strengthen the already strong muslim influence in the area. A reminder: by 2030, India will be the largest nation in the history of the world.

Then there is Iran; and Israel. These two countries are the monkey-wrenches in the equation. The arab countries would be no real threat to Israel without the money pouring in to them from Iran---which is NOT an arab country! on the other hand, Israel would have had to come to some kind of realistic accommodation with its neighbors were it not for the financial and military support from America.

So, at the end of the day, we now have this crazy situation where the tensions between "Jew" and "Arab" are only being exacerbated by the constant funding (and meddling) by non-Jewish America, and non-Arab Iran! As we say in my homeland (Brooklyn): verkokte!

Still, at least Mr. Kagan deals cogently with the complex Middle East---as opposed to Breszinski's latest drivel.

Robert Kagan deserves credit for recognizing certain realities. The world remains complicated and dangerous more than a decade after the Soviet Union fell. Nationalism and religious fanaticism remain. Many people now doubt the merits of Globalization. Francis Fukuyama erred in predicting the end of history back then, though I don't see that Kagan is really attacking Fukuyama, other than in the title. Clinton also erred in declaring an end to the era of big government. We are not on a deterministic path to democratic capitalism.

Somebody needed to write this book. The fact of the matter is that democracy and capitalism were historicaly uncommon forms of social organization back when the USSR keeled over. The same is true today. Of course, one can still argue that people are better off with capitalism and democracy. This is why somebody needs to write another book. Kagan is no visionary. He makes many observations about the way things are, and that is fine. But it is more important to think about how things could and should be.

To put it simply, excessive focus on the way the world is kills any chance for progress. Of course, the pursuit of unrealizable goals led to the disasters of the 20th century. But I do not think that the global order envisioned by Fukuyama (and by Hayek) has been proven unrealizable. Perhaps Kagan should now turn his attention to how we might avoid the international conflict and tension that he correctly observes. This is not to say that he has no opinions to offer. But he does not offer any sort of fundamental change to deal with the situations he observes. His call for world democracies to unite against autocracies could be as much a source for escalation of global problems as a cure. Perhaps we should not give up on dreaming just yet.

This is a very good book about international politics trends. In 1992, Francis Fukuyama in The End of History and the Last Man stated that with globalization and modern technology liberal capitalism had won. The fall of the Berlin wall and the USSR collapse supported this optimism. But, in 1995 Samuel Huntington rebutted Fukuyama in The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. Huntington saw a world balkanized by antagonist cultural and fundamentalist religious groups including the resurgence of radical Islam and nationalism. His vision perfectly fit the post 9/11 reality.

Kagan refines Huntington vision by mentioning the revival of three long running struggles. The first one is the competition among great powers vying for regional predominance (China, Russia, Europe, India, Iran, and the U.S.). The second one is the renewal of the competition between democracies and autocracies. Because of the rise of China and Russia this struggle is not over. The third one is the older struggle between Islam and secularism. Those struggles put an end to the dream of a peaceful world where globalization would have smoothly spread liberal capitalism.

The power struggle between autocracies and democracies will be the dominant one. Kagan differentiates himself from Huntington by stating that more than culture and religion, a government nature better predicts countries affiliations. Asian democracies are more closely aligned with the democratic West than with Asian autocracies. Great powers diverge on global issues ranging from the war on terror to Global Warming. When considering Iran and Hezbollah, Russia and China do not see terrorists but instead strategic partners as they support Iran nuclear venture. This makes it more probable that a terrorist network will have nuclear capabilities. On Global Warming, China and India view any effort in curbing their CO2 emission as the West restraining their economic power.

Regarding the clash between radical Islam and secularism, Kagan feels Islamists live in a dream. Their goal of rejecting modernity (capitalism, globalization, women's right) and return to a time when Islam was dominant over a millennium ago is futile.

The rise of Russia relies on its huge oil and gas reserves. It has a resulting large Current Account Surplus and has repaid its foreign debt. Its economy has rebounded allowing for rising military expenditures. Russia has regained its World power status. But, Kagan overlooks Russia is a castle of cards built on high energy prices. Also, Russia population is aging and its labor force is shrinking. That bodes ill for Russian power.

China is an autocratic behemoth with an incredibly rapid economic growth that will soon spend more on military than the entire EU. China is very ambitious as its leaders see the World divided in two: a Euro-Atlantic region dominated by the U.S. and an Asian region dominated by China. Kagan overstates China's case and overlooks its political corruption, misalocation of capital with a near insolvent banking system. Regarding the China-U.S. rivalry Kagan contradicts himself by first dismissing their economic codependence and later mentioning such codependence will ensure China and the U.S. will not enter into conflicts. China needs the U.S. markets to keep its export-lead economy growing. To further study this issue I recommend Smick's The World Is Curved: Hidden Dangers to the Global Economy and Wolf Fixing Global Finance (Forum on Constructive Capitalism).

Kagan addresses the come back of Japan as another great power. Japan still is the second largest economy. It is building up its military as the competitive tension between China and Japan is rising. But, Kagan ignores unfavorable demographics: Japan's aging society and shrinking labor force that will prevent Japan from retaining its power.

India is another rising Asian power supported by strong hi tech and service sectors. Both India and China see themselves as leaders in their region. But, China's framework is one of tough autocratic politics anchored in the 19th century. India is more focused on geoeconomics and soft power in a 21st century European framework. Nevertheless, India has become a nuclear power just to fend off Pakistan and China (who supports Pakistan).

Iran is another country with great power ambitions as it believes it should become the hegemon of the Middle East. It defines itself by its stand against the U.S. Iran fosters strong relationship with Russian and China to counter the U.S. But, just like Russia what is Iran without high oil prices? And, what else do they have besides oil?

The U.S. obviously is still the number one superpower. It ignores the UN because its Security Council is paralyzed by the schism between its autocratic and democratic members. The U.S. will remain the one superpower because the majority of the World wants it. The EU is now more closely aligned with the U.S., as it fears the rise of Russia. And, the EU fully recognizes it owes its success to the U.S. Kagan elaborates on this concept in his other excellent book Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order. Also, China loves the U.S. markets more than it fears its hegemony. Japan and India are drawing closer to the U.S. to counter China and Russia. Only Russia, Iran, and other parts of the Middle East are all around belligerent anti-Americans. But, the anti-American block is pretty isolated.

Kagan suggests we were too optimistic in the 90s when we thought liberal democracy had taken over world politics (Fukuyama); and, we are too pessimistic now when believing outside forces have no influence on Russia, China. and radical Islam. Kagan states it does. The U.S. and the West can't give up promoting the forces of modernity (globalization, women's right, Internet). This is so citizen living in autocratic regimes and Muslim countries have a growing awareness on how the rest of the World lives.

I recommend another interesting book on the same subject: Fareed Zakaria's The Post-American World.