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Rites of Peace: The Fall of Napoleon and the Congress of Vienna

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Adam Zamoyski's `Rites of Peace' is a thorough examination of the fall of Napoleon's empire and the subsequent reconstruction of Europe by the victorious allied powers of Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia. The Congress of Vienna, as this delegation was dubbed, was a watershed moment in European history, says Zamoyski, and one that has been largely neglected by historians ever since. Replete with extravagant soirées, hunting trips, duels, and scandalous sexual liaisons, this eight-month long negotiation served as a meeting ground for a virtual who's who of European nobility. Most prominent and influential were Talleyrand, Metternich, Tsar Alexander, Frederick William III, Castlereagh, Wellington, Humboldt, and an array of monarchs, princes, and aristocrats that are too numerous to name. Ostensibly, the goal was to bring stability and justice to the entire continent, and to a certain degree this was successful. But inevitably, all parties had their own agenda and thus Zamoyski's story is one full of intrigue and political maneuvering. The results were mixed, but the effects of the Congress of Vienna would impact the whole of Europe for some time to come.

First, I have to give credit where credit is due. Zamoyski's bibliography is huge and he clearly has done a massive amount of research for this book. This is definitely one of the most thorough and detailed histories that I have read. The negative side of this is that it is a bit too detailed, in my opinion. Don't get me wrong, I enjoyed reading about all the debauchery and scandalous escapades, but Zamoyski tends to wander off into inane details that only serve to temporarily bore the reader. With that said, Zamoyski nicely utilizes many original sources, such as personal letters from Metternich to his many lovers, which successfully convey how the principal actors viewed their mission, as well as their fellow delegates. I definitely finished the book with a good feeling for the personalities and intentions of all those involved. Overall, except for a bit too much fluff, I would say this is definitely a groundbreaking and worthwhile read that shouldn't be missed. Four stars.

Adam Zamoyski says in his introduction (p.xiv) that the literature on the subject is scanty, elusive and one-sided. Noone can say this after having read this magnificent, scholarly and entertainingly written book. 570 pages on essentially three years of diplomacy could have been stodgy, but the writing is extremely lucid, and the minutiae of day-by-day negotiations (sometimes, as over the Saxon question, very repetitive, and just occasionally, as over Swiss affairs, also a little tedious) are seamlessly interspersed with vivid accounts of the personalities involved, of their moods and of the hedonistic and frivolous ways in which they spent their time between negotiations (much of the latter information culled from the reports of Metternich's secret surveillance teams).

Fascinating details include:

1. The ease with which politicians in those days were able to move from employment by one court to employment by another: von Stein from the Prussian to the Russian Court; Hardenberg from the Hanoverian to the Prussian Court (and in office there during Prussia's annexation of Hanover); Gentz from being a civil servant in Berlin to being an agent of the British government and then to taking service in Austria.

2. The intense suspicion between all of Napoleon's opponents. Each constantly feared that others might come to terms with Napoleon at their expense: after all, there had been a long history before Napoleon's invasion of Russia when countries had made just such deals with Napoleon, whose victories had made it possible over and over again for him to play one of his enemies off against another. Even within delegations there were animosities: initially Britain was represented at negotiations by no fewer than three envoys who so obviously detested each other that they were simply ignored by the other diplomats. The English, not well versed in continental politics, were universally considered gauche in manner and women's dress; but eventually Castlereagh took over, and after a while he became one of the key players, and one of the more sensible ones at that.

At one time the allies nearly went to war with each other - but the extraordinary thing is that while the threat of war hung over the Congress, the rival delegates met at balls and other spectacular entertainments every evening.

3. The open and promiscuous randiness of the principals is truly astonishing, as is the readiness of aristocratic and royal ladies to move from bed to bed. So many statesmen had affaires during the Congress: Metternich, who, while he had been ambassador at Napoleon's court, had slept with two of Napoleon's sisters, now fell in love with the Princess of Sagan and wrote her letters as remarkable for their love-struck clichés as for his measureless conceit; Humboldt sought out fat lower-class girls; women threw themselves at the ever-willing Alexander I. There are marvellous chapters (esp. 18, 19 and 21) on what life was like during the Congress of Vienna, how kings away from their courts let their hair down, and how the aura of majesty was dispelled.

