Customer Reviews

Revolt on the Tigris: The Al-Sadr Uprising and the Governing of Iraq

5 star:		(0)
4 star:		(3)
3 star:		(1)
2 star:		(1)
1 star:		(3)

 

 

Well written and offers insight into problems with conditions, people of Iraq, and sub-contractor who were in South-Central Iraq during the Sadr uprising.

This reviewer was there. Thus has first-hand experience of what happened. The author (Etherington) gives you a account of what was happening. Unfortunately, he slants his management and leadership style (and why not, he was the author)favorably and omits his mistakes in leadership, his ego, utter reliance and trust of those he led; however, it is a must read on issues and events occuring 2003/2004.

Etherington wrote the book in his voice, with his perceptions, and from his perspective: it's his, well-received or not. His understanding of the tribal nature of the Iraqis has no parallel in the US. Americans, especially those who've not visited the Middle East, have little concept of the reality of the region and the daily challenges faced by Westerners who attempt to function there. Etherington painted a portrait of the region that is utterly realistic and authentic. His prose is readable and refreshing in the use of terms and phrases more commonly used in the UK. I thank him for sharing his time and expertise with the Iraqis and his attempts to make the situation better.

...but still illuminating, particularly on the subject of the haphazard, ill-planned and ill-thought-out nature of the CPA's governing of occupied Iraq. That the author, ostensibly in charge of an entire province, had no way to communicate with his superiors other than a Hotmail account and a satellite phone is frightening. The contractors widely used in Iraq like Halliburton/KBR are shown as mostly unreliable if not incompetent.

This is one of the best books to emerge on post-Saddam Iraq. Mark Etherington tells the story of his governorship of Wasit province in south-central Iraq, based in the city of Kut, 2003-4, including the evacuation of his staff in the face of attack by Moqtada Sadr's Mahdi army in April 2004.

Unlike so many accounts of the period written by journalists and academics, Etherington does not try to tell the whole story of the occupation and transfer of sovereignty. Neither like so many others does he have an axe to grind (especially Americans balming other Americans, state dept, pentagon etc.). Rather he sticks to what he saw, heard and lived through - maybe the focus comes from his background as an officer in the British paratroopers - and this will make his book of value to future historians.


I can't know if all the details are right. But his account confirms much of what I saw myself in US-British run Iraq: the lack of any overall plan; the professionalism and commitment of many of the US troops; the confusion in hierarchy caused by the contracting out of so many simple tasks to contractors like Kellogg Brown and Root; and the ambivalence of many Iraqis ....

"The inhabitants of Kut and the wider province bore our errors and inadequacies with endless courtesy, dignity and grace," he writes. "They were ambivalent about so many things, particularly the occupation of their country; and saw no contradiction in thanking us with great emotion for toppling Saddam Hussein and as passionately asserting their right to be left alone, independent and in peace."

Etherington's tentative conclusion - and the reader can trace him reaching it through day-by-day experience - is that the occupation lacked the resources, particularly the military ones, to enforce and stablise its authority. And therefore that the problems arising from this undermined what planning and strategy it had. The US, he concludes, needed more troops and a more vigorous response to challenges (the initial looting across much of Iraq in April 2003 is outside the scope of the book) to give Iraqis confidence in the future.

Along the way there is a pen portrait of Paul Bremer, the chief US administrator, an excellent description of the `goldfish bowl' CPA headquarters in the Baghdad green zone and passages that evoke beautifully the Tigris river flowing through Kut.

Of course Etherington writes from his own perspective - the strength of the book - so it is very much an `outsider' assessment of the Iraqi parties strong in the province, Sciri and Dawa, and of the tribes. But he has written something of a first draft of history in a courageous way.

