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33 of 33 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Peace Through Terror, July 3, 2000
This review is from: Rome and the Enemy: Imperial Strategy in the Principate (Hardcover)
Susan Mattern, a professor at the University of Georgia, has written a well-researched analysis of how the Roman Empire's leaders made strategic decisions from 31 BC to 235 AD. Chapters cover topics from the nature of the decision-making elite, the Roman image of the world around them, strategic limitations, economic resources, and strategic values. Although a bit dry and academic in tone, this work provides a valuable synthesis of the elements that enabled Roman leaders to formulate a strategic policy for the Empire. Roman policy, as Mattern hammers home repeatedly, was not based upon either deterrence or a search for defensible borders. Rather, Roman policy rested upon overawing both external and internal enemies with the ability of the Empire to inflict massive military punishment upon all transgressors. Rome made war to avenge injuries upon the empire in order to maintain the honor of that entity. Failure to avenge a Barbarian attack or to settle disputes with diplomacy was viewed by Roman leaders as not only a sign of weakness, but also an invitation to further enemy aggression. In order to maintain peace, Barbarian arrogance (i.e. disrespect for the power of Rome) had to be kept in line by smashing military defeats, followed by humiliating surrenders. The greater the arrogance of the enemy, the more severe the Roman revenge, ranging from mere defeat to total annihilation; as Mattern wrote, "if a tribe caused too much trouble, the Romans saw no moral or ethical argument against wiping it off the face of the earth". Nor was there a time limit - Roman retribution might not come for years or even decades, but their enemies had to be assured that it would come some day. Roman security rested far more on repeated demonstrations of military prowess and a willingness to pay any price to avenge insults to the Empire, than the size of the army or border defenses. Mattern has very useful chapters detailing the limitations of the Roman Army based on available manpower and the ability of the Empire to extract taxes. Interestingly, the Roman Army during this period amounted to only about 1% of the total population and the military budget is estimated to have been approximately 2.5% of the "Imperial GNP". These statistical points help Mattern to hammer home her points that Roman strategy, as such there was, aimed at achieving a psychological effect upon the enemy rather than achieving security through either quantitative or qualitative superiority. These chapters on the economic underpinnings of the Empire and strategic limitations make this book a valuable addition to any collection of Roman military history. Mattern also makes interesting points on the differences between how Romans made strategic decisions compared with current methods. Amazingly, maps and geographical information were not used in planning military operations. Nor were financial considerations of cost and gained measured; major military resources were devoted to hold onto Britain despite the poor economic resources of the island. Instead, Mattern convincingly claims that it all came down to maintaining the image of the Empire as able and willing to inflict assured retribution on aggressors. Peace for Roman was thus achieved by psychologically terrorizing all challengers into subject inactivity.
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5.0 out of 5 stars
How did the Romans think of war and peace and strategy?, October 9, 2007
This book is not a tale or narrative. Instead, it is an examination of the evidence about how Rome thought of war, peace, and strategy. Through literature, histories, and historical evidence, the author captures a sense of Roman thought.
Romans worried about the image of Rome, the way others thought of Rome. They gaurded with ferocity the reputation of Rome as a terrible enemy.
Romans did not have a sense of mapping, geography, strategic boundaries, or key crops and resources, in a way that modern military and foreign policy specialists take for granted. Instead, Rome had a strong sense of the enemy, those who would try and push at Rome, and who needed to be kept down, subdued, killed, in order to ensure a strong Rome.
This book is a bit dry, but it is fascinating in how it weaves its sources to reveal a way of life and of thought, regarding empire. There have been those who feel that America needs to understand this Roman view of power and fear, in order to understand why some in the world go to war with Americans. I think that this is over-stated. It is not as though we lack this Roman perspective in the West... rather I would say that we have layered over it many strategic lessons, and some forgetfulness.
This sort of writing augments more narrative histories by capturing the historic sensibility of the times. There should be more histories of this quality written.
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5 of 8 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Another side of Rome, September 24, 2000
This review is from: Rome and the Enemy: Imperial Strategy in the Principate (Hardcover)
Susan P. Mattern wrote a book that is well made, easy to read and has well supported ideas. She breaks down Imperial Strategy, not into where, who and how, but into why and what for. While other books focus on what the Romans are doing, she examines why they do it. She breaks it down into parts, dealing with how the army, the empire's income and the Roman values shape and mold how they respond to threats and outsiders. The hardcover might scare you, but it only took me two days to read and for a person who has a basic knowledge of Roman History, the book should not be a problem.
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