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The Roman Army at War 100 BC - AD 200 (Oxford Classical Monographs)

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There is a large literature on the Roman Army. As Goldsworthy points out, much of it is flawed by an idealized view of Roman soldiery and anachronistic interpretations. Inspired somewhat by Keegan's pioneering "The Face of Battle", Goldsworthy sets out to review the evidence critically in an effort to reconstruct how the Roman Army was organized and was the experience of service for both commanders and rankers. His use of sources is excellent and he is very careful not to over interpret the data. This work is based clearly on an excellent knowledge of Roman history. Interested readers should be aware that this is specialist monograph, written with an audience of scholars in mind. To understand the text fully you need a good basic knowledge of Roman history. Acquaintance with prior works on the Roman army is very helpful.

Adrian Goldsworthy, a classical scholar, initially wrote this book as a thesis at Oxford University. Goldsworthy felt that, "both the popular and scholarly view of the Roman army is at best highly misleading, and in most cases utterly false." By employing the method introduced by John Keegan in the Face of Battle, Goldsworthy seeks to use classical literary sources to demonstrate how the Roman army actually fought on campaign. The author relies heavily on the standard ancient sources - Caesar, Tacitus, Polybius, Plutarch, Josephus - and synthesizes them in an effort to pain a collective portrait of the Roman army in action. As a scholarly revisionist work, this book does provide an interesting synthesis of material from diverse sources. Yet a sober analysis of this book reveals that it does not merit universal acclaim because it neither breaks significant new ground nor possesses sound analysis.

Readers familiar with the classics of ancient history may be dismayed by the manner in which the author weaves together disparate anecdotes from more than 300 years of Roman military history in an attempt to validate his theories. Examples from different centuries, different theaters of war and different types of war are thrown together into a bouillabaisse that is confusing and misleading. Using examples so disparate in space or time - and with significant gaps in sources - to develop a general theory is intellectually dangerous. Imagine attempting to develop a general theory on how the French army fought between 1640 and 1940 based upon a sprinkling of memoirs from the early 18th Century, the Napoleonic era, and the First World War and the problem should be apparent. It is also noteworthy that the author criticizes other author's for using anachronistic sources in analyzing the Roman army, and then proceeds to do exactly that himself. The author's choice of odd post-classical military references, such as out-dated Victorian military manuals, is particularly odd.

Unfortunately, the author fails to provide much that is really new, and the little that is new is overly generalized and dubious. Goldsworthy concludes that, "the army's organization was not characterized by its rigidness, but, quite the contrary, by its great flexibility. Its units adapted to the local situation." And, "the strategy adopted by many Roman armies on campaign was anything but methodical." The author's main intent is to discredit the monolithic, automaton perception of the Roman army and replace it with a more complex view that encompasses innovation and human motivations. Certainly taken against eighty-year old assessments such as J F C Fuller's, Goldsworthy's text appears more modern. While using outdated ideas as fodder for a revisionist graduate school thesis makes sense, it does not make sense to re-cast this effort as a crusade to correct all other interpretations of Roman military methods.

As in Keegan's Face of Battle, the author attempts to dissect the mechanics of Roman battle. Critical to Goldsworthy's analysis is his unquestioned faith in S L A Marshall's assertion that only 25% of soldiers actively participate in combat. Never mind that Marshall fudged much of his research or that US troops in Korea did not fight in close-order lines as the Romans did, Goldsworthy believes that this 25% figure was germane to the Roman army as well. According to Goldsworthy, Roman infantry tactics were geared toward achieving a penetration in the enemy "line" and thereby collapse their morale, but if this did not immediately occur, the battle could ebb and flow until one side broke. This is nonsense on many levels. First, any subaltern knows that you cannot achieve a tactical penetration without local superiority, and a thin Roman double-line formation could not hope to achieve this against the typical dense-pack formations of most of its opponents. Even if a small penetration were achieved, the Roman soldiers would be quickly enveloped and annihilated once outside the protection of their own battle line. Goldsworthy does raise three important issues, but fails to exploit them: the Roman preference for large reserves, the Roman knowledge that troops in close combat became exhausted after about 15 minutes and the stabbing tactics of the gladius sword.