4. The immature and headstrong nature of Alexander, who, confident of his huge military might, frequently took unilateral action to the dismay of the other powers. The confidence and skill of Talleyrand. The shameless greediness of Prussia, which exceeded the considerable greed of the other participants.

5. A great deal hung on the moods and personal characters of the principal characters, and this account is certainly a challenge to the structuralist view of history. A powerful final chapter shows how these individuals, backward rather than forward looking, managed to clamp a reactionary settlement on the continent that, so far from producing a stable Europe for a hundred years (a view that Henry Kissinger propounded in the 1950s and 1960s), would create during that time many rebellions, civil and international wars with a heavy cost in human lives.

One of the most neglected and least understood periods of the early 19th Century was the peace settlement that ending the Napoleonic wars, the Congress of Vienna. Over the years there have been few books in English on the Congress of Vienna; the most notable was The Congress of Vienna a Study in Allied Unity 1812-1822, by Harold Nicolson, a solid but rather dry work on the subject. Rites of Peace by Adam Zamoyski, is a fast pace, well written book on this fascinating topic.
So much of what we thought we knew about the congress seems to be incorrect, Alexander l takes on the same characteristic of megalomania that Napoleon suffered from between 1811-1814. Metternich, is portrayed as being far more interested in his love life then fate of Europe and so forth. A great book on a difficult and confusing topic.

Zamoyski carefully marshals his facts through the body of the book saving his opinions and historical observations until the fascinating final chapter. While the detail is tedious at times [love affairs, table settings and womens' dressing gowns), the book shines with scholarship and detail. Talleyrand fascinates in his brilliance, durability and negotiating finesse representing la belle France' for its role as convict and heavy. Castlereagh also shines until the end of the Congress and then to read about his final tragic end saddens. The focus tho is really on Metternich and Alexander of Russia both who come off as fully alive characters in a stirring drama of diplomacy occurring two hundred years ago. A worthy and informative read.

Adam Zamoyski is rapidly becoming one of my favorite Napoleonic era historians. His Moscow 1812 was brilliant, well-researched, and extremely detailed. Now, Zamoyski has added to the previous book with his latest, Rites of Peace: The Fall of Napoleon & the Congress of Vienna. Beginning almost immediately after Napoleon's final withdrawal from Russia, this book tells the story of the aftermath and the end of the Napoleonic wars. Zamoyski's rich detail is included, unfortunately almost too a fault. While the book is definitely interesting, it gets bogged down to the point where it's extremely slow reading for most casual readers.

Once again, Zamoyski doesn't dwell on the military details of battles, though he certainly doesn't gloss over them, either. Readers wishing for in-depth examinations of the battles of Liepzig or Waterloo will be left wanting. Instead, Rites of Peace covers how these battles affected the greater societal whole in Europe, how the various monarchs handled them and what they wanted to do afterward. Zamoyski introduces all of the major players in European politics, with Metternich (Foreign Minister of Austria) getting a lot of detail. Once Napoleon is defeated, the Treaty of Paris is signed and other problems present themselves.

Zamoyski saves his greatest detail for the Congress of Vienna. Opening in early November, 1814, this Congress (which Metternich figured would last about 6 weeks) lasted upwards of 6 months. Ostensibly, it was supposed to solve all of Europe's pressing problems, but it turned into more of a social occasion and negotiations often dragged on to great lengths to solve small issues. Zamoyski spends an incredible amount of time on the sexual escapades and romantic dalliances of all of the attendees, from the Russian Tsar to Metternich and Talleyrand of France. Zamoyski's able to provide this detail because Metternich had the Austrian police keep close tabs on every delegate and the police reports are extensive.

Of course, it wasn't all social occasions. The Congress of Vienna consisted of a lot of horse-trading between the powers, with each side trying desperately to get the best deal that would favor them, often at odds with other European powers. Zamoyski does a great job of showing what each faction wanted and how it contrasted with others' plans. Almost every province or duchy in Europe, in addition to the great powers themselves, has representatives at the Congress, and all of them were looking to get a piece of the action. Zamoyski makes all of this fascinating, as we see all the conflicts that arose from these negotiations.

Unfortunately, Rites of Peace does get mired in the social aspects of the Congress. I agree that these issues are relevant, especially when they interfered with the negotiations. But Zamoyski spends so much time on them that many of the personages started to run together, causing some exceedingly slow reading. This is countered by Zamoyski's writing style, which makes these passages much more interesting then they would normally be.

