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The Roman Revolution

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This is without doubt Syme's masterwork. The praise has been lavish. A.J.P. Taylor said it was a "work of brilliant scholarship which can be enjoyed by the expert and the layman alike". Sir Maurice Bowra said "his work is extraordinarily persuasive and interesting, it is the best book on Roman History that has appeared for many years." The Classical Review wrote that is the "one of the most important books on Roman history since Mommsen.

Need more reasons to read it? Well, I'll try. I'll start by saying that this is one of the top 25 books I have read - though I by no means agree with everything Syme believes.

What Ronald Syme has done is to lay bare the workings of the late Republic and early Empire. To do this required an effort of scholarship and synthesis on a gargantuan scale. And yet Syme manages to render the story in a lucid, straightforward, compelling manner. His arguments are often ineluctable. You find yourself drawn along, at times unwillingly, to conclusions you thought far-fetched.

The period under scrutiny is 60 BC to AD 14. Thus he covers the last generation of the Republic and the first two or three of the Empire. In a nutshell his hypothesis is that the Republic simply was not equipped to manage what had become an empire. He believes that Rome was inevitably drawn to the rule of one.

He writes of Caesar: "The rule of the nobiles, he [Caesar] could see, was an anachronism in a world-empire; and so was the power of the Roam plebs when all Italy enjoyed the franchise. Caesar in truth was more conservative and Roman that many have fancied; no Roman conceived of government save through an oligarchy."

Augustus, however, was a different matter. And it was Augustus, believes Syme, who wrought the revolution that forever changed the Roman way of life. To suggest, as has some have done, that there was no true revolution, almost defies sense and logic. And Syme ably makes the case.

But aspects of the Syme's theory remain controversial. He writes: "The nobiles by their ambition and their feuds, had not merely destroyed their spurious republic: they had ruined the Roman People. There is something more important than political liberty; and political rights are a means, not an end in themselves. That end is security of life and property: it could not be guaranteed by the constitution of Republican Rome. Worn and broken by civil war and disorder, The Roman people was ready to surrender the ruinous privilege of freedom and submit to strict government as the beginning of time....So order came to Rome. "Acriora ex eo vincula", as Tacitus observes."

Wow. This is breath taking and highly controversial. He might as well have been writing about pre-Nazi Germany (and note that Syme wrote "The Roman Revolution" in 1939). And, frankly, I must tell you I do not agree with his condemnation of the nobiles. Nor do others.

The most important voice in opposition remains that of Erich Gruen's. "The Last Generation of the Roman Republic" MUST be read alongside "The Roman Revolution." Gruen believes that the monarchy was in fact neither anticipated nor inevitable. And he strongly believes that the Republic was functioning quite well, thank you very much, and could in fact have coped with empire.

This great work of scholarly history was first published in June 1939. In his brief foreword Sir Ronald Syme speaks cryptically about its publication being a matter of some urgency. From that we have to infer that he saw it as having contemporary relevance. From a slow and careful reading I would add that we ought to be very careful and circumspect in how we draw parallels and apply lessons. I don't dispute for a moment that a thorough and precise examination of what was done over the turbulent transition from the later Roman republic to the principate gives deep insight into human motivations and political processes. However if one particular lesson comes over loud and clear to me it is how terminology can be distorted for political ends, deliberate or even unperceived. Those prone to assert that `reading history' will in some inevitable way support some cherished preconception of their own will, if intelligent and attentive, gain a salutary insight into what history really consists of, and with that a perception of the pitfalls of dealing in glib generalisations and citing as convenient parallels things that are no parallels at all.

The first job of the historian is to clarify what really, or probably, happened and to interpret accurately or at least rationally what the sources for the period tell us. This is rarely a matter of simple fact in the sense that multiplication tables are simple fact. Syme's reasoning is bold and forthright, and while he has no claim to be taken as gospel he never seems to me perverse or unreasonable. I personally doubt that Antony was the straightforward and honest type portrayed by Syme - Syme himself can't get away from the part Antony played in the proscriptions. On the other hand he has every reason to ridicule Octavian's propaganda concerning the nonexistent threat posed to Rome from Antony's Egyptian queen and Octavian's official party line that elevated the naval skirmish at Actium into some mighty turning-point of history.