Modern armies typically maintain 1/9th of their forces in reserve to meet unexpected situations in battle, but the Romans kept a much higher percentage - about one-third. There is no reason to believe that the Romans relied on the unpredictability of winning battles by the extra-aggressive behavior of only 25% of their infantry, but rather, far more plausible theories suggest that the Romans won by well-timed use of reserves. It is likely that against Barbarians, the Romans expected their first two lines merely to hold off and exhaust the enemy for about 15 minutes. At the decisive moment, the Roman general would commit his reserve and this third line would literally massacre the front-rank of the exhausted enemy, who usually lacked the discipline or command and control to employ a tactical reserve properly. As Goldsworthy notes, the Barbarian "wedge" formations usually resulted in the tribal leadership out front and these were the men killed by the Roman reserves; without leadership, the rest of the enemy usually broke and ran. The key question here, is how exactly did the Romans deploy their reserve through the first two lines. However it was done, it required a high degree of training and discipline - both Roman strong points. As for the gladius, Goldsworthy fails to note that stabbing tactics were essentially defensive and far less tiring than the wild, offensive slashing tactics employed by Rome's enemies. Thus, Goldsworthy's depiction of Roman battle tactics is fundamentally flawed, although he does make some interesting observations.

I have many books on the roman army but this one is by far the best. As the other reader pointed out this book has a completely different approach from the illustrated uniform and equipment guide which is very common. It examines the army from a much more humane perspective, exploring how the roman soldiers acted under the enormous strain of the bloody hand-to-hand combat. I could not praise this work enough. I only hope Mr.Goldsworthy would write onother book on the subject.

This study takes a giant stride past the heavily illustrated uniform and equipment guide approach that typifies the accessible literature on the Roman war machine. Instead of another piecemeal anatomy of the Roman army's elements and field techniques,Goldsworthy -- much as W. Hanson did for the Greek hoplite -- takes the reader onto the battlefield where each aspect of the army -- command, morale, tactics, weapons, logistics, perimeter defense, reconnaissance, etc. -- can be seen in relation to the whole. The author illustrates his theme by portraying a variety of adversaries in typical campaigns for each region. The time frame covers the newborn Empire's period of rapid expansion, when the legions were still adapting to the widely differing fighting styles along porous and ill-defined "frontiers". I found this book (along with Hugh Elton's companion work on the later Roman army) immensely useful in researching my articles on the campaigns in Judaea in the first and second centuries CE. It told me just what I needed to know: what probably transpired on the battlefield, in the camps, during the advance and back in headquarters, as well as the reactions and adjustments of the Roman and barbarian infantry and cavalry. Highly recommended. Jim Bloom Silver Spring, MD

From an aggressive Republic to a dominating Empire, Roman culture and influence spread through three continents on the backs of its armies. Military power, flexibility of command, pursuit of glory, and pure mechanical determination shape the Roman world from 100 BC to 200 AD. For three centuries, the Romans expanded borders and spilt blood, fighting the enemy and themselves. It is to this end that Adrian Keith Goldsworthy attempts to show the Roman world, and more precisely the Roman military, with more emphasis on individuality than is typically discussed. He does so in his work, The Roman Army at War, an in depth book comprising of organization, movement, and tactics, as well as a deeper delve into a sphere of human emotion and motivation, asking why events unfolded as they did and to what end. Emphasis is placed on the individual thoughts and motives within a campaign, whether it is the lowest recruit or the Emperor himself. Gone are the days of archaic military history thinking in terms of emotionless blocks of troops moving in straight lines, ready to lay their lives down for the cause of Roman victory. Goldsworthy navigates through a sea of frail conclusions, unconvincing explanations, and unreliable sources, many of which he cites throughout the text, dealing with the Roman military and how they waged war, coming out the other side into the fairly uncharted waters of how war was waged on the individual. This is the new frontier of military history and is in dire need of further research as stated by Goldsworthy. Blocked off in six main chapters with several sub-topics contained within each chapter, Goldsworthy reveals a story of Roman military life which is not always cut and dry and certainly not romanticized.

