After President Ronald Reagan's landslide 1984 defeat of former Vice-President Walter Mondale, the Democratic Party's leading fund-raisers and policy analysts decided to coalesce around a plan to push the party rightward. Democrats were losing, they argued, because the party was being held hostage by so-called special interests (labor, minorities, women and the poor) while the rest of America had moved on. The liberal values that had produced the New Deal and the Great Society, they explained, were being rejected at the polls while self-serving, narrow interests within the party were refusing to release control of a bus heading off a cliff. The authors of the present book, Mr. Ferguson and Mr. Rogers, argue, on the contrary, that there is little to no evidence to back up this belief in a "right turn" within the American electorate.
Beginning with a detailed study of public opinion, the authors conclude that throughout the 1970s (the period which oversaw the vast increase in business support for the GOP at the expense of the Democrats) public opinion on the vast majority of political and economic issues of the day either remained stable or moved considerably to the left. While *ideologically* moderately conservative, the U.S. populace continued to be *programmatically* liberal or social democratic; very often increasingly so. Turning then to an examination of the theory of critical realignment (the belief that electoral change occurs through shifts in well-defined social groups such as Catholics, blacks, blue-collar workers, rural Protestants, southern whites, etc.), Ferguson and Rogers find much there to criticize. Where these voting blocs are found to exist their existence is sometimes not stable over the lifetime of the party systems they are thought to be responsible for, or their existence is found to continue uniformly *across* periods of realignment. The authors instead posit an alternative approach - an *investment theory of party politics* which focuses on coalitions of major business interests that come together to push favored candidates and parties in order to control the state. Voter-centered analyses, they argue, greatly underestimate the vast expense in money, time and information acquirement necessary to control the state. Formulating and implementing particular policy is even more expensive. While a large corporation or business-funded think-tank may be able to research a candidate's voting record and policy positions, the vast majority of voters are left to evaluate candidates primarily on the basis of superficial campaign marketing.
The main body of the book studies the trajectory of the New Deal coalition that came together around Franklin Roosevelt in the 1930's and began fragmenting in the 1970's. The modern Democratic Party was born as the party of capital-intensive, internationalist free-trade oriented big businesses, with organized labor as a junior partner. Because these firms were capital rather than labor-intensive they could afford to co-exist with organized labor while the labor-intensive (and protectionist-seeking) businesses that coalesced around the Republican Party simply could not. While this New Deal business bloc - made up of firms like General Electric, IBM, Pan Am, the Standard Oils of NJ and California, Bank of America, Chase, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Bros. - was quantitatively a relatively small part of the American business community it was far wealthier and more powerful than its GOP-oriented competitors. So while the Great Depression was forcing upon other industrialized nations - those with fewer capital-intensive and internationally-oriented big businesses - the revolutionary choice between socialism and fascism this new version of the Democratic Party was able to successfully accommodate *both* capitalist and worker. In the historical narrative that follows the text spends little time with either the Truman or Eisenhower administrations although it notes elite disappointment with the relatively austere fiscal policy and correspondingly anemic growth rates of the latter. The 1957-58 Eisenhower recession further confirmed for a significant segment of business the need to return to a Keynesian growth model based on a combination of lower taxes and higher fiscal spending. The JFK, LBJ and Nixon administrations (both the business support and opposition to them) are explored in relatively more detail. These sections makes for a fascinating read.
The great recession of 1973-75 marked a major turning point in American politics. The period immediately prior saw the beginning of a decline in the rate of profit in manufacturing, possibly either caused or augmented by the increase in international competition. The OPEC oil price shocks of the time also forced Democrats to choose between Big Oil and their working class base as the party felt compelled to institute price controls. Oil and gas responded by switching parties. Meanwhile, the increase of growth rates in the Third World relative to those of the advanced economies saw a business drive to expand overseas, a tendency exacerbated by the vast amounts of post-boom oil money being invested there. The collapse of detente (related to the above processes) initiated a call for a vast increase in military spending. Thus, in response to these increases in both costs and international competition, increasing segments of the business community turned to a direct attack on the working class and the New Deal, as a now significant layer of capital-intensive businesses turned to the Republican Party for the first time.
The tragic result was the coming of the Reagan Administration which lead an attack on labor and the poor while siphoning vast amounts of wealth to its elite supporters by way of the Pentagon and lowered taxes on the rich, the combination of which lead to unprecedented deficits. A proposed 20% cut in Social Security benefits was fortuitously beaten back by the Senate while attempts by the administration to limit Medicare coverage met with mixed success. In a further shifting of the financial burden from big business to the general population, Reagan's first term oversaw the prosecution of hazardous waste violations decline by 50%, a rise in the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) allowed exposure limits on hazardous chemicals by 10 to 100x, and an 88% decline in regulation enforcement by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). For the position of Secretary of Labor Reagan appointed Ray Donovan, a construction company executive and chronic violator of national health and safety laws (who was cited an average of 10 times a year by OSHA during the late 1970's for violations defined as involving "a substantial probability that death or serious physical harm could result"). To head the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) itself, Reagan appointed another construction executive with a long history of OSHA violations. Other administrative posts were placed under similarly-minded leadership. As the size of the giant Reagan deficits kept ballooning more businesses jumped ship although many like weapons-manufacturers and labor-intensive firms (whom profit most from worker-insecurity) cheered on.
Although this book was published in 1987 it presciently prefigures one of the major conflicts that most virulently divides the Democratic and Republican parties. Beginning with Reagan the GOP became the party of big deficits (e.g. Reagan, G.W. Bush, Gov. Romney's estimated addition, if he had won, of trillions of dollars according to various non-partisan budget analysts) while the Democrats became the party that sought balanced budgets (e.g. Mondale's call for higher taxes, Clinton's combination of spending cuts and additional revenue, Obama's calls for a "balanced approach"). In order to understand this one has to once again follow the money. For investment bankers and other holders of long-term securities the concern is that if the debt gets too big the government would be tempted to deal with this by simply printing a lot of money, thus lowering the value of their assets. The GOP, on the other hand, as the party backed overwhelmingly by labor-intensive businesses, are the people who stand to make a greater profit whenever there is greater worker insecurity so they purposely seek to make the deficit as big as possible in order to later use that as an excuse to shred Social Security, Medicare and what's left of the New Deal. The strongest opposition to Reagan also came from multinationals oriented towards Europe and hopeful of detente and with it a corresponding increase in US-USSR trade; this at a time when much of the rest of American business was shifting to the Pacific Basin, the Middle East and parts of the Third World. Allied with them were urban real estate interests who were opposed to Reagan's cuts in federal spending on real estate-friendly programs like mass transit and urban development (which competes with the Pentagon for funding). Among the most interesting fruits of the alliance of these business forces was their favoring of the Army and Air Force over the Navy (for reasons too complex for this review) and a turning to support what began as a grass-roots nuclear freeze movement, transforming and de-radicalizing it in the process.
The book concludes with an analysis of the campaigns of the candidates for the 1984 Democratic presidential nomination (Mondale, Hart, Glenn, McGovern, Cranston and Jesse Jackson), President Reagan's landslide re-election and final thoughts on what the then-future might hold. While the Democrats tried to re-win the White House by compromising on an industrial policy with a long-term dedication to free trade but short term commitments to troubled industries, the economy began improving and the high interest rates began to fall making so uneasy a compromise less urgent to the interested parties.
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