Customer Reviews

The Road to War: Revised Edition

5 star:		(5)
4 star:		(2)
3 star:		(0)
2 star:		(0)
1 star:		(1)

 

 

This book, written by one of today's most reputed historians of WW2, focuses on the years immediately preceding the war. Each chapter is devoted to one of the future belligerants and describes how they perceived the approaching crisis, what their objectives were, and what choices they faced. This approach is very successful in showing how each nation saw the situation at that time, as opposed as we see it today.

Although all sections are stimulating, a few are especially worth mentioning. The section on Germany makes it clear that a "readjustment" of Germany's post-WW1 eastern frontiers was inevitable and that indeed western powers themselves recognized it as inevitable. The section on Poland is very interesting and iconoclastic, balancing today's popular image of Poland as a helpless victim (which indeed she became AFTER its defeat in 1939) with a well-documented picture of an arrogant, racist state that western European states in the 30s generally despised. The chapter on England highlights the key importance that the English attributed to the Empire, and shows how Great Britain tried to defend this anachronistic creation against the revisionist powers, even in the face of its own economic decline.

The book is valuable both for its convincing general arguments and for its analysis of specific issues. At the general level, the picture of the 30s that emerges is that of a world constrained by a geopolitical straitjacked that was growing increasingly inadequate. The author argues that Britain and France, who were (and clearly perceived themselved to be) the biggest beneficiaries of the status quo, tried as long as possible to defend it against appeasing the revisionist powers while preparing for the worst with rearmament. The appeasement phase bought them time mostly at the expense of countries outside their direct sphere of influence, which they abandoned to Germany and Russia. However, Britain and France finally became convinced that the Axis powers were after a more radical reshaping of the international order. This, almost by definition, implied sacrificing parts of the English and French empires themselves; this Britain and France were not willing to do, so when they got ready they declared war. The rest is known.

This book makes its case very convincingly, and clearly states (the Introduction is fantastic) that the "fairy tale" version of WW2, where Britain and France are the white knights that go to war to save Europe's freedom, is ludicrous. They declared war, as every power in the history of the world has always done, in order to defend their own interests. They cared about Poland as much as they had cared about SChekoslovakia - something that the events both in september 1939 and in 1945 made abundantly clear.

The book is also full of delightful smaller issues, like: antisemitism in pre-war Poland (I did not know that it was the Poles, not the Germans, who first wanted to deport Jews to Madagascar, and this well before the war); the way racism affected the international relations between the US/England and Japan; and the almost universal belief, in Germany as in France as in England as in Italy as in Japan, that no great power could survive without some sort of Lebensraun (very interesting in light of how all these countries prospered after the war even after the colonial empires collapsed).

This is a wonderful book. It is dense with concepts and provocative thoughts. After you read it, you will want to get back to it time after time.

We all know the story: Hitler comes to power and embarks on a course of expansionism. Britain and France, Allies against Imperial Germany during the Great War, falter at first and refuse to stand up to Hitler, even sacrificing Czechoslovakia at Munich. But they finally find their courage and draw the line at Hitler's conquest of Poland, which initiates the Second World War.

This book sheds quite a lot of information on the events leading up to the war, stripping them of a lot of the romantic mythology which has surrounded the war since it started. Overy turns his eye to the gritty details of the foreign policy decisions of the European powers, without boring the reader with pointless detail, and it sometimes doesn't look pretty. But real-world events are seldom pretty. The first chapter alone, "Who Will Die For Danzig?" earns the book 3 stars in my opinion.

The removal of some of this romanticism does not, in my opinion, strip either the war itself or the men and women who fought the tyranny of the Axis powers of the heroism that has rightfully been attributed to it and to them. However it began, the war was a struggle against tyranny, and as such, carries with it a nobility that cannot be stripped away by something as simple as the truth.

Highly recommended.

This book was written as a companion to series of television documentaries on the origins of WWII. Given this background, you might expect a relatively conventional overview or 'coffee table' type of book. The principal author, however, is Richard Overy, perhaps the preeminent scholar of WWII and man who has made a career of looking at well known historical episodes from fresh points of view. Overy is also that unusual scholar who tries to, and succeeds at, writing books for both the community of scholars and the broad reading public.