Goldsworthy begins with the description of Roman military organization covering the evolution of the Legion due to "the changing scale of warfare" (37) from thirty maniples to ten cohorts. This was due to the need for a "far more flexible legion" (37). He further goes on to discuss the introduction of small scale fighting armies, made up of legionary detachments or vexillations, noting the lesser need for large standing armies because seldom "was there ever an enemy capable of organizing an army large enough to produce such large scale warfare" (38). Reinforcing the idea of Roman adaptableness, Goldsworthy goes into detail on the Roman armies' ability to change where change was needed, highlighting Arrian's Cappadocian legions in what is today eastern Turkey, "the roman army was an inherently flexible organization" (38). He concludes that the armies "ability to adapt to local situations" (38) was a key factor of its success. Goldsworthy follows this point up with a brief description of Rome's chief enemies, the Germans, Gauls, and Parthians, along with concise descriptions of their customs and methods.

The chapter on the Roman campaign deals with the idea of an aggressive and offensive army as opposed to the previous stereotype of an army of rigid defense. In fact, he even goes as far to say that a Roman army on defense had either been taken off guard or was admitting its grim position, "the Roman army sought always to bring the conflict to a decisive conclusion as soon as possible by seizing the initiative and dictating the course of the fighting" (114). The idea was to show Roman force, even if badly outnumbered or under supplied, in order to persuade an enemy out of fighting, "the Roman emphasis on the offensive in all forms of warfare was another aspect of this attempt to dominate the enemy's collective willpower and suggested the inevitability of Roman victory" (114). Goldsworthy continues on to discuss the Roman advantage in siege warfare as well as its ability to excel in low intensity skirmish and ambush combat. He affirms many Roman commanders were able to "use forces of heavily armed, legionary infantry as raiders to attack and completely surprise enemies who habitually fought using the tactics of raid and ambush" (114). He concludes this section dismantling the preexisting ideas of Roman-style warfare's reliance on geographical settings; also its inability to defeat the Germans and Parthians as reasons to the slowing of expansion in those areas. According to Goldsworthy, that would be to "deny the fundamental flexibility of the Roman army" (115).

The second half of his book goes into a much more personal level of the military and its characters. Beginning with the generals, Goldsworthy goes straight into his explanation of a Roman general's mobility and interaction in battle as opposed to the popular opinion of a stagnant observer. Describing the three positions of generalship during battle, front line combat, surveying from the rear of the army, or directly behind the men, he expresses that most Roman generals preferred to stay "close to the fighting without taking part, encouraging their men and directing their reserves as the situation required" (168). This allowed for a flexible general who could plug gaps when necessary and rally troops at different points in the line, a perfect form of command for the Roman army. As Goldsworthy emphasizes "the technical skill of the Roman general lay not in the sweeping moves of grand tactics, but in paying close attention to the detail of small unit tactics, directing his units" (169). He ends with how a general's upbringing in Roman society and the emphasis of "courage or virtus" (169) is the driving force of military success and shaped the Roman general in battle.

Goldsworthy's largest chapter deals with the unit in battle. He goes into explaining the idea that tactics, drill, and weaponry can only go so far on a battlefield. The core ingredient is the soldier himself and how he will react to the speed and stress of warfare. Goldsworthy states, "moral, far more than physical, factors were of most importance in determining the course of the fighting" (244), battles in this period seem to be highly fluid confrontations involving intervals of intense melee and then long episodes of uneasy face off where the difference between victory and defeat could be rather small indeed. He puts emphasis on the idea that most men in a battle "were instinctively more prone to avoiding threats to themselves then to attempting to kill the enemy" (245), also adding that "few men could have had any idea of the grand tactics of the battle, or indeed what was happening anywhere outside their own patch of ground" (245). Once again he is reiterating the concept of the Roman military as a group of individuals as opposed to a robot mob void of all emotion. He, however, finalizes that the Roman edge in battle was mainly due to its "discipline, fear of punishment, and good morale" (246), which allowed them the opportunity to hold out just longer then their enemies.

The final section of Goldsworthy's book deals with the individual soldier in battle concentrating on motivation and bravery. He discusses how discipline, unit cohesion, quality of leadership, opportunities to spoils of war, and even punishment were all essential motivators of the common Roman soldier. Acts of bravery were significant to the Roman army because "in the course of battle there were many occasions when it was important for one, or a few, individuals to push ahead, or cut their way into an enemy formation, in order to achieve victory" (264). The actions of a single man could rally others to go above the call of duty and sway a battle in Rome's favor. Bravery is excellent for morale and was a main cause of factors, such as personal recognition by a general or possibly Emperor, which could change the outcome of a battle. Goldsworthy displays many accounts of individual soldiers being rewarded by the Emperor, which encouraged striving for glory in battle, "the encouragement of boldness through reward helped to motivate individuals to the displays of aggression needed to achieve victory" (279). He finishes his work reaffirming the importance to rethink what we as a society assume of the Roman military and how it worked. They were not always perfect, they were not always victorious, however, as Goldsworthy concludes, "awareness of the difficulties faced by the Roman army only increases admiration for its achievement" (286).