The story I read from Syme is as follows. The Roman republic was always part-sham. Its official mode of governance was by the senate and people, with the consuls as chief officers of government chosen at stated intervals by the people. Real power was exercised by shifting coalitions of nobles together with the unseen influence of the moneyed equestrian class. The values that weighed with both nobles and plebs were tradition and `authority', there being no written constitution. There was certainly some flexibility, but it was rare for the plebs to choose as consuls anyone lacking aristocratic status. There was no concept of progress whatsoever, and democracy on the Athenian model was despised. `Liberty' was largely theoretical, except in the sense that free speech was untrammelled to a degree we would never tolerate now. There was no pressure from any class for reform let alone revolution, but the knights and bankers were provoked at the peril of any who did so (as Catiline found to his cost), and the plebs were prone to periodic revolt, offering a power base successively to Marius and to Caesar. Blatant inversion of the meaning of the laws was the stock-in-trade of anyone with a mission, invoking some higher interpretation as suited. Indeed what Cicero tried to do in opposition to Antony was much what he boasted of having repressed as consul in relation to Catiline. Gradually a single figure came to be dominant in the power-struggles. Sulla brutally put down the adherents of Marius in the name of restoring the right-and-proper dominance of his fellow aristocrats. However when Sulla thought his work done he simply resigned. Not so Pompey or Caesar. They sought personal dominance in a way Sulla had not done. Pompey was a brute, Caesar to some extent genuinely liberal (although I see no reason to believe that any Roman republican leader had any opinion except contempt for the plebs). However on attaining power Caesar went back basically to the status quo ante, but took the unprecedented step of accepting dictatorship for life and appointing a successor, something not even Sulla had contemplated.

From there on fate favoured Octavian. His luck was phenomenal, his ruthlessness total, his skill in balancing interests and oligarchies unprecedented, and his mendacity instinctive and brilliant. He was the butcher of Perusia and the co-tyrant of the proscriptions, and he never really changed. He was by no means all-powerful, but he eviscerated the old aristocratic oligarchies and established his own. Unrest had suited him during his rise, stability after he reached the top. He had a genuine Roman respect for tradition, but he had a populist sense that the plebs would be kept on-side with a better water-supply. He knew a good idea when he saw it, and he first supported Egnatius Rufus and his private-enterprise fire-brigade until he realised Egnatius was a danger, at which point he executed Egnatius and nationalised the fire-brigade. He removed occasions of unrest by paying off retired soldiers with money rather than letting them loose to seize land in Italy, and he paid provincial governors a salary to reduce problems to himself from their practice of extortion. Throughout, he adopted the old names and titles while systematically inverting what was done in their name.

Syme has had to interpret the sources, and I have had to interpret Syme. That's history for you. It is a matter of using our brains, and it won't just prove what we prefer it to prove. In the last resort this history gives no comfort whatsoever to my own enthusiasm for democracy. In the first place Romans disliked that idea, and in the second they traded their once-cherished `libertas' (such as it ever was) for stability, such as it turned out to be. Augustus established a monarchy, leaving a successor of last choice who, as a Roman noble (unlike Augustus), wanted supremacy but hated the form of supremacy he inherited. It all lasted for 400 or 500 effective years. The thousand-year Reich of 1939 lasted all of 12, the British Empire roughly 150, the Soviet empire some 40 or 70 depending on when we start counting, and the New American Century looks dead in the water already. It was the creation of one city and of one man, through oligarchies of course. Go figure.

Syme wrote this, his first work, in 1939. He both challenged prevailing views of Augustus and demonstrated how family ties and allegiances affected the politics of the late republic. Above all, however, "The Roman Revolution" is a study in politics and power and the story of an adventurer subverting a declining system and seizing control. The sequel, The Augustan Aristocray, was published nearly 50 years later. Syme's style deliberately echoes that of his hero, Tacitus, and he is a difficult but rewarding read.

This was required reading for a graduate course in Roman history.

