Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of Technological and Environmental Dangers [Paperback]

Mary Douglas (Author), Aaron Wildavsky (Author)

Editorial Reviews

Review

Offering what they call a cultural theory of risk perception, the authors suggest that peoples complaints about hazards should never be taken at face value. One must look further to discover what forms of social organization are being defended or attacked. -- New York Times

Product Details

• Paperback: 224 pages
• Publisher: University of California Press (October 27, 1983)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0520050630
• ISBN-13: 978-0520050631
• Product Dimensions: 5.5 x 0.8 x 8.3 inches
• Shipping Weight: 10.4 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 3.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (5 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #574,245 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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Most Helpful Customer Reviews

21 of 22 people found the following review helpful

5.0 out of 5 stars A Classic July 18, 2005

By Dan Kahan

Format:Paperback

This book is a classic in the study of risk perception. It is the genesis of the so-called "cultural theory of risk," which is an alternative to the dominant rational-actor and psychometric theories of risk perception. Douglas and Wildavsky's basic claim is that individuals conform their perceptions of various societal and personal risks to their preferred visions of a good society. Although (as noted by Gintis in his review) Risk and Culture is only casually empirical, it furnished a blueprint for a subsequent program of rigorous empirical study that is by now very far advanced and that corroborates Douglas's and Wildavsky's account.

4 of 6 people found the following review helpful

3.0 out of 5 stars Brilliant But Dated November 30, 2011

By David S. Wellhauser

Format:Kindle Edition|Amazon Verified Purchase

Interesting work on culturally selected fears, but dated. This was originally published in 1982 so many of the example make the work seem more than a little out of step with current fears (justified or not). Still, the core argument remains valid.

However, I would not recommend this work because of its dated examples and argument.

On The Kindle Edition

Once again the quality of this Kindle edition is frighteningly pathetic. If you want a good e-copy give this edition a pass.

10 of 23 people found the following review helpful

2.0 out of 5 stars A Plausible Thesis, but not Properly Balanced March 4, 2005

By Herbert Gintis

Format:Paperback|Amazon Verified Purchase

The authors suggest, reasonably enough, that one's personal political and cultural predispositions affect how one assess the risk of different possible social dangers. If this were the only factor affecting people's risk assessment, it would be quite difficult to generate an informed social policy in a democratic society, and research in to actual risk levels associated with different degrees of social damage would be worthless, since people simply listen to the gurus that support their personal positions.

The authors present no data. Why is data important? Because if 90% of voters fit their description, we are in a much different situation that if 10% do. My best guess is that people systematically underestimate most social risks (e.g. accidental nuclear war, deadly SARS-type plagues) and overestimate a few (riskiness of air travel, danger of poisons in food). Most people, however, are willing to let the ideologues battle it out, and are strongly affected by the way the journalistic accounts of the battle portrays the cogencies of different positions. If I am right, the extremists on either side of positions, of the sort depicted by the authors, perform a valuable function but do not determine the outcome for the purposes of social policy. For instance, there are vehement supporters of gun control and equally vehement supporters of the rights of gun owners. Most voters, however, lie somewhere in the middle and are swayed both by events and scientific evidence. If that is so, the possibility of effective social policy is possible in a democracy. But, some say, the extremists are willing to put in time and money to sway the public, so ideology wins the day in this manner. I respond that it is wise for voters to take the strength of preferences into account in making social policy decisions. At any rate, no balanced discussion of these issues will be found in this volume.