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115 of 125 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Important but flawed, February 24, 2000
It would be difficult to overstate the importance of this book. It was the first comprehensive popular history of Nazi Germany to appear in English, and it is probably more responsible than any other single source for shaping the way that Americans think about Nazi Germany, World War II, and the Holocaust. More than that, this is an estimable work of history. Shirer has done an admirable job of combing through the mountains of primary source material that the Nazis left behind and assembling a coherent and comprehensible narrative from it.Of course, it would be a mistake to view this book as simply or even primarily a work of history. It is intended as an indictment of the evil and barbarity that the Nazis perpetrated in Germany and across Europe for more than twelve years and as an indictment of the men and women in Germany, in France, in Great Britain, and elsewhere who allowed that evil and barbarity to occur. Shirer is not content to point out that Hitler and Himmler and Goering and Frank were monsters; he also is intent on showing how complicit the German Army and the German people were in what happened and how the ignorance, stupidity, and cowardice of the politicians of the West and the Soviet Union actively assisted Hitler's monstosities in coming to pass. The reader can almost visualize Shirer shaking in outrage when he considers the evil Hitler wrought with the help of the rest of Europe. This outrage is, in many ways, both the book's greatest asset and its greatest shortcoming. While Shirer's indignation makes this a great moral work, it also causes him to be more than a little unfair to some of his subjects and to present the history as being more one-dimensional than it in fact was. Shirer never tells, for example, that one of the principal reasons that Chamberlain and Daladier were willing to appease Hitler was that the Depression had bankrupted both Britain and France. They believed that they could not afford to rearm so that they could stop Hitler militarily, and so they sought to get the best deals they could at the bargaining table. Their policy was, of course, dangerously short-sighted, but it is unfair to both men to suggest that their policy was almost solely the result of cowardice. Then, too, is the fact that Shirer almost invariably describes Rosenberg as a befuddled dolt, Goering as fat, and Ribbentrop as vacuous. It is readily apparent to the reader that he does so because he feels he must constantly reiterate their lack of praiseworthiness, but it is disconcerting to the reader. I am at a loss to explain what Goering's girth has to do with anything, or what it was about Rosenberg's writing that made him any stupider that most Nazis. While I believe that Ribbentrop deserves almost all of the calumny that can be heaped on him, Shirer never makes a real case for his vacuity. Finally, it must be said that Shirer appears to run out of steam towards the end of the book. All of World War II is covered in the last 25% of the book, and many important topics, including the Holocaust, get short shrift as a result. These criticisms should not be taken to mean that I believe that this book is not meritorious or that it should not be read. On the contrary: one would be hard-pressed to find a better, more comprehensible, more accessible one volume book about Nazi Germany. It ought to be the starting point (but not the ending point) for anyone interested in World War II or Nazi Germany.
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