Most books on the Roman military are either overly concerned with the actions of the commanders, relegating the troops to mere cogs in their well-oiled battle plans, or so incredibly boring and badly organized you wonder how people actually got paid to write it.

Although some of the reviews here are critical of his methodology and statements, I find it amusing that they attack his ancient sources, as if there was a hidden cache of writings that Goldsworthy ignored that show how it really happened. He does attempt to use more modern research to buttress some of his points and put the ancient writings in context (many are propaganda in the first place), probably because he believes (rightly so IMO) that they have lessons that can be applied to antiquity -- just as modern writings on Roman logistics have to use army manuals as reference. The attacks on his references to SLA Marshall are equally puzzling, did they read the same book I did? In the sections where he references those studies it's talking about archers (not the infantry as the reviews would imply) or the psychology of soldiers and the importance of unit comrades in keeping you going despite the fear (which is obvious to most people with a military background).

If you've grown tired and bored of Roman military studies written by academic armchair legates then this book may have the sort of fresh ideas and perspective that you need to get energized again.

In his detailed analysis of The Roman Army at War 100 BC-AD 200, Adrian Goldsworthy presents a new outlook on the Roman Army as a military force. Goldsworthy finds Hollywood films and previous historians' portrayals of the Roman army to be very misleading and blemished, and he also points out their failure to accurately depict the Roman army during war time. This book, then, is an attempt to understand how the army actually performed on a campaign.

Goldsworthy believes that the reason other historians have inaccurately interpreted the Roman army is a result of using sources that mainly describe the Roman army during times of peace. Therefore in this book Goldsworthy is clearly concentrating on the Roman army during times of campaign in order to get an accurate depiction of the Roman army. He clearly breaks down the book by precisely explaining the organization of the Roman army, the Romans main opponents, the strategies and objectives during the campaign, and the role of the general. Goldsworthy then goes into great detail to explain the unit during battle and also the individual soldier during battle. By employing this method, he gives one a clear understanding of how the army exerted itself during battle.

An example of how Goldsworthy describes the Roman army during campaign is his delineation of the general during warfare. According to Goldsworthy, other historians concentrated more on the general's observation of universal rules of warfare instead of investigating how he actually implemented the tactics of war. Goldsworthy examines the general closely in order to see where he was, and what he did before, during, and after the battle. He provides an expansive view of the general that enables one to really get a sense of the important role a general played in the campaign.

While reading this chapter one is able to see the importance of reconnaissance and intelligence and how these things played a significant role in the outcome of the battle. In one section of the book, Goldsworthy describes the advantages and disadvantages for a general who stayed behind the lines observing the battle as a whole, compared to the general who led a unit into battle and fought as a regular soldier. Another example of the influential role the general played was his relationship with the soldiers, which if good, prompted a high morale, but if bad, might lead to a low morale that could dictate the results of a battle. Goldsworthy uses detailed analysis of campaigns against opponents such as the Jews or Goths in order to enhance the reader's overall understanding of the general during battle.

One really gets a keen understanding of the Roman army in action because Goldsworthy spends half of the book discussing the unit during battle. While most historians only examine the equipment, armor, and weapons of the individual soldier to understand the unit during the campaign, Goldsworthy looks not only at the technical side of the fighting, but also the behavior of the individual soldier in order to better understand the unit during battle.

A good model of Goldsworthy's technique is his description of the actual collision between the Romans and their opponents. He gives the reader an in depth examination of what happened when the two sides met. He thoroughly explains the use of the shield, sword, and other weapons the soldiers possessed in order to infiltrate the enemy line. Goldsworthy gives examples of skeletons that were discovered at Maiden Castle to show what type of wounds the Roman soldiers endured, so one is able to get a more adequate perception of how effective the armor was. Goldsworthy effectively explains the stress of the battle and how that might have affected the fighting ability of the unit. The book also describes the importance of discipline in the units in order to cope with the fear of combat, especially when facing the Germanic tribes in Germany who were known for their intimidating tactics such as taunting battle cries, coercive bugles or drums, plus the fierce looking bearskin outfits. Goldsworthy explains how the pressure of battle was handled by having the front line fight for about fifteen minutes then retreat to the back of the line to rest while the line behind them took over. These details exemplify how this book enhances the readers' understanding of what Roman soldiers went through during battles.

