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The Rise and Fall of Elites: An Application of Theoretical Sociology

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This monograph first saw the light of day in 1901 and has been understood as a somewhat famous attempt at a non race-based understanding of 'elitism'. The failure of this attempt to be either genuinely explanatory or entirely successful seems, by almost all accounts, to have been historically verified by fascisms repeated descent into racism. But, given the utter failure of the Fascist movements of the post World War II era to gain traction, one wonders if perhaps now Pareto can, at last, be given a fair hearing. One even wonders if Pareto is fairly characterized as a fascist.

Be that as it may, Pareto still might have much to teach us about the interactions of elites. According to Pareto, elites rise to power, maintain dominance, and then fall; but only if another elite is struggling to take its place. (One is here reminded of Lenin's remark against Trotsky, I believe, 'that no state ever fell without being pushed'.) History is, according to this text, a circulation of elites; and for Pareto, the ideologies that these elites represent are only of secondary importance. What one must always keep in mind while reading this book is that, for Pareto, Liberals and Socialists (that is, the leaders of these ideological positions) are equally elites. By the 'elite', I should point out, Pareto always means the leadership of a class.

Pareto distinguishes between subjective and objective factors; the latter being real objects while the former are psychological states. Thus belief and unbelief are, for Pareto, equally psychological states. In fact, according to our author, belief is often the sign of a rising elite. Note that by 'belief' he doesn't merely mean religious beliefs; according to Pareto socialism is a belief, that is, it is a psychological state. Indeed, for Pareto, perhaps somewhat surprisingly given his right-wing tendency and reputation, nationalism itself is also a belief. Now, he doesn't propose to ignore these beliefs; on the contrary, it is the skepticism of the rulers towards beliefs that weakens them in the face of the rising elite. These 'myths' are a part of history and need to be explained.

The 'religious sentiment' (i.e., belief) of the masses is what leads to revolt. This sentiment is exploited by the rising elite in its attempt to overthrow the ruling elite. (In this matter the 'skepticism' of the ruling elite is no small aid to the rising elite.) And what we also need to keep in mind is that logical argument almost always fails in these matters; people believe for non-rational reasons, sentiment must be met with sentiment, i.e. socialism must be countered with nationalism. In fact, in these pages Pareto, over a hundred years ago, by describing the similarity between Christian and Socialist behavior, seems to indicate the possibility of a convergence of Christianity and Socialism vis-à-vis the ruling bourgeois. This possibility is currently being explored, thanks to the collapse of 'really existing socialism' in the USSR, by the most au courant leftist continental theory.

Keep in mind that, for Pareto, it is the 'decadence' (i.e., it is 'less apt to defend its own power') and the unabated rapacity of the old elite that causes it to perish. Indeed, he says of this decadence and rapacity that the old elite "could prosper if one of them were absent." Scientifically, or so Pareto maintains, there really is nothing to choose between. Speaking of some historical examples of some crimes of new elites Pareto says, "The old elite, when it was in power, did even worse, so that one cannot conclude from these facts anything against one or the other regime..." Pareto simultaneously holds that reform is the most dangerous moment for the ruling elite, and that the waning of power is perfectly compatible with a rise in the use of violence. In fact, one comes away from this book feeling that the things that Pareto held in most contempt were inefficiency and incompetence and, indeed, some of his most contemptuous gestures in this matter are reserved for the capitalists.

In any case, the problem seems to be that the falling class, no longer believing in itself, can no longer attract the best young people to its cause. The rising class has 'belief' and hope, the falling one only has its privileges. Persecution seems to be no remedy for this. Indeed, thanks to persecutions, "many people of doubtful loyalty and unsteady character were eliminated and professional politicians kept away." ...Very amusing! But here, in 1901, Pareto sees the best of future generations going to socialism while all persecution does is prune the revolutionary plant.

In fact, if one carries away anything from this book it is that old elites must eventually fall. We learn here that socialism is the heir of Christian 'belief'. And since Christianity is dying, all the old elite can do is delay the inevitable 'homecoming' of the common people (and their 'religious sentiment') to socialism. Thus 'belief' replaces 'belief'. Again, there is little rationality in this process; Pareto is at pains to emphasize the 'subjective phenomenon'. This is why nationalism is the best answer to socialism; one counters one irrationality with another.

