Most Helpful Customer Reviews
|
|
36 of 37 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Asprey rises as top historian with The Rise of Napoleon, November 28, 2000
Few historians could write this most impressive and thoroughly researched work about Napoleon Bonaparte. Written in a clear and insightful style, Asprey has mined sharp insights, shrewd observations, and new understanding of one of history's greatest (and most complex) leaders, from a gold mine thought long paid out. What readers should gain from this important biography, that is also a political-military-economic history, is that there are distinct doctrines for war, peace, and more importantly, intervention to impose the will of peace, law, and government upon nations which threaten another's security. Asprey accomplishes this by using a very well written and interesting story line that chronicles Napoleon's life in a manner used all too infrequently by other writers of historical lives. It is never dull, often revealing, and thoroughly fascinating. The reader finds the secrets of Napoleon's great abilities by understanding his childhood, his youth spent in bookstores, and his lust for reading and writing. Like Asprey's "War in the Shadows," this book will enlighten, infuriate, and hopefully inform a whole new generation of 21st century historians, members of the armed forces, and business leaders to understand that genius come from knowing, doing, and believing in one's innate abilities. Napoleon Bonaparte certainly understood his and Robert Asprey reveals all in this first of two volumes. The next volume, The Fall of Napoleon, will be eagerly anticipated.
|
|
|
44 of 47 people found the following review helpful:
3.0 out of 5 stars
An Entertaining Tour-guide of Familiar Locales, July 12, 2001
Robert B. Asprey, a former US marine officer, has set out to write a two-volume history covering the rise and fall of Napoleon Bonaparte. In this first volume, Asprey covers Bonaparte's career from his birth in Corsica in 1769 to his triumph at the Battle of Austerlitz in 1805. This two-volume effort is not based on any newly-unearthed primary sources or recent archaeology. Rather, Asprey seeks to provide a balanced account of Napoleon's rise and fall using standard sources such as his correspondence, while avoiding the hero-worship or tyrant-bashing style of so many other accounts of the French emperor. In great part the author succeeds, making this volume an excellent introduction to Napoleon's life. Organizationally, the book is divided into 48 short chapters that generally cover 2-6 months of Napoleon's life. Each chapter is succinct but well-written, although the author does tend to over-use modern colloquialisms. Readers seeking in-depth analysis of battles or political and economic decisions will be disappointed by this approach, which tends to scratch only the surface of key events, but the editor may be more responsible for brevity than the author. Ending this volume at Austerlitz is an odd choice, since the victories of Jena and Friedland were yet to come. Probably the Brumaire coup of 1799 would have been a better place to conclude the rise of Napoleon, with a middle volume to cover 1800-1812 and a third volume to cover his fall in 1812-1821. The lack of any kind of summation or commentary chapter as conclusion to this volume is also odd. The only significant historical error in the book is the confusion over the Caffarelli brothers, both of whom were French generals who served under Napoleon in this period. On page 309, Asprey mentions that Caffarelli died in Syria in April 1799. Later on page 538-40, Caffarelli is mentioned as commanding a division at Austerlitz in 1805. On checking the index, readers will note only one listing for a "General Louis Maximilien Caffarelli." In fact, Louis died in Syria but his brother Marie-Francois was the general who fought at Austerlitz. The author failed to note that he was in fact referring to two different individuals. There are also other instances of historical distortion, such as the author's account of the demise of Robespierre and the naval battle off Toulon in July 1795. Asprey's account is very sympathetic toward Napoleon, and it is difficult for professional military men not to admire the Corsican artillery officer who displayed great skill on the battlefield and restored order to his country. While the author points out the obvious blots on Napoleon's ledger, such as the massacre of Turkish prisoners at Jaffa, he avoids asking tough questions; did Napoleon participate in the Jacobin massacres in Toulon in 1793? French looting in Italy is mentioned, but this account only hints at Napoleon's personal looting. Furthermore, Napoleon's treasonous conduct in Corsica in 1792 while on paid leave is inexcusable and should have merited some kind of rebuke from this historian. This volume does loose some coherence when in comes to the thorny issue of Napoleon's "grand strategy." In this regard, Asprey goes along with conventional - if flawed - wisdom. The first campaign in which Napoleon truly planned and executed on his own was the Egyptian-Syrian campaigns of 1798-9, and the author goes along with the French assertion that the objective was to "strike a blow at British commerce" and to menace India. This commonly-repeated assertions are idiotic. British trade with Egypt and Syria was minimal and a small French expeditionary corps could hardly control huge expanses of land against the Turks and march 3,000 miles across desert and mountains to India. Until the advent of the Suez Canal, Egypt had no strategic value for Britain, but the loss of 20,000 good-quality French troops on a hair-brained expedition cost France dearly in the 1799 campaign in Western Europe. Once