The goal of this book is to provide a sophisticated understanding of why the WWII occurred and to dispell myths about the actions and motivations of the major actors. The authors chose to organize this book on a country by country basis. There are excellent introductory and concluding chapters providing some overview but most of the book is dedicated to careful analysis of the politics and diplomacy of the major combatant countries.

Why did WWII occur? A major cause was the unsatisfactory nature of the attempted settlement following WWI. Several of the major combatants in WWI felt aggrieved by the results of the Paris peace conferences and treaties. The desire for revision was driving force in diplomacy and internal politics for the two decades following WWI. The aggrieved parties naturally included Germany but also included the Soviet Union, Italy, and Japan. WWI inflicted terrible wounds on the powers who wished to maintain the post-WWI settlement. France's losses were grievous, and since the French economy lacked the dynamism of Germany's and her birth rate was lower, she remained in a vulnerable position. Britain withdrew from continental politics for much of the 20s. When the British did return to active participation in continental affairs, it was with a weakened economy and a depleted defense establishment. Perhaps only the active participation of the USA could have maintained the post-WWI settlement, but the USA pursued isolationist policies until the very eve of WWII.

Overy and Wheatcroft provide excellent analyses of internal politics and diplomacy in each nation. Several themes emerge. The Great Depression did not cause the problems and tensions that led to WWII but horribly exacerbated them. Particularly in the democratic states, the freedom of action of leaders was sharply limited by domestic political considerations and a good deal of what is seen now commonly as the cowardice of the leadership of Britain and France was due to the demands of internal politics. The leaders of the dictatorships were less constrained and their actions tended to reflect their own preoccupations and irrational goals. Deterring or stopping the Germans would have required alliance with the Soviet Union, but this proved to particularly difficult for a variety of reasons.

An unstable international system, weakness on the part of the parties interested in upholding the system, and international economic catastrophe were the ingredients for WWII. Add to this mixture the malign figure of Hitler, a man bent on at least continental domination, and whose motives were clearly not understood by the leaders of Britain and France. The rest is the tragic history of the 30s and 40s.

This is not Overy's best book. There is a "hand-wringing" quality to his writing, as though he were afraid of offending someone, perhaps due to its being written for the BBC. And he fudges in a big way British pre-war bungling regarding the Rhineland and Czechoslovakia, and Stalin's role in the purge trials.

Part of the explanation for the whitewash of Stalin can be found in the publications dates: The first edition of this book was published in 1989, so it was written BEFORE the fall of the Soviet Union, whereas the second edition came out in 1999, afterward. I don't have a copy of the first edition for comparison purposes, but I do have Overy's "Russia's War", which came out in 1997, in which he is very clear about Stalin's direct role in the purge trials. It appears that Overy didn't go to the trouble of revising this material for the second edition "The Road to War", perhaps thought "Russia's War" was enough. But he could at least have made reference to his newer work, rather than let his older misinformation stand uncorrected.

Overy obfuscates the British role in Hitler's remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936 and in selling out the Czechs at the Munich debacle in 1938, but I'm not sure why he thinks he can get away with this. The historical record of British indifference and French trepidation is quite clear in both instances.

He goes on for pages about FDR's problems with the Isolationists, but never once mentions Harold Nicolson's now well-known 1939-41 secret U.S.-based propaganda campaign against American neutrality.

Andrew Wheatcroft's chapter on Japan is pretty good.

Overy is a good writer, which can lead one to believe that one is learning a great deal while reading his books. But at least in this book Overy neglects the first task of the historian, which is to tell us WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED. Atmosphere is nice, but the facts have priority.

Suggestions for further (and better) reading:

Winston Churchill - "The Second World War", volume 1.
Basil Liddell Hart - "History of World War Two"
Julian Jackson - "The Fall of France"
Richard Overy - "Russia's War" - based on post-1989 evidence, this is much better than the chapter on Russia in "The Road to War".

Not recommended.

This review is based on the paperback edition of 2009.