Ronald Syme's book The Roman Revolution was originally printed in 1939. My report is on the book's fourth printing of 1960, which incorporated minor revisions. Syme was an Oxford professor of ancient history for most of his adult life. He is primarily remembered for this book, which was hailed as a groundbreaking analysis of Roman political life after the assassination of Julius Caesar. Syme also wrote an excellent analysis of the works of the Roman historians Tacitus and Sallust. When this book was published, many historians detected that current events of the time; such as, the rise of Fascism in Europe, had an enormous influence on Syme's book. Specifically, he ominously observed the cult hero worship of Mussolini and Hitler in Italy and Germany where he had traveled on numerous occasions in the 1930's. The excuse Caesar Augustus used to seize power was that the political structure of the Republic and the Senate became inadequate to rule Rome; thus, he was only doing what was necessary to restore public order. Syme found that the Dictators in Italy and Germany were eerily repeating this excuse some two thousand years later. In the introduction to his book, Syme stated that the new government which Caesar Augustus instituted "was the work of fraud and bloodshed, based upon the seizure of power and redistribution of property by a revolutionary leader."

The book covers the political and social structure of the Roman state between 60 BCE and 14 CE; essentially the domination of Pompeius Magnus through the Principate of Augustus. Syme correctly theorized that leading up to this turbulent period of Roman history the government was really an oligarchy, which was conveniently masked behind the façade of a republic. Syme wrote in his chapter on "The Roman Oligarchy:"

"The political life of the Roman Republic was stamped and swayed,not by parties and programmes of a modern and parliamentary character, not by the ostensible opposition between Senate and People, Optimates and Populares, nobiles and novi homines, but by the strife for power, wealth, and glory. The contestants were the nobiles among themselves, as individuals or in groups, open in the elections and courts of law, or marked by secret intrigue. As in the beginning, so in its last generation, the Roman Commonwealth,`res publica populi Romani', was a name; a feudal order of society still in a city-state and governed an empire."

Noble families determined the history of the Republic. Thus, Syme wrote that the true history of Rome could not be understood without knowledge of the noble families and clans, who provided the men that comprised the oligarchy. Men from the noble families comprised the different competing political factions in Rome. The machinations of Rome's political factions, coupled with the inefficiency of the oligarchy to rule a large empire and the rise of a professional army, all contributed to the fall of the Republic. Through Syme's investigation of the oligarchy he revealed the shifting alliances among the noble elites, and the rise and fall of various noble houses, which culminated with the great change that took place during the revolution and afterwards with the Prinicpate of Augustus.

In an orderly fashion, Syme used thirty-three short and succinct chapters to present the progression of events leading up and through the Principate of Augustus. Syme's description of Julius Caesar's victory over Pompey the Great and his allies, as well as the intrigue leading up to The Ides of March, are most illuminating. Syme wrote that "Caesar's Dictatorship meant the curbing of the oligarchy, promotion for merit." Thus, Syme believed that the assassination of Caesar by Brutus and Cassius was not the work of patriots defending Rome's republican form of government, but was the work of men protecting the vested interests of the ruling elites. Syme's assessment of Caesar's dictatorship and the actions of the assassins certainly provides food for thought. "The tragedies of history do not arise from the conflict of conventional right and wrong. They are more august and complex. Caesar and Brutus each had right on his side." Syme followed The Ides of March with an excellent analysis of the Caesarian party, the rise to power of Caesar's heir Octavianus known later as Augustus, and the political machinations of both Octavianus and Antonius, commonly known as Mark Anthony during their Triumverate with Lepidus. The Triumvirate not only began a political revolution, but a social revolution with their proscription on their political enemies of between 100 to 300 senators and thousands of knights. The Triumvirate's revenge through proscription culminated in a vast redistribution of wealth through the confiscation of property and a harsh imposition of taxes.

Syme showed an unusual bias in favor of Mark Anthony. He described him as a great soldier and chivalrous, but politically outwitted and trapped. Syme believed his character was maliciously maligned in life and after death. What I found most surprising and the assessment I disagreed with, was Syme's description of Mark Anthony's relationship with Cleopatra. Syme called Mark Anthony's marriage to Cleopatra a mere "ritual marriage" even though she gave birth to his twin children. Syme's claimed that, "there is no sign of infatuation here," and that their marriage "left no political consequences" and that "Mark Anthony was compelled to stand by Cleopatra to the end by honour and by principle as well as by the necessities of war." I found this claim to be naïve of human affairs. When one considers Mark Anthony's actions in Egypt which led up to the battle of Actium, he was either in love with Cleopatra or she truly was a "siren" as Roman propaganda described her; which meant he was duped by her. In either case, the Roman Empire could not suffer having one of its leaders under the spell of a foreign queen.