Throughout the book Goldsworthy furnishes the reader high-quality information so he can obtain a grasp of what the Roman army was like during their campaigns. In each chapter Goldsworthy first addresses what he is going to talk about, explains how other historians have addressed the topic, and then gives many supporting statements, facts, and educated opinions to support his reasoning. At the end of every chapter he concludes by quickly reviewing the major points that he wants the reader to comprehend. This is especially beneficial because there is an immense amount of information given in every chapter. However, Goldsworthy is a specialist in the field of Roman History so it is helpful for one to have some basic back ground knowledge of the Roman Empire in order to get a deeper understanding of the points that Goldsworthy presents.

Overall this book was well written and gives the reader a new outlook when viewing the Roman army, or as Goldsworthy would say: "To understand the army, and place into context all other aspects of its behavior, we must gain a better understanding of the Roman practice of war." (p. 286) I found this book full of knowledge and would recommend it to anyone with an interest in ancient warfare or a penchant for the Roman Empire.

This is an outstanding book for many reasons. It is goes into great depth to explain the training, equipment, morale, leadership, strategy, and tactics of the Roman Army. The only reason I don't give it 5 stars is because it is written from the academic veiwpoint, which of course is what Mr. Goldsworthy is, and therefore lacks some of the passion and excitment I would like to see. Nevertheless, Mr. Goldsworthy does an outstanding job of trying to paint as accurate a picture as he possibly can from the historical/archaeological record of what the soldiers, leaders, armies, and navies looked like and how they lived and fought for the Republic and the Empire. You can not complain about lack of information because Mr. Goldsworthy gives a great deal, although you may disagree with some of his conclusions. I guess that is one of the things that is so exciting about studing the Romans is that although we know large amounts of information about some things there is still mountains of information that has been lost to history and we will never really know the whole story. I highly recommend this book for anyone who wants to study the Roman Army much deeper than you can in one of the many books on this subject that just scrape the surface of the information available to scholars and military historians today.

