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The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914

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This well written and thoughtful book is a fine combination of diplomatic history and analysis of the underlying forces driving the relationship between Germany and Great Britain in the second half of the 19th and early 20th century. The termination point for the narrative is, of course, the outbreak of WWI and the British decision to join the war on the Franco-Russian side. Kennedy is very careful, however, not to let that momentous event overshadow his narrative and analysis; he takes care to set events and forces in their specific context, not as preludes to war.

This book is organized into 5 sections, 3 narrative sections describing the basic diplomatic history interspersed with 2 analytic sections discussing the underlying features of Anglo-German rivalry. The narrative sections are concise, excellent accounts looking at events, personalities, and descriptions of diplomacy, the broader international context, and relevant internal German and British politics. These sections, however, presuppose a basic knowledge of the history of the period. The final, and briefest, narrative section covers the period leading to WWI. While not intended to be an analysis of the outbreak of war, this is a very astute analysis of the dynamics of events with a particularly good analysis of British motivations for the decision to commit to the Franco-Russian alliance. Anyone who has read Niall Ferguson's The Pity of War and his arguments about the British decision to go to war should read these sections for a thoughtful and deeper alternative analysis of the British decision to go to war.

Where Kennedy really shines, however, is with the structural analyses. These cover economic history, social history, the role of the press and public opinion, the constitutional-social structure of German and British politics, colonial rivalries, and even some of the major personalities involved. Kennedy sees the development of Anglo-German tension as being an inevitable result of German unification and economic development. In the mid-19th century, Germany was a congeries of small, largely rural states. In !914, it was the most powerful state in Europe with the most modern industries, a particularly powerful army, and a growing Navy. Given that Britain had been the predominant world power, some form of tension was inevitable. The specific form of the conflict was not, however, inevitable. Here Kennedy is particularly good on how the major differences in German and British society drove the conflict. The recent origins of the German Empire the relative lack of national cohesion, and the somewhat jerry-rigged nature of decision making processes were all contributors. The relatively authoritarian nature of the German state and the strong tendency of the German leadership to use foreign policy to address domestic political contradictions and encourage national solidarity are seen as a major source of Germany's relatively aggressive foreign policy. The British, with a more liberal state and a governing elite used to concessions to preserve domestic peace, were more pragmatic, but there were still limits to what the British would tolerate from the Germans. Kennedy is good also on the roles of specific important figures. His discussions of important German leaders, Wilhelm II for example, or the Earl of Salisbury are insightful and show how specific events are determined not just by broad forces but also by individuals' decisions.

This book has considerable value beyond its worth as historical analysis. It shows very nicely the complex interaction between foreign policy, internal politics, and social structure in a sophisticated but comprehensible manner. Its particularly good in revealing the dangers of authoritarian political structures, particularly when menaced by internal threats to legitimacy.