An important aspect of Syme's book is his description of Augustus. Unlike earlier nineteenth century historians of Roman history such as Theodor Mommsen, who portrayed Augustus as a visionary and paternal ruler, Syme's description was harsher and frankly realistic when he wrote, "his sense for realities was unerring, his ambition implacable he was resolute. He had a cause to champion, the avenging of Caesar and was ready to exploit every advantage." The chapters that follow Syme's narrative of Rome's transition from the Dux of Octavianus and Antonius to Princeps of Caesar Augustus are replete with facts about the composition and inner workings of the party of Augustus. Syme's delved into the machinery of the new government, including Augutus' use of patronage as well as his many thwarted attempts at planning for his own succession. What Syme's found was a man that grew very adept politically; from the boy of eighteen when he was named as the heir to Julius Caesar in his will, into the greatest of the Roman princeps, spanning fifty-six years until his death. Augustus became the "leader of a large and well organized political party as the source and fount of patronage and advancement." Augustus knew that to retain power he had to maintain the general consent of the governed, which he did, not by following the constitution or past precedent, but by using the tremendous resources at his disposal. Augustus kept the plebeians in check; making sure they were fed, kept them amused with games, and constantly reminded them that he was protecting them from the oppression of the nobiles. Augustus controlled all of the armies of the Roman Empire by providing their retirement severance pay out of his own pocket. In addition, as his legionaries conquered new territory, he gave them large tracts of land when they retired; thus, founding several new towns in Italy and the provinces. His patronage to the army insured that he controlled a network of armed and devoted garrisons throughout the Empire. Augustus could do all this because he had become the richest man in the Empire. He ruled Egypt, which was the breadbasket of the Empire, and as its king he did not have to give account to any person or governing body. Thus, Syme's described Augustus as "A citizen and magistrate to the senators, he was imperator to the legions, a king and god to the subject populations." In essence, Augustus dealt the mortal blow to the Republic and set himself up to be the savior of Rome and the founder of the Pax Augusta, which "saved and regenerated the Roman People."

In conclusion, I highly recommend Syme's book to any serious student of Roman history. I found that his theories for the fall of the Roman Republic were a correct interpretation of the history. Although I found The Roman Revolution to be a very well written book, I do have a few complaints. Most of the footnotes referring to ancient historians' commentaries were printed in Latin and Greek. For those who are not proficient in both of those languages, it detracts from the added information or historical points that Syme's wanted to make. In addition, the index was confusing at times to use since its scope was prosopographical in nature.

This work, written on the eve of the Second World War, is still an excellent analysis of the fall of the Roman Republic and the emergence of Augustus. Written in style that deliberately echoes Gibbon, Syme produced a 'prequel' of Gibbon's great work. It is a testimonial to this work that comparison with Gibbon is appropriate.

I gave this book a high rating because I very much appreciate the emphasis on the relationships between noble families, and between the oligarchy and government; although I realize that this point of view is considered slighly old fashioned by some. I have read a number of books on Roman history, and I often have the feeling that I am getting a "space ship view" with an interpretion of what we see down there being filtered through my, and the author's "value filter". I this book I began to understand something about what may have gone on. The Roman concepts "Auctoritas", "Clientela", "Dignitas" and "Libertas" explain a lot. I must admit I lost my good opinion of Augustus, but obtained a better one of Anthony and Julius Caesar. I would like to know more about Agrippa. Some reader may find the details of the relationships between the families very tedious, but for me, it made the history real. I commend the scholarship that it must have taken to write such a detailed analysis. One feels it is a "behind the headlines" view, much like one gets in a book by Peter Heather.

How did the world's most powerful, free republic fall into dictatorship? This pressing question animates two classics of classical history--H. H. Scullard's "From the Gracchi to Nero" and Sir Ronald Syme's "The Roman Revolution."