This book is really only a long essay, the hardcover edition before me has 75 pages of text, 18 pages of notes, and a 22 page introduction. The notes are quite good and should not be passed up. For example, while nicely playing off his understanding of socialism as but another belief, Pareto, after discussing some socialist 'sectarians', writes, "One day we will perhaps have the Holy Inquisition of the socialist faith. (Note 18)" The Soviet 'show trials' of the thirties were indeed this Inquisition. This really is a superb book, a worthy companion piece to all the great political realists of history - from Machiavelli to Gramsci.

This essay by Vilfredo Pareto is apparently considered to be a classic of sociology. I wonder why? It's a worthless, demented screed by a maladapted bourgeois who just can't stand the idea of common people having it their way. Especially not women. Thus, it belongs to the same genre of literature as "The Anti-Capitalistic Mentality" by Ludwig von Mises. "I'm old, grumpy and have axes to grind. This time, I'm not going to sound as intellectually polished as I did in my younger days". Mises was at least funny. Pareto's irony doesn't bite.

Pareto's theory can be summarized in a few short sentences: If an elite turns "effete" while still being rapacious, it will be overthrown by another elite. The dissident elites always claim to act in the name of the people, and they always lie. If an elite is rapacious but strong, it will remain in power. If the elite is "effete" but not so rapacious, it may be able to stay in power, but this is less certain. Elites inevitable become "effete" with time, hence there is always a turnover at the top. The actual revolutions are based to a large extent on irrational emotion, since humans seldom act from strictly rational motives.

That's it. That's his theory. Perhaps he said something more about it in his more extensive French and Italian works. If so, his essay isn't a very good introduction! The actual theory takes up less than half of the essay. The rest is devoted to complaints against "effete" judges, "effete" temperance activists, and "effete" men or women who try to reform prostitutes (as if prostitutes were working their trade voluntarily). I guess Pareto had some kind of macho Italian prejudice against the effeminate French!

Still, if you are really lucky, you might be able to spot *something* interesting even in this shallow work. Pareto regards the victory of socialism as inevitable, since the bourgeoisie is weak, and weakness deserves nothing but contempt. The workers, on the other hand, are strong. Pareto involuntarily admires the solidarity and sheer strength of will found among striking workers, or the efficiency of union organizers. The bourgeoisie is a class of hedonistic exploiters, who attempt to defend their exploitation by hypocritical do-goodism, since they are too weak to actually use force.

This, of course, is the mentality of a fascist, and although Pareto never became a fascist, the regime of Mussolini would later claim him as a forerunner. Spengler had the same attitude to the coloured races. While supporting the White Europeans, he nevertheless admired the cunning and prowess of Third World peoples. According to some sources, Hitler had the same attitude in the bunker: since the German people had betrayed him and lost the war, they might as well perish. The story may be apocryphal, but somehow it does capture the "pure" fascist mentality. Perhaps a real fascist cannot be racist or classist. You either eat, or are eaten. And those who eat are worthy of admiration, even if the ones eaten happen to be your co-ethnics or co-bourgeois. In the same manner, some hunters admire the killing instinct of wolves, even when these harm hunters. In a warped and weird sort of way, this cynical honesty is the only redeeming trait of Vilfredo Pareto.

Another thing that struck me are the similarities between Pareto and George Sorel, who claimed to be a socialist and Marxist. There seems to have been a strange symmetry between the two men. Sorel must have agreed with Pareto, and for that very reason decided that a socialist revolution was necessary! Sorel also felt contempt for the decadence of the bourgeoisie, and feared that the reformist labor leaders would drag the workers into the degeneration as well. He too despised bourgeois doo-gooders, and actually preferred the captains of industry. The need for violence and a pessimistic outlook were other Sorelian traits, plus the notorious idea of the general strike as a "myth", a way of heeding the fact that people often act out of irrational impulses. In a strange way, Pareto was the theory, while Sorel was the practice. And indeed, Sorel's "left-wing" politics occasionally turned fascistic, as when he expressed admiration for Mussolini or collaborated with French activist monarchists.

But what about Pareto's theories? At least as laid out in this slender volume, they fall very short. Dissident elites don't always claim to act in the name of the people. After World War II, the most successful option in the Western nations has been the one considered most unlikely by Pareto: "effete" elites stay in power by becoming less rapacious. Why does this work? For long, the reason was presumably that the elites were just as rapacious (and macho) abroad. European workers got their "effete" welfare state. The coloured peoples got beaten up. Today, this is not necessarily working any more. Also, it seems as if all great powers are equally strong - or equally weak - and have no other option than to co-operate with each other. I'm not sure what Pareto would have said about this polycentrism.

But, frankly, I've been charitable to our Italian friend. At bottom, his text is simply a temper tantrum against democracy and women's emancipation. It's probably a classic best forgotten.