Rites of Peace is well-researched, with many end-notes to take in if you're the type of reader who does that. Zamoyski also provides an extensive bibliography and index as well. Maps are scattered throughout the text to illustrate points, such as the Swiss territorial gains after negotiation, and there is a block of full-color pictures in the middle of the book, giving a face to all of the major personages involved. That's a big plus in a book where personal and romantic issues are so much at the forefront. The book is quite long, however, so be ready for an extended read (as well as the weight, as the hardcover is quite heavy).

All in all, Rites of Peace is an extraordinary examination of the end of the Napoleonic Wars and their aftermath. While it does get slow at times, the amount of detail and the vivid pictures that Zamoyski paints are well worth the effort. Combined with Moscow 1812, Adam Zamoyski has created quite a treat for the history reader.

David Roy

This is centered on the Congress of Vienna, but it also covers the broader diplomatic process at the end of the Napoleonic wars, including the first Peace of Paris, the Hundred Days and the final introduction of the Congress System.

Zamoyski covers both the diplomatic negotiations and the seemingly endless flirtations and amours surrounding them. He is particularly fortunate in covering the Congress of Vienna, as Metternich had thoughtfully arranged extensive spy coverage and was also intercepting everyone's mail, thereby providing a vast horde of lurid trivia for future historians. At times the endless romantic details become distracting, but they also help set the mood for the congress and remind us of the many distractions facing the diplomats. Also, in an era of absolute monarchs, personal issues could matter a great deal.

By comparison with the 1919 Versailles Settlement (see for example Margaret Macmillan's "Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World") I was struck by the relative reasonableness and amicability of the initial Peace of Paris. Zamoyski portrays the initial allied entry to Paris as almost a grand family reunion. Yes, it was an occupying army, but everyone was glad the long wars were finally over and eager to revisit friends, relations, or old mistresses. Rather than looting, the invaders indulged in massive shopping sprees. The new Louvre art collection was deemed a masterpiece which should not be disrupted. In a similar spirit, the allies saw the need for a generous peace with France, which would remove most of Napoleon's acquisitions, but which recognized that France needed to be part of a new European balance of power and which thus aimed to avoid antagonizing or humiliating her.

Since France's fate was apparently resolved in the Peace of Paris, the Congress of Vienna was focused on the endless bickering between the victors over how to divide the rest of Europe, especially Poland and Germany. Zamoyski shows how France, in the shape of Talleyrand, was able to exploit its supposedly neutral role at Vienna to once again become a major diplomatic force by acting as a representative of the smaller powers against the attempted dominance of the Big Four (Russia, Britain, Prussia and Austria).

Despite endless dancing, festivals, romances and bickering, the Congress did slowly work its way through a series of awkward and reluctant horse trades of territory between the powers. Unlike Versailles, strikingly little thought was given to the wishes of the inhabitants of the affected territories. If the King of Prussia needed an extra 10,000 souls to balance his account, neither he nor anyone else seemed particularly concerned about which nationality or creed he acquired.

Then, famously, the Congress was disrupted by the 100 Days of Napoleon's return from Elba. This unfortunately did lead to significantly harsher terms for France, including further territorial losses and the dismantlement of most of the Louvre collections. But, as presented by Zamoyski, it made little difference to the overall shape of the European Settlement.

Zamoyski writes well and managed to keep me engaged through a complex set of wheeling and dealing, both diplomatic and romantic. He does sometime indulge a little too much in small details, but he also helps remind us of how much individuals, with their own whims and foibles, matter in shaping international politics.

We were overdue for a readable history of this period, and Zamoyski (bar the odd quibble) has done a creditable job.

In particular, he brings out well the crucial importance of the Hundred Days, not for what might have happened - Napoleon's prospects were never very bright - but for what did, in giving the victors a badly needed cold shower. In the Summer of 1814 - barely three months after Napoleon's despatch to Elba - disputes over Saxony and Poland had brought them to the brink of war - with Britain and Austria ready to ally with France against their fellows. With Napoleon's defeat, all thought themselves "home and dry" and free to quarrel among themselves. The Deus ex machina - or "Diabolus ex Elba"? - delivered the mother of all wakeup calls, ramming home how fragile their victory still was, and concentrating their minds in a Johnsonian sense.