he was in charge, Napoleon then directed numerous silly plans for expeditions to the West Indies, the Mideast, China and India, none of which made any strategic sense. The costly expedition to Santo Domingo was more of the same nonsense, but Napoleon's reputation as a strategist remain unblemished. Asprey's account then hinges heavily on Napoleon's "hell-bent" desire to invade England and thereby finish off the instigators of continuous continental wars. In this account, the author maintains that Napoleon definitely wanted to invade England in 1804-5, but a clumsy French naval leadership and unfortunate circumstances thwarted him. Asprey certainly spends much effort detailing that Napoleon was not the aggressor in the renewed war, but that England sought to renege on the Peace of Amiens and then egged on Austria to mobilize. However the author does miss a major point: if Napoleon was "hell-bent" on invading England and since he knew that his navy was no match for the Royal Navy in a fair fight, why then did not Napoleon launch a "Pearl Harbor" type sneak attack on the British homeland? During the brief cease-fire of 1802-3, French ports were not blockaded and a French army was sent by sea to Santo Domingo. Could not Napoleon have sent this army to land in Kent instead? Asprey says that Britain's three main assets were its navy, its gold and its subversive tactics, but all of these could have been trumped by a surprise descent. Thus the main historical question should be, shouldn't Napoleon have been more of an aggressor than he in fact was? This volume covers all the main aspects of Napoleon's life in short, but adequate detail. However, it does not attempt serious analysis or ask the kind of tough questions that might justify a new interpretation of this great captain.
|
|
|
35 of 38 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Napoleon for the 21st Century, February 14, 2001
In what is perhaps the first full-length biography of Napoleon in English of the twenty-first century, Robert Asprey turns to the nineteenth century for his inspiration. Asprey, a former U.S. Marine captain, has previously written on military topics. The present volume covers Napoleon's life up to his stunning victory at Austerlitz. Primarily a military history, in spite of Asprey's apparent aspirations as revealed in his "Note to the Reader," Asprey glosses over lightly Napoleon's political achievements. The political changes wrought by Brumaire as quickly dealt with in one short chapter. The Rise of Napoleon Bonaparte therefore does not replace other biographies of Napoleon, such as Vincent Cronin's, that gives more attention to the political and cultural aspects of Napoleon's life. Asprey points out Napoleon's egoism, his ambition, his quick temper, all of his faults, but does not dwell on them unduly. The events of Napoleon's life are given precedence over moralizing about or psychoanalyzing that life. Generally Asprey avoids trying to divine what Napoleon was thinking and instead tries to explain Napoleon's actions in the context of the times and of Napoleon's life. Written in forty-eight short chapters, the book is based entirely on secondary sources, both in English and in French. Asprey relies largely on the classic work of historians of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries for his sources, though he does make extensive use of research done by modern historians in journals and in papers presented to the Consortium on Revolutionary Europe. And Asprey often lets Napoleon speak for himself through liberal use of the Emperor's voluminous correspondence. After a perhaps too brief an overview of Napoleon's life before 1789 -Napoleon's early years are dealt with in a mere 80 pages before his arrival at Toulon. Asprey jumps almost immediately into Napoleon's military career. The author presents a highly simplistic overview of the background dynamics of the French Revolution (which Asprey obviously abhors). Asprey presents a fairly even-handed look at Napoleon's career, however. He does not excuse Napoleon's actions, but does not moralize over them either. At times I found the analysis somewhat superficial, especially when dealing with political matters. Another criticism is that the volume could use more maps. There are just seven maps included (the advertised maps of the end papers are missing) and those are all of whole theaters of war except for one small, not very detailed, map of the battlefield of Austerlitz. There are just 27 illustrations spread throughout the text, mainly portraits of personages mentioned -nine of which are of Napoleon's marshals. On the whole, these pictures don't add much to the book. Some minor errors have crept into the books, some of which could be editing errors. Another shortcoming of the book is that the index is only partially analytical. The prose is straightforward, factual and unadorned. It lacks the élan that the subject lends itself to and there are no literary flourishes or vivid descriptions of battles. I get no feeling of an "old soldier" writing of another old soldier as I do when reading Elting's books. Asprey deals with the battle of Marengo, for example, in a scant five pages. Asprey has taken a fresh, if somewhat superficial, look at Napoleon's life. The book is factual and informative and can be recommended especially to those new to Napoleon and his life. It would make a fine companion to Vincent Cronin's Napoleon Bonaparte which, while laudatory, does give a much better picture of the non-military side of Napoleon's life. I look forward to the second volume.
|
|
|
Most Recent Customer Reviews
|
by Robert Asprey
by Christopher Hibbert
by Alan Schom
by Philip G. Dwyer
by Frank McLynn
See all 59 books this book cites