Syme's analysis of the end of the Free State is as authoritative as it is magisterial. Written in the terse, energetic style of Tacitus, RR shares Tacitus' verdict on the falling Republic--that a princeps, however horrible, was the only "solution" for a state ruled by warring, short-sighted, power-lusting factions.

But what a marvel those factions were to behold! For the patient reader, there is a gripping story herein--as intricate as Puzo's "The Godfather," as high-stakes as Hugo's "Ninety-Three," as vibrant as Shakespeare. I think this is historiography at its best.

This is a monumental and absolutely first rate work of scholarship. It covers the period roughly from Marius to Tiberius, which saw the fall of the traditional oligarchic republic and its replacement by the despotic monarchy as designed by Augustus. While it has a great deal about the politics, it also addresses issues related to the administration of the Empire.

Following the empowerment of the Tribunes of the People under the Gracchi brothers - enabling popular assemblies to make law, originally the exclusive province of the Roman Senate - and the expansion of the empire beyond Italy, Syme argues, the Roman Republic entered a period of unprecedented crisis. Not only did the army gain political power as enforcer and monopoly holder of organized military means, but the subject peoples became interested in accessing and influencing the old-style oligarchy. Moreover, with the multiple new avenues of power, including mob-inciting demagogues who ruled the streets, a cacophony of laws were promulgated (or more often, blocked). The result was over a century of recurring civil war, which invariably erupted during certain crucial transfers of power at the change of the yearly consulship. It was only Augustus who solved the equation of who should wield power with the creation of a kind of monarchy, in this view.

Prior to this crisis, Rome was governed much as a Greek City State, with a narrow local elite taking advantage of its subject peoples to support their power games via the extraction of their wealth; responsibilities were thrust onto governors (for periods too short to learn much about their provinces) who had little knowledge of administration and cared nothing for the welfare of local subjects. The Roman Oligarchy had ruled for hundreds of years in this way, transferring power on a yearly basis to consuls as voted by the Senate, which prevented the development of autocratic power. It was essentially an aristocracy of Patricians (descendants of those who overthrew the monarchs) and rich Plebians who had achieved military glory in times of crisis (e.g. the Scipios, who defeated Hannibal). The Senators had to maintain their prestige through lavish displays of wealth in public events but also to help their client base, all for the glory of their families. Rather than parties or ideology, their power was based on family alliances as extended by a loyal "clientele" sworn to mutual assistance. Underneath them were the equestrians, who were businessmen and local aristocrats in the provinces; they made money instead of seeking glory. Finally, there was the proletariat. Only rarely did "new men", such as the military genius Caius Marius, arise to hold power in times of external threat.

Politically, this system worked reasonably well until Rome became a Mediterranean superpower. First, the source of soldiers - gentleman farmers - proved inadequate to the requirements for years of military service: they were too few and had to work the fields regularly or face ruin. This opened the way to the establishment of a professional army by Marius, in which the proletariat and anyone else could serve for wages and make a career. Second, the subject peoples of Rome wanted the same rights as the citizens; they rebelled violently and were suppressed with increasing frequency. With the opportunities that the Tribunate offered to go over the heads of the Senatorial oligarchy, the great general Marius created a new structure of power, which included both his loyal soldiers and the proletariat as well as the provincials. Sulla, Marius' protegé and then rival for power, attempted to reinstall the old oligarchy in a bloody civil war that wiped out a vast array of political talent from ranks of the oligarchy and equestrians. It was here that the powerful generals - Pompey (allied with provincials) and soon Julius Caesar (a patrician favoring the "common man") - emerged to battle the old oligarchy in a conflict that eventually could have destroyed the Republic.

While still a teenager, Octavian (mysteriously adopted by Caesar just prior to his assassination and later known as Augustus) then stepped into the breach and after much struggle completely reshaped the power structure. The true genius of Augustus, according to Syme, is that he was able to use the power of the armies - he gained command of the most important nearby legions in case of need - while channeling the ambitions of citizens into service for Rome (and for himself, of course). He did this by creating legitimate outlets for the energies of ambitious men of talent (as military officials but also as professional administrators), who served the state and empire rather than constantly maneuvered for executive power within the oligarchy. Essentially, in addition to opening administration to talent from the provinces, Augustus made a major step in the establishment of the apparatus for a more modern state, replacing the amateurish behavior of non-professionals that was the hallmark of Greek City States.