And not just temporarily. The Holy Alliance, formed to preserve their victory, would endure for decades. Britain dropped out early - being an offshore island she could afford to - as did France after 1830, but not until the Crimean War did its core - Austria, Russia, Prussia - fall apart, and it was a further decade (1866) before one of those three actually fought another. Even that war - the work of another "wild card" of even lower probability than Napoleon - remained a unique "exception that proves the rule" until 1914. For Bismarck, having got what he wanted, promptly formed a "Dreikaiserbund" which was essentially the Holy Alliance by another name. All this was Napoleon's work, and specifically the result of his return in 1815. His admirers often speak of how he would have "united Europe" had he won, overlooking the degree to which he did unite a much of it for a remarkably long time. It recalls the old "united Ireland" joke that the Irish can unite only under British rule - because that unites them against the Brits. Napoleon did a similar job of uniting Europeans against himself.

Some nitpicks. Zamoyski seems to take Napoleon's 1815 embrace of constitutional government seriously, though a plainer case of "The Devil was sick, the Devil a monk would be" is surely hard to find. And the last chapter spoils it somewhat, with his grumbles about the settlement often sounding plaintive and almost childish. He speaks of "Siberian chain gangs" as if these weren't a normal part of Russian history, or could have been made less common by some change in the Vienna settlement. More generally, complaining about their disregard of nationalism, he talks as if the peacemakers had a "tabula rasa", to draw on as they pleased, after himself spending the earlier and better parts of this work showing they didn't. Take Poland. The Tsar had it and was set on keeping it. Condemning the 1815 arrangements leaves only two alternatives, to close with the Tsar over the Poland/Saxony deal - little change, just slightly more Poles in Russia and less in Prussia - or else return to the carve-up of 1795, which from a "national" viewpoint is even worse. Which does he prefer? Ditto (pretty much) for Germany and Italy. The Kings of Sicily and Sardinia, however "imbecilic", were on the winning side, so could hardly be dispossessed, and if the Tsar kept Poland, Austria and Prussia could only be compensated westwards, ie in Italy and north Germany respectively. South Germany wasn't available, as its rulers had deserted Napoleon in good time, so were also in the winning camp. In short, most of the continent was already "spoken for".

Zamoyski grumbles about the arbitrary transfer of "souls" between rulers, as undermining traditional loyalties. But given how much of that Napoleon had done, especially in Germany, it wasn't easily avoidable. Bar Venice and Genoa, extinguished nearly two decades before and not restored, the worst examples were Norway and Saxony, but those who stick too long to the losing side have always risked loss of territory. And given the straggling and quite un-ethnographic borders of Napoleon's France in 1812, the total number of people under foreign rule may have actually gone down.

One can't help feeling Zamoyski is just miffed that his own country didn't fare better. It recalls the international school which set an essay on elephants and got -

Englishman - how to hunt an elephant
American - economic importance of the elephant
Frenchman - sex life of the elephant.
German - military importance of the elephant
Pole - the elephant and the Polish question.

Yet, at the risk of blasphemy, did even Poland do so badly? My impression is that through the 18C her "independence" was a joke, and that from the Northern War to the Seven Years, she was routinely trampled over and plundered by foreign armies in pursuing their own conflicts. Was this better for her people than the nasty but brief ordeals of 1830-1 and 1863-4?

Zamoyski is rather sniffy about the "century of peace" after 1815. Perhaps, as a Pole, it matters less to him, but the wars between Britain and France, which since 1689 (1066?) had been events as regular as the World Cup (and British victories celebrated like Olympic golds) were certainly ended. There was still a rebellion or three, but even counting these, the two biggest - China's Taiping Rebellion and America's Civil War - were in areas not covered by the settlement. Europe got off light. And were the 1830 Polish and Belgian revolts really "major wars"?

As even Zamoyski acknowledges, the peacemakers had an enormous task, and it is far from clear that different decisions would have caused fewer long-term problems. As King Albert of the Belgians told a critic of the Versailles Treaty. "They did what they could". Perhaps an even fairer comment on the 1815 than the 1919 settlement.

Still, with all its faults, an excellent book. Enjoy it.

I have also read,"The Polish Way," "The Forgotten Heroes,"(about The Polish air Force in WW II - Saving London), and just thoroughly enjoyed this one. One thing about all of Zamoyski's books is that they are, above and beyond, the best researched books, that I've probably ever read. I so look forward to the next Zamoyski work. One gets wonderfully lost in reading his work. Quite the brain massage. Highly recommended!!!