Customer Reviews

Rommel

5 star:		(2)
4 star:		(0)
3 star:		(0)
2 star:		(1)
1 star:		(1)

 

 

I am not impressed by this book. The account of Rommel was rather sketchy, and the arguments were not laid out in details for the reader to judge for themselves. This book could certainly do more with its analysis of Rommel and his achievements - or lack thereof. In particular, much more could be said about Rommel's accomplishments and failings as Afrika Korp commander and as a commander in Normandy. There is much to be said about the 'Rommel' myth which was not discussed in this book.

A reasonable read for those being introduced to Rommel, but not adequate for more informed and thoughtful readers.

This book, unfortunately, lacks detail. It makes allegations and judgments on Rommel's 'art' of War, which has been overanalysed and have been found to be not simply good but excellent. The author obviously lacks any extended knowledge of operational and tactical intricacies. Thus, for example, it has been stated that Rommel was not concerned with logistics. On the face of it, this may seem to be true. However, it must also be considered in the context of the background of the Wehrmacht and its General Staff. As a battlefield commander, Rommel expected his Staff Officers to be able to keep up with the tempo of operations. This, for the most part, they were able to do except when supplies from the Continent were in short supply or were being intercepted by the Allies. Further, much is made of Rommel's disobeying his initial orders to engage in a holding action in North Africa. What this author fails to mention is that (1) there was a blueprint of what was called "Plan Orient" which envisaged controlling the Suez and (2) strategically, it made more sense to go after Suez as that would have threatened the British Empire, especially in India. The lack of foresight was more on the part of the German High Command, than of Rommel for when in the last stages of the North African Campaign, when it was becoming clear that the Afrika Korp would be destroyed, supplies miraculously found their way only to be surrendered to the Allies. Does this mean Rommel was without fault? Of course not. No commander is ever perfect - that is the first lesson from the study of military history. One could point to Rommel's ignoring of Malta as being one of his 'strategic' errors. But as a counter-point, one could also demonstrate that operating on a much wider front - in Normandy - Rommel's genius for defence was very much evident, albeit ignored by his High Command.

There is one last point. The author makes much of two issues - first, that Rommel was Hitler's favourite general! I am somewhat taken aback by this as being a black mark against Rommel. Obviously he was a successful commander and any head of state - even one as demented as Hitler - would want to fete a successful commander. It has also been stated that Rommel skillfully used the Propaganda Machine to his benefit. This cannot be denied. However, it must also be kept in mind that the conduct of war takes place across a variety of spectra and these include the 'cognitive' and 'psychological' domains. The author should recognize that one of the outcomes of Rommel's use of the Propaganda Machine was in the release of Gen. Auchinleck's letter in which he cautioned his tactical commanders against considering Rommel as 'super-human bogeyman'. This is a classic example of one form of what we today identify as 'effects-based operations'. So to find Rommel using these tools would not and should not be surprising. The second point concerns whether Rommel was a part of the conspiracy to assasinate or otherwise remove Hitler. Stop to think about it for a moment. For any military officer to plan on what is ultimately an act of treason is not a flippant act. There are also indications - infact the fateful meeting with von Rundstedt and Hitler at Soissons is a case in point - that Rommel did give Hitler an ultimatum after the successful landing of the Allies in Normandy. What turn that ultimatum would have taken is a matter of speculation given Rommel's very serious injury, and his name appearing on the list of persons suspected of being involved in the July 1944 Plot, which resulted in his committing suicide. This leaves us neither here nor there!

I have often wondered about this author and his motivations to 're-work' Rommel and, frankly speaking, I cannot come up with any reason - academic or otherwise - as to how this author came to write this book.

Conclusion: Read this book if you want to know how NOT TO do history; Else avoid it like the plague!

Just like the majority of those new to WWII, years ago, I thought that Rommel was an excellent commander, tactician, strategist, etc. It was only when I began to delve into details and talking with authors that I realized the myths built up around Rommel, and many other Generals, were finally coming down. This book actually does an excellent job in showing Rommel's tactical knowledge and expertise and puts it into context with what actually was the reason for his achievements in France and North Africa.

I have to point out that what I wanted to read the most about was the British addition to propaganda in regards to Rommel. The author shows that since the British were pushed off the continent, after the fall of France, Norway, the Balkans, etc, their only field of battle against Nazi Germany (aside from the Battle of Britain) was the North African theatre. This meant that their only 'claim to fame', so to speak, in showing that they had taken a part in taking down the German land Army was showing what odds they were able to overcome. Thus, Rommel became a 'superman' and the 'Desert Fox' and Montgomery, the commander who eventually defeated him, became THAT much better than Rommel himself.

A lot of detail is given to Rommel's involvement with the assassination attempt on Hitler (or non-involvement). I wasn't surprised to see that Rommel was ignorant of what was going on around him in terms of German policies and strategy. He was a talented tactician, to a point, but the fact is he was sent to North Africa to help the Italians hold back the British, not wage war toward the Suez Canal and beyond, which is something he hoped to do. He never had the man-power for such an offensive and even so decided to go through with it, letting logistics sort themselves out. The end result was a sea-saw of battles that eventually led to the demise of the Afrika Armee.

A recommended read for those interested in seeing Rommel's achievements in an objective light, his victories and losses, as well as how BOTH the Germans and British used Rommel for their own needs (the most photographed German general, it should be noted). Also, how even after the war he served as a token tool for, once more, both the Germans and British in propagating their respective causes. Lastly, I would agree with the previous reviewer who said that much was still left out in regards to both what Rommel achieved and lacked but this book is at least a step in the right direction, and for that I believe it deserves 5 stars.

I recommend any officer of the United States Army at the military academy to read this one for sure!!! Rommel was a straight up fighter, but fair and tough... he liked the cameras!!! Knights Cross is another great read,,, as well as The Rommel Papers!!!