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Red River Campaign of 1864 and the Loss by the Confederacy of the Civil War

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This well written and researched little book deals with the issue of whether the Confederacy could have done more with their victory in April, 1864, in the Red River campaign and whether there was a failure in the command structure. The Northern forces quickly captured New Orleans and south Louisiana in 1862; but it was not until 1864 that they began their move north to capture the rest of the State of Louisiana and begin their conquest of Texas. The Northern forces were led by the inept political general, Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks, a former Speaker of the U. S. House of Representatives. The Southern forces were led by the aristocratic Maj. Gen. Richard Taylor, the son of a former president, Zachary Taylor, and the brother of Jefferson Davis's first wife, who had died at a young age. Neither man was a trained career soldier. But Taylor, a Yale graduate and former Louisiana sugar planter before the war, had served under Stonewall Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley in 1862 and was the better general.
After the Battle of Mansfield on April 8, 1864, resulted in a Confederate victory, General Taylor wanted to pursue and destroy the remainder of Banks's 30,000 man (and some women) army, but was prevented from doing so by his superior in Shreveport, Lt. Gen. Kirby Smith, with the result that most of Banks's army was able to retreat to the safety of south Louisiana and live to fight another day in other battles. The author documents all of this and specifically shows how certain troops from the Red River Campaign were used in other battles in other states.
The author further points out that the crushing destruction of such a large Union army so close to Lincoln's re-election campaign in November, 1864, might have contributed to his election defeat with all the consequences that might have meant for the war.
An excellent and recommended study.

An interesting account of largely ignored campaign during the Civil War. Michael Forsyth's detailed descriptions of the relationships amongst the primary Union and Confederate leaders sets the stage for his analysis of the campaign and also sets this book apart from other military history books. His conclusion that this campaign could have changed the outcome of the Civil War is both interesting and soundly arrived at based on the level of research he conducted. Highly recommend this book for those studying the decisive but intangible aspect of combat power - leadership.