I could not agree more with the last two reviews. The only reason I gave this one star is because you can not give it less than that. This book should be under the fiction section as it contains nothing but that. I was in Iraq when the CPA built and occupied this site and during the build up to the attack. A lot of the problems that the author mentions were created by him and his poor leadership. He had numerous offers to locate his camp in a more secure location but chose not to. The fact is that it was the author who endangered peoples lives and the funny thing was that some of the people who saved the day are the ones that he keeps shooting down; i.e. KBR.

Please do not buy this book as the author does not deserve to make any money or receive recognition of what he did, or in this case did not do, in Iraq.

In April 2004, Shi'ite firebrand cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and his Jaysh al-Mahdi militia rose in revolt against the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq. Revolt on the Tigris tells the tale through the eyes of Etherington, a British political officer in charge of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) office in Al-Kut, the capital of the southern Wasit province.

Rather than shed much light on Al-Kut, its political figures, and the complexity of the local society, Revolt on the Tigris offers inside baseball. Etherington describes his meetings with coalition administrator L. Paul Bremer, senior British representative Sir Jeremy Greenstock, and other diplomats. Local color is limited to a few short descriptions as Etherington hops from one coalition base to another. Overshadowing a one-paragraph overview of Al-Kut's demographics are thirty pages describing his compound, equipment, and staff, e-mails he received, and his thoughts of the local Ukrainian detachment and military contractors.

Revolt on the Tigris reflects well the issues dominating CPA attention in late 2003 and early 2004. Etherington describes his mechanism to elect local councilmen and the implementation of gas rationing, which subsequently degenerated into rioting. But he offers little insight into local politics. While he refers to meetings with local officials, he mentions few Iraqis more than once, and these only in passing. When he decides, for example, to visit every local council in the province, the resulting narrative centers more upon the division of his day, conversations with his deputy, and the amount of water he drank than upon the content of the meetings. Questionable assumptions supplant local understanding. Etherington criticizes the coalition decision to disband the Iraqi army, but does he really believe that a predominantly Shi'ite province would have welcomed continued deployment of an army it viewed as an agent of oppression?

The description of Sadr's revolt continues the narrative's myopia. Etherington describes compound perimeter defenses, conversations with military officers, and his own weaponry, but makes little effort to understand the internal political dynamics that led to the revolt. His treatment of it is limited to a portion of one chapter. He offers no analysis of Sadr's subsequent decision to join the political process, nor does he consider the motivations and planning that underpinned Sadr's strategy.

Questions over Etherington's objectivity as narrator also undercut his recounting the CPA's governance of Al-Kut. An official assessment of what went wrong in Al-Kut placed blame on Etherington for, among other faults, "toning down" reports of Islamist activity. Historians will find value in Etherington's account, though, in that it illustrates the isolation of the CPA as it consumed itself with its own bureaucracy while remaining oblivious to Iraqi political developments outside its compound walls.

Middle East Quarterly, Spring 2006

I was on the site during the big battle in the book, when Etherington insisted on staying to negotiate with insurgents who weren't interested in negotiating but were buying time to dig in around us. In fact, they were looking for hostages, preferably American. The CPA compound was renovated at an expense of $20,000,000 but that did not include fortifications for the river bank because the governor liked the view of the river. When the compound was surrounded by hundreds of insurgents on April 6th, that exposed flank made it possible to shell the compound at will.

I could go on but there's steam coming out of my ears right now and I shouldn't write under those conditions.

Most of this book is complete rubbish which does nothing to outline the situation in Iraq but seeks to bolster Mark Etherington's ego. In fact the very fact that he wrote this book making him look like some kind of hero speaks to his character and the character of the book. Etherington personally placed the security of the compound at Al Kut at risk when he disregarded security improvements recommended by the civilian security contractors. He further placed the personnel in the compound at risk by failing to evacuate the compound at the recommendation of the same security contractor.

He had no plan to coordinate with III Corps to facilitate the mobilization of the QRF or any other support of that nature. He gave contradicting reports so that he could preserve the illusion that all was well in Al Kut refusing to evacuate the compound.

Save your money - do not buy this book. This is one man's ego trip that in no way represents the truth.