Overy's book about the state of the World before the outbreak of the Second World War is only one of many such works written by English-speaking authors. For the amateur historian it is somewhat surprising to note that the questions dealt with by these authors are apparently so complicated that even today, 70 years on, scores of Anglo-Saxon historians can still find new aspects to write about, whereas the Germans seem to be happy in the belief that WW2 was all Hitler's (i.e. their own) fault.

There is a glaring contradiction in both of these attitudes: the Germans should, after all, be opposed to have all the blame put at their feet and should try to argue their case, whereas the erstwhile allies should endeavour to perpetuate the Nuremberg accusations - but the state of the matter is quite the opposite. What might be be the reasons for this?

Could it be that the Germans feel, in an effort not to lose their trust in a reasonably equitable world spirit, that they must accept the horrible things that were done to them (the destruction of their towns and cities with the loss of half a million lives, the expropriation and expulsion of twelve million of their countrymen and the death of another million in the process) as proper punishment for their own misdeeds?

And do Anglo-Saxon historians - and some politicians - look ever more closely into the causes of this European catastrophe because they believe that the guilt placed on the Germans is so great as to crush the spirit of a whole nation and thereby cause a major breach in the very centre of Europe, which may yet lead to the complete collapse of Europe as we know it?

Overy's very sober analysis of the economic and political situation obtaining in the major states in the 1930s can help us to see the past more clearly and prevent us from falling from one extreme into another, like Götz in Jean-Paul Sartre's play "The Devil and the Good Lord". Götz had to learn that his courageous intention to throw his former evil self overboard and to act solely according to the high principles of morality would eventually result in the same misdeeds as before.

The book itself is not the description of a chaotic mass of details but the analysis of the individual situations the major states found themselves in prior to WW2. He singles out seven such countries and describes them in so many chapters - Germany, Great-Britain, France, Italy, the Soviet Union,, Japan and the USA - but not Poland, surprisingly. Such a differentiating treatment yields interesting insights into the historical and political aims of the lands involved which would otherwise escape the reader.

Thus Overy tells us that the foreign policies of the two, initially, major actors, Britain and Germany, were not as different as all that. Both players, Chamberlain and Hitler, employed a strategy of bluffing as best they could in the negotiations, up to the point of giving in, if necessary, in order to gain time to rearm their country for a war that seemed more and more likely.

The objectives, too, were of the same imperialistic nature - Great Britain trying to hold its disparate parts, its "Lebensraum" (Overy), together while the Reich tried to shuffle off the restrictions placed on it at Versailles. A strong state in the centre of Europe being unacceptable to Britain, war became inevitable.

The author presents clearly the changes in foreign policy in the two countries after the Munich agreement of late 1938: the average Briton prepared for another war because a containment of the Reich could not be achieved in any other way, whereas large parts of the German population could not but admire Hitler's bloodless victories and conclude that his was the best policy.

Even Hitler's internal actions did not cause much of a stir in London: the British people was not to get the impression that they were going to war for Jewish interests, and the communists were considered to be dangerous on the other side of the Channel as well.

By 1938, Germany's expenses for rearmament came to 17% of the country's revenue, British rearmament amounted to one quarter of her income (p. 132), this figure doubled the following year. In Britain, between 1936 and 1940, expenses for armaments went up by a factor of 15 - whereas in the Reich they increased only fivefold: such a pace could not be sustained by Britain for much longer, the moment of the clash was predetermined.

Overy concedes that Hitler's expectation to resolve the Polish crisis in the same bloodless and successful manner as before was understandable, but he faults him for not having recognized the British change of policy after Munich. On the other hand, he states on p. 137 that Britain did not go to war in 1939 to save Poland but to save the "international system" from which Britian profited more than any other nation - but that too, turned out to be an illusion.

For those with an interest in the interwar years, the events of which will lead to WWII, but are not well read on the period, this book would be an excellent place to start your study. Its not the most comprehensive title on the market but it is very engaging and covers the key people and events and attitudes of the time.