This is a wonderful interpretation that makes many aspects of Roman history comprehensible beyond naked grabs for personal power and glory. In Syme's view, the huge Roman Empire had become ungovernable by the fractious oligarchy, denuded as it was of talent over the previous 100 years of civil war; Augustus buried the old oligarchy while maintaining the appearance of the republic's institutions, bringing order at the price of liberty, which an exhausted citizenry welcomed. There is no doubt that much of this is accurate, in my opinion.

That being said, Syme makes many judgments that I found questionable, though they are nuance rather than the core ideas that I find very sound. He portrays Augustus as a proto-totalitarian, while I think he was a simple despot. He likes both Marc Anthony and Tiberius, while I think they were mediocre libertines. These are things we can never know, of course, so my interpretation is personal.

Regarding Syme's method, I want to add a note of caution for the reader. He assumes a certain level of knowledge; if the reader lacks it, the book will be very rough going and dry. You need to know not only who Sulla and Cato are, but also Livius Drusus, Crassus, the Metelli, and many many others. Syme did not intend to retell any of the stories attached to them. You also need to know the history and chronology from about 150 bc to 30 ad. If you have this grounding, the book is truly a joy of subtle interpretation and analysis accomplished by a great master scholar, who knows every obscure scrap of written sources that supports his case. The book also has a quirky, though elegant writing style.

This is one of the best books on Roman history that I have ever read, but it is not for casual readers. You need to be something of a Roman history buff before you read this, either at the gradual level or having read the wonderful historical novels of McCullough. With these caveats, I recommend this book with the greatest enthusiasm.

Syme's 1939 work is essential reading for anyone who wants to have an in depth understanding of the Roman Republic's collapse. Although later works have disputed his thesis (Caesar was a proto-fascist), it is still an important book to read and well worth the investment in time and effort.

R. Syme reveals the real power players in ancient Roman society, the backers of the competing generals searching personal domination of the empire.
That empire contained two classes of citizens: the patricians and the plebs. Rome was ruled without a real constitution (legality was a casual or partisan question). In fact, an oligarchy of 20 to 30 men detained all power strings. They represented whom? The main factions involved were the optimates (wealthy nobility), the nobiles (consular houses), the equites (provincial aristocracies, captains of industry and finance) and the novi homines (senators for the 1st time). Three other groups as a whole were politically very important: the plebs, the soldiers and the Senate.
Ambitious generals tried to cement different factions into a block, a Party as a power base.

Julius Caesar was a nobilis, backed by the plebs. By nominating many novi homines he took control of the Senate. He became the first Roman revolutionary by abolishing all political liberties and installing a dictatorship. He was stabbed to death by the defenders of the Republic.
Marcus Antonius took the helm at the Caesarean Party, but Caesar also nominated a young nobilis as his heir, Octavianus. Provisory political stability was created through a triumvirate (M. Antonius, Octavianus, Lepidus) which installed a reign of terror, wiping out all political opponents through proscription and abolishing all private rights of citizenship. After the elimination of Lepidus, the two remaining triumvirs fought the battle of Actium: Octavianus became the sole master of the situation. In the choice between political freedom (and a new suicidal civil war?) or a stable government, the power players opted for the latter.
The reign of Octavianus (Augustus) was backed by the plebs (panem et circenses), the military, the Senate (purified by nominating many novi homines) and the consuls (designated by the emperor). The power of the nobiles was broken. R. Syme characterizes his reign as plutocratic. Many novi homines were opulent men from the colonies and the municipia (Italy without Rome). In reality, Rome was ruled in secret by members of his family (Livia) and personal adherents (Maecenas, Agrippa).

R. Syme's book contains many in depth portraits of major power players. A few examples: Cicero was the head of the optimates who intended to employ Octavianus in order to destroy the Caesarean Party and to restore political liberty. Octavianus was a hypocrite and opportunist chameleon, who seized power through bribery, fraud and bloodshed.
This magisterially and clear analysis of a power struggle is a must read for all historians and for all those interested in the history of mankind