Customer Reviews

From Roosevelt to Truman: Potsdam, Hiroshima, and the Cold War

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The origin of the Cold War remains a hot topic, with several new books appearing each year revealing new information from previously sealed archives and basic research into private papers of major players in the Cold War. Having read a number of these studies, I would rate Wilson Miscamble's as one of the very best. His select bibliography alone list hundreds of sources, and his copious footnotes show that he used these references extensively. Indeed, some of his best material appears in the footnotes, all of which bear noting. Miscamble takes the reader from the day Truman was called to the White House to be told that FDR had died, through the trying first weeks of leading the nation through a deadly maze of challenges as World War II grinds to an end. Truman was placed in a bind by FDR, who had not even informed him of the work being done to develop the atomic bomb. Nor had Truman ever met Churchill or Stalin, with whom he would have to cooperate to defeat Hitler's forces, then concentrate on winning the war against Japan. The author shows the forces with which Truman had to deal at each stage of the War and in trying to shape a Postwar world: establishment of the United Nations, winding down Lend-Lease, formulating a means to meet the perceived threat of Soviet expansion and domination of Central and East Germany. Throughout, he shows Truman's weaknesses as well as his strengths, and although you may still have many questions about the Cold War when you finish this book, you are also likely to have a greatly enhanced appreciation of the roles played by the major players, especially with respect to Truman's role as the Cold War developed. This is an excellent book with which to study Cold War origins, and it will provide you with leads to further study if you care to pursue the topics it covers in greater detail.

This book gives a thorough look at the transition and evolution of the Truman administration's foreign policy approach. I found it a surprisingly easy read for a book based on solid research. Though my exposure to other works dealing with this subject is admittedly narrow, I would highly recommend it to anyone seeking a balanced view on this subject.

Anyone with an interest in US policies of WWII or post-war, or an interest in a careful and accurate critique of FDR's approach to same, needs to read this.
Miscamble tries his best to be neutral, but FDR's ego and ignorance shines through, as does his disastrous romance with Stalin and his willful ignorance of Stalin's policies and horrors.
An equally accurate and popular examination of his economic policies would do wonders in properly gauging FDR's presidency as the disaster it was.
Truman, limited as he was, did far better.