Customer Reviews

Rising Sun and Tumbling Bear: Russia's War with Japan (Cassell Military Paperbacks)

5 star:		(2)
4 star:		(4)
3 star:		(2)
2 star:		(1)
1 star:		(0)

 

 

I am surprised at the shortage of really good works in English on the Russo-Japanese War which, far from being an obscure backwater event, was in actually one of the watershed conflicts of the 20th century around which much of subsequent world history pivoted. This is definitely one, if not the, best treatments of the war available. Connaughton gives excellent and through accounts of both the land and naval operations in a very readable narrative. The only reason I don't give it 5 stars is for an incomplete bibliography, the lack of footnotes/endnotes, the inadequacy of the maps (although there are 15 maps spread throughout the book, I found myself often having to flip around between several of them to find the location-occasionally in vain-of some obscure, previous unreferenced place name), and some sloppy editing (which intermittently led to disjointed transitions and the casual use without any introduction of previously unmentioned people). However, these problems were minor and certainly don't detract from the value of the book. At the end, Connaughton provides a fresh analysis of why the lessons of this war were not well absorbed into the tactics and strategy of the First World War and I especially liked how he closed with a poignant and heartrending reminder of the personal human tragedy of all war. When military history is often presented like a recount of a sporting event--sometimes with melodramatic or maudlin sops of dubious sincerity to war's human cost--I found the epilogue to this book to be refreshing. Overall, highly recommended.

There are not a great number of modern histories of the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War, but Richard Connaughton's Rising Sun and Tumbling Bear is clearly the best. The author, with 30 year's experience in the British Army and access to British official records on the war, brings a richer and more detailed military account than Denis and Peggy Warner's The Tide at Sunrise (which is also very good, but less detailed). While the author leans toward admiration of the Japanese war effort - at one point, describing the Japanese army as "a well-oiled machine with high morale, confident, well practiced and undefeated" - he is more than fair to the Russian side as well. This book is marked by superb detail, superior organization and insight derived from sound military judgment and experience.

Rising Sun and Tumbling Bear consists of 15 chapters, with a conventional chronological structure based upon major topics. The author also provides 15 sketch maps, which are a bit skimpy but adequate. Connaughton provides a succinct but excellent background chapter on events leading up to the war, followed by an even better chapter on opposing forces. In addition to excellent detail on both ground and naval forces, the author cites the main Russian weakness as an over-abundance of elderly, ineffective leaders. In the sections on early ground and naval actions, the author notes that a British correspondent reported the attack on Port Arthur as it was occurring- a first in journalism. Throughout the book, the author makes the point - and supports it with evidence - that Japanese operations were facilitated by a superb intelligence effort, while Russian efforts were hindered by awful intelligence support. Despite the fact that the Russians usually had numerical superiority on the ground and at sea, they continually thought they were out-numbered.

Although many historians have been very harsh on the Russian war effort, Connaughton notes that Russian strategic plans were usually sound, but poorly executed. On the ground, the Russians were also hindered by commanders who adhered to outdated tactics, such as volley firing and attacks in mass formations across open ground. The Russians did enjoy some advantages, such as a superior logistic capability based upon the China Eastern Railway and new quick-firing artillery pieces. Russian infantry units were also quite good at building defensive positions integrating machineguns and barbed wire, intimating conditions that would soon appear in the First World War. The author also notes that the Japanese were unsuccessful in following up after their victories, with pursuits being hindered by inadequate cavalry and weaker logistics. I also noted from this account, that the Japanese made the mistake of using landmarks such as rail lines as boundary markers between their formations - which usually leads to no one really controlling the rail line.

The sections on the siege of Port Arthur are particularly interesting since they allude to the slaughter that modern weapons could inflict on infantry. The author is equally harsh on General Nogi's wasteful attacks (which Allied generals would repeat in 1914-16) and the self-defeating behavior of General Stoessel. Interesting details include the Russian use of naval torpedoes on land and the Japanese mistake in making their assault ladders too short. Russian heroes, such as Smirnov, Tretyakov and Kondratenko do get their due in these pages, as well. Amazingly, the author notes that the Japanese prepared the surrender document two years before the war began (talk about prior planning!). Japanese success in blasting the Russian defenders off the vital 203 Meter Hill with heavy artillery may have convinced European military observers that firepower could break any defense.