The Roman Army at War by Adrian K. Goldsworthy [G.] contains a sweeping look at most aspects of the Roman Army as it existed between the years of 100BC and AD200. Throughout the book, G. stipulates that the majority of the Roman military success was due to its army's organization, discipline and morale.
The Roman Army at War is divided into seven basic sections: the organization of the Roman Army, enemy strategy and tactics, the Roman campaign, the role of the Roman general, the roles of the various army units, the duties and mentality of the individual soldier, and a brief appendix addressing logistics. The first portion of the text (the organization of the Roman army) is laid out in a straightforward way, first explaining the hierarchy of units and officers, then moving on to each unit's particular role in the makeup of the entire army. An attempt is made to elaborate on the history of the Roman military structure, the graduation from the Greek phalanx, the change from maniples to cohorts and the need for the first cohort of each legion to be expanded in size. G. then proceeds to illustrate the composition of the enemies of the Roman state (between 100BC and AD200). Three enemies are addressed; the Germans (specifically the Chatti and the Cimbri), the Gauls (under Vercingetorix), and the Parthians (with particular emphasis on the battle of Carrhae). Sections one and two of The Roman Army at War lay a foundation so the reader can better interpret the remainder of the book.
The Roman campaign is classified as one of three types: conquest, the suppression of insurrection, or punitive action. Caesar's wars with the Belgic tribes and [Cestius] Gallus' march on Jerusalem are cited as examples. Repeated throughout is the idea of `first strike', gaining the initiative by attacking before one's enemy (even with inferior numbers). According to the author, "When the Roman army abandoned the offensive...it was a sign that things had gone badly wrong" (Goldsworthy 114). The role of the commander was broken into fragments: the gathering of intelligence, the `council of war', the general on the battlefield, and management of the troops after victory. As demonstrated with the example of Caesar's wars with the Belgic tribes, a general might gather intelligence firsthand. The general is portrayed as directing reserves (which G. proposes as a gigantic 50 per cent or more of the total force) and riding about to raise morale, or fighting with his men. The combat of the unit was greatly affected by its commander; the discipline instilled on it is recounted in the section on `the unit's battle'. The unit's composition and purpose are revealed in the aforementioned section, along with tactics to make them more imposing since (according to G.) most (or sometimes all) of the battle depended on intimidation of the enemy force. The job of the individual soldier as well as details of his equipment are explained (weapons, armor, siege or camp tools) along with his willingness to fight. G. insists that only 25 per cent of soldiers actually fought with the idea of killing the enemy (rather than self preservation). This is the basis for almost his entire argument on the arrangement of units and the soldier's disciplinary training. After completing the analysis of military combat, G. launches into the logistics of the Roman army. This section might have served better attached to the `Organization' portion of the text.
Much of The Roman Army at War relies on a group of period sources such as: Josephus, Polybius, Vegetius, Caesar, and Plutarch. There is also a group of more modern authors whom G. has chosen to build his theses around, particularly J. Keegan (author of The Face of Battle and The Mask of Command), N.J.E. Austin, N.B. Rankov, T. Cornell, and S.L.A. Marshall. Throughout the book, G. contrasts the paper (or ideal) strength of the Roman legions with their actual practical or physical strength. He continually references detachments of troops sent to undertake mundane jobs and its weakening effect on the army as a whole. What is not certain is precisely how much of the Roman army was involved in these tasks; G. claims that up to 40 per cent of troops may be utilized in such matters at any given time, this is absolutely untenable. To send away such a large number of troops would leave barely enough to make effective battle. In addition to this, G. accepts the studies of S.L.A. Marshall as dogma. Much of the text is devoted to the idea that only a very small fraction of the army was involved in actual combat, and only for a span of fifteen minutes or so. All of the armies training and maneuvers are centered on the limitations imposed by these characteristics. What G. does not recognize is that the evidence Marshall provides in his study is incompatible with the time-period addressed in The Roman Army at War.
The Roman Army at War does an excellent job of convincing the reader of most of G.'s theories; he employs all manner of entertaining stories, references, and quotations to push across his ideas. When compared to a similar text, such as that of J. Fuller, The Roman Army at War seems far more relatable (if only for its more modern origins). For a reader accustomed to Gibbons or translations of Josephus, G. is much more pleasant to read. The Roman Army at War will suffice to explain the basic workings of the Roman army to a person unschooled in history. It facilitates the understanding of one of the most important aspects of Roman life and can lead to a better understanding of Roman civilization. To an adept historian, the book is a quagmire of poorly contextualized evidence and flawed reasoning. It is fairly short (about three hundred pages) and a majority of the more basic information is acceptable (since it is re-stated from others works) but the new ideas of the work are quite untenable.

Adrian Goldsworthy has done an admirable bit of analytical history regarding the Roman Army from 100 BC to 200 AD. His analysis has put him at odds with some reviewers, but I applaud him for stretching the subject matter for all its worth. When comparing Goldsworthy's thesis/book with earlier works by Webster, Connolly, Keppie, and Watson, to name a few, he has deliberate looked beyond just the archeological and historical record. As a retired Soldier of nearly 30 years experience, I can attest that the doctrinal manuals and historical records don't always capture the reality of "what it was actually like." Goldsworthy does here what he continues to do in his later works, sift through the evidence, identify the gaps, and then provide his best analysis of what "may" have happened. He is logical and attempts to be persuasive rather than dogmatic. Few other ancient military historians have done the "analytical stretch", David Victor Hanson and Richard A. Gabriel are two that come to mind. So I recommend this book to the reader who is not uncomfortable with allowing Goldsworthy to state his case on what Roman warfare was like. It is up to the reader to accept or scoff at his conclusions. A few points of agreement - treat doctrinal manuals with great care, these texts are written for ideal units and conditions. Don't underestimate the important of small group or unit cohesion, tribal, maniples, cohorts, etc. Surprisingly few combatants are actually engaged in fighting at any particular time, despite what Hollywood would have you believe. [...] Finally remember that Roman commanders, like those of other times and armies, made tactical decisions depending on the opponent, terrain, weather and other factors. It is pointless to build a singular model of how the Roman's fought and then try to apply it to every engagement. Bottom line, track down a copy of this book and enjoy Goldsworthy's analysis. You will find it time well spent if you are interested in how the Roman Army might have fought.