It shows Hitler's aggressive nature in gaining power, rearming Germany and gaining back lost territories from the defeat of WWI. It shows Great Britain trying to rebuild from WWI and the depression of the early 1930s while keeping the Empire together. Mr Overy shows Chamberlain in a more positive light than some authors during his period of appeasement with Hitler, hoping that Hitler would stop his aggression once Germany regained lost territories and allow Europe and Great Britain to get on with economic and civil progress in peace.
The picture of President Roosevelt working to ignite the American economy out of the depression as well as maintain the US's predominately isolationalistic attitude was also poignant. FDR's idealistic but perhaps naive foreign policy is also discussed. Stalin was busy in rearming and growing his economy, purging the military, fighting the Japanese, bullying Finland, the Baltics and trying to infest Europe with Communism and to cause all kinds of unrest.

The author discusses all seven major belligerents of the war during the 1920s and 30s to show the attitudes and happenstance, the differences and similarities of these countries. Germany, Russia, Italy and Japan aggressively looking to enlarge their empires while Great Britain, France, and the US being largely content with their existing empires were just trying to solidify and improve their positions without enlarging them.
The author provides profiles for all seven nations and their key people. Besides the narrative photos of the key people are presented as well as a few maps that depict empires and areas of interest. There is also an extensive Notes section, a Bibliography and Index.

Though there doesn't appear to be any new material, the author does present an accurate and unbiased presentation of the aspirations of each of these countries that will either draw themselves together or against each other that will lead to the greatest conflagration the world has ever seen.
If you're looking to read about the prewar years and the causes that will ignite WWII, this is a worthy candidate.

What I find interesting in this book is that the author looks at all the main belligerents of the Second World War and studies their respective strengths and weaknesses. From what I can make out of this study is that the world was divided in the establishment powers such as Britain and France who prior to the conflict were becoming increasingly overstretched and unable to meet massive commitments overseas, a stheir resources dwindled and their determination to act decisively decreased.
war was therefore the result of the challenges they faced from revisionist powers such as Germany, Italy, Japan, the Soviet Union and even to some extent, the United States of America.
One interesting point which came out early in the book is that Poland, which is traditionally shown as the first victim of the Nazis and which suffered more casualties during that war than possibly any other country, is portrayed as a hardline, uncompromising and aggressive state. This explains why few countries were ready to come to the aid of Poland when she was attacked. Interestingly,the USSR comes in a more favourable light. I would consider this book a follow-up on the study by A.J.P Taylor's earlier work on the same subject.
Could that war have been avoided? That's the central question which the book raised. The message that comes accross is that conflict was the only outcome possible as realtions between European States and other powers deteriorated and a new balance of power was in the offing.

Richard Overy has done a wonderful job in explaining why and how the major powers went to war. All countries had the same intentions - to retain and/or expand their empires and to make the world into an image of theirs. In this regard I would say all the countries were just like Germany in their outlook and all the politicians were micro-Hitlers. The only difference being that Hitler took the lead and initiative in fulfilling his desires, though in a very brutal way. Had he not done so, some other country would have, maybe a few years later. Ultimately all of them stood for the same thing- colonial expansion and global control. Just because some of them were democratic does not make them any less worse.

What I cannot understand is how all the politicians & statesmen refused to take Hitler seriously till it was too late. Again and again Hitler gave evidence of his intentions and again and again everyone felt that he would listen to reason. How could they have ignored all his statements and actions? How could they have misread him? Some answers are found in the last chapter - "Conclusion" which is absolutely wonderful. I would suggest that this should be read right in the beginning after the "Preface" and "Introduction" - both brilliant- as it helps clarify certain doubts/questions which arise when one reads the other chapters.

One is also saddened by seeing the absolute lack of faith and trust between the Allies- a misnomer if there ever was one. Had these powers looked beyond their own selfish interests and if they had had a bit of faith in one another, we may have not witnessed this carnage.

One thing I seemed to notice was that there is strong bias towards USA. Many of its (in)actions are explained and justified at length which is not so with the other countries who possibly also suffered from the same limitations. I would love to see this chapter rewritten but this is a minor flaw in this otherwise brilliant book.