In a few cases the author overstretches himself. At one point, he states that "an approach march at night culminating in a dawn attack was a new phenomenon of warfare." Didn't Washington teach the British that lesson at Trenton and Princeton in 1776? At another point, he notes the appearance "for the first time in modern warfare [of] the construction of opposing lines of trenches.." which ignores the appearance of trench warfare at Petersburg in 1864. However, these omissions are not that for a British military historian, since they rarely acknowledge or utilize examples from American military history. In a few cases, the author may have used `facts' that were unconfirmed, such as Japanese heavy artillery consumption at Port Arthur (the figures sound unreasonably high) and the infamous Samsonov-Rennenkampf brawl (which probably didn't happen).

The author asks two key questions: why were the Japanese able to consistently defeat the Russians and why were the lessons of this war not understood before World War One? As for the first, the author believes that the Japanese had a distinct advantage fighter closer to home, which led to higher morale. The Japanese military also benefited from a leadership structure based more on merit and ability, rather than political connections. As for the second, the author notes that different observers took home different lessons from the war and often drew diverging conclusions, often in line with their own prior biases.

The Russo-Japanese War proves to be one of the more interesting wars ever fought, since it proves to be forebringer of the future, World War I which will be fought nearly ten years later. Trench warfare, superiority of the machine guns on the battlegrounds and meaningless infantry charges were all shown in open light as the Russian and Japanese soldiers fought against each other.

The book proves to be well written, nicely researched and revealed a good insight into this war which ironically speaking, isn't too well known in Western nations. A serious student of World War I could see here, that chaotic command structure of the Russian army, had their root initially when they fought against the Japanese. While rarely outnumbered, the Russians were continouesly out-professionalized by their Asian opponents.

The war was the first time, a white European power have been brought low by a non-white power since the colonialism began in ernest. A good reading material that comes highly recommended by anyone who got an interest in this subject.

This is one of two serious-length books on the Russo-Japanese war available in English. There are two shorter books (the Osprey "Essential History" and an "Illustrated History). The other book, "The Tide at Sunrise" by Denis & Peggy Warner, is longer and from a less military point of view, Denis Warner being a journalist. The current book is written by a retired British soldier, and consists of a "substantial revision" of a book he wrote in the late 80s after winning a silent auction and becoming the proud owner of a large library on the subject from the staff college he taught at.

The Russo-Japanese War is one of the stranger wars of history. The two opponents *looked* well-matched for one another, with the larger and more experienced Russian army handicapped by the length of their supply line along the trans-Siberian railroad. In actualy point of fact, however, the Japanese were pretty much universally aggressive and resourceful, while their opponents seemed to be able only to come up with excuses for failure, as opposed to ways to succeed. As a result, there were no major battles during the war that the Japanese actually lost or that the Russians were able to claim to have won. Russian soldiers were stolid and brave, and given some time skillful in battle, but the Japanese only rarely gave them a chance to learn anything and exploited every weakness they could find.

This is a good military account of the campaign, with some flaws. The various battles are examined intelligently, the character and actions of the various commander dissected dispassionately, the course of events recounted clearly and concisely. There aren't any notes to the text, however, and at times this is maddening. It's my firm belief that any work or person quoted in the text of a book should be attributed *somewhere*. If you don't do it in the text itself (something like "a British observer says..." isn't enough) then it should be in a footnote or something. The maps are only adequate, and don't do much to convey the movement of the troops or their dispositions at various times. There's also a reference to Takano Isoroku, who later changed his name to Yamamoto and became Japan's senior admiral at the beginning of World War II, but since the author makes no mention of the name change, most won't recognize Takano-san as anyone other than Admiral Togo's aide. The index is useless, failing to list entries that should be listed, and not citing places where the subject does appear. While the text of this book is worthwhile, the finishing touches are rather shoddy.

I enjoyed this book, and unless you can find a used copy of the Warner book this is the only account of the Russo-Japanese War available that I'm aware of. It also has the virtue of being shorter than the Warner book by a couple of hundred pages, if I remember right. So my recommendation, while qualified, is largely positive, because there are so few alternatives.

Chapters One and Two were extremely interesting. However, the author often allowed the story to become bogged down in the tactical minutia--Regiment X advanced on Hill Y to attack Brigade Z. Connaughton demonstrated very little ability to convey the wider importance of individual engagements or make the reader care. Despite maps included at the beginning of almost every chapter, I rarely understood who a particular engagement fit into a larger battle. Thus, chapters five through nine and parts of nine and ten were painfully dull. If Connaughton was intent on writing a comprehensive tactical history of the Russo-Japanese War, it needed to several times longer to adequately explain events. Given how well this book started, I was very disappointed with the final product.

On a side-note, the chapter in this book on the Russian Fleet's journey around the world seems to be more-or-less a summary of The Fleet that Had to Die, by Richard Hough. At times he even uses similar phrases! Also, the absense of citations was bothersome.

There aren't NO footnotes to this Cassell edition of this important book. It is indeed sad - and very unprofessional - that an otherwise very good book of this level of narrative detail would omit its reference sources. Additionally, the narrative detail is degraded by the poor quality of maps provided. The maps in this book are of such extremely poor quality, they provide barely enough detail to orient yourself to the flow of combat. As a result you cannot adequately envision a lot of of important details regarding the conduct of operations. If you can locate some independent maps, the narrative detail is much more meaningful. Most people are highly ignorant regarding the importance of this war in regards to the military operations througout the 20th Century. Both of these significant inadequacies (no sources and poor maps) in this edition only exacerbate our lack of knowledge regarding this important war.

A very good look at the Russo-Japanese war. The Russian ground forces had many chances to win but poor training with even worse leadership threw them away. The Russians were good at defense but it was a case of "almost won". This war in fact started the downfall of the military that fell in world war one. They were not ready for the next war. This war started Japans case of "victory fever" that ended in world war two. A good book on a little known subject.

This is a very informative book on the Russo Japanese war! A very straight forward and fact filled book. A very well researched piece of work. I enjoyed it very much.

Connaughton's book is a good ,comprehensive history of Russo -Japanese war. Both were expansionist powers .So confrontation seemed inevitable. Budding Japanese nationalism collided head-on with Russian imperialism.. Creeping Russian expansion into Korea posed a threat Japanese national interests. Tokyo reacted violently.

On February 6,1904 Admiral Togo launched a pre-emptive strike on Russian fleet that lay at anchor at Port Arthur. Though Togo failed in destroying the fleet , he succeded in crippling its movements. Japanese landed troops on the west coast of Korean peninsula and soon effected a crossing of river Yalu. This marked the beginning of demise of Russian power in the Far East.

Here I wish to make a few comments which a student of War/History may find it enriching. Russian withdrawl from Yalu together with its failure to fall back upon Liaotung peninsula unbarred the road to Port Arthur which came to be besieged by Japanese forces. Subsequent Russian attempts to relieve the siege were foiled. However the striking feature of these campaigns were Japanese inability to gain decisive victory. Japanese armies often managed to pierce or outflank Russian positions but failed in enveloping it. Russians refused pitched battles and effected tactical retreats into the depths of Manchuria.

Author has argued Russo-Japanese war as harbinger of First World War : machineguns, barbed wire entanglements, artillery, Japanese use of arsenic smoke during the siege of Port Arthur. I endorse this view. Coming of machineguns bestowed lethal firepower on defending forces making massed frontal assaults suicidal and costly. This led to emergence of no man's land which gradually widened separating combatants making decision increasingly difficult. Japanese came to depend on artillery overwhelmingly to suppress enemy fire zones which at that time were not too deep. It sound ironical experience derived from this war was not incorporated into the training manuals of Western armies. As a result, European had to re learn this experience painfully during Great War. Equally significant was the importance of troop morale in war.Japanese morale was superb. Japanese soldier never shrank from courting death. He knew only one thing ,advance,Advance despite all obstacles strewn across the path. Victory at all costs. The above combined with a fanatical respect for authority [personified in the form of Emperor] transformed Japanese soldier into formidable fighting machine.

Regrettably , this was a war ignored by historians and academics though this cause a tectonic shift in forces which drastically re arranged world affairs. What were they?

It stimulated revolutionary tendencies in Russia which for a long time was gnawing at its vitals.

By removing Russian threat it helped Kaiser's Germany to focus efforts in the West .This altered balance of power in Europe. In order to restore equilibrium Britain ended her policy of isolation and entered into an alliance with France.

But biggest impact of Japanese victory was felt in Asia, Africa. It infused confidence and boosted the morale of peoples who were struggling to free themselves from European tyranny. In India ,the effect was profound. During wintry nights people sat in circles and spoke about Japanese victories while passing huqqa.

Finally, it sowed the seed of future confrontation with US. Covert American support emboldened Russians turn down Japanese demand for war reparations. Tokyo now started viewing Washington with suspicion, hostility and distrust.

Author was unable to attach sufficient importance to the above aspects. Be as it may,the book is an essential reading for history buffs and layman alike.