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The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform

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Professor Corum has produced a very concise (c. 200 pages) history of how the German Army spent its inter-war years. Including chapters on doctrinal development (air and ground), training, and weapons design and implementation, Dr. Corum has done his best to avoid political/strategic questions that are inherent in a text covering the rebirth of the German military.

Dr. Corum also makes a statement in focusing on General Hans Von Seeckt as the driving force behind many of the reforms the Reichswehr undertook during his years as chief of the general staff. By taking the spotlight away from Heinz Guderian, Corum has placed the emphasis on the man who fostered the kind of general staff where sweeping tactical and organizational changes were possible. Professor Corum also makes it very clear that those changes were in large part due to a serious assessment of the lessons of the First World War.

A reader from an allied country may have difficulties in trying to separate the great advances in warfare made during the period of the Reichswehr, and how these principles were misused only a few years later. However, one can not avoid marveling at the professionalism and flexibility of the tradition of the Prussian General Staff, and it is those qualities that Professor Corum has focused on in his text.

Corum, a historian, German linguist, and former military intelligence officer has written a fine study of how Germany was able to absorb the lessons of its defeat in WWI, overcome the restrictions placed on the size and composition of its armed forces, and develop the revolutionary military doctrine that swept it to astonishing victories against every European country it engaged. Corum focuses on General Hans von Seeckt, enigmatic Chief of the German General Staff -- twice awarded the Pour le Merit, Germany's highest decoration for valor -- as the architecht of this remarkable feat. Seeckt set the stage for reform of the Army by fostering a climate of open discussion on all matters regarding doctrine development in which the ideas of the best thinkers -- regardless of rank -- were given a full hearing. A tremendous number of experimental programs were conducted to try out various tactical doctrine. Many of these, secretly carried out in the USSR. Corum cites numerous training manuals, military correspondence and other primary resource documents to illustrate the revolutionary nature of Seeckt's impact on the German military. The book appeared about the same time as a book on American preparation for WWII -- There's a War to be Won -- that is very instructive when read together with Roots of Blitzkrieg. Current military leaders and their civilian overseers should read both books and bear in mind that the constrained resourses available to our armed forces today make the German model the more relevant of the two. Americans, fifty years ago could count on the full mobilization of our industrial and population base to prepare for war. Today's headlines continually reflect lack of preparedness in training exercises, inability to recruit and retain quality personnel (especially pilots), and inadequate funding for research and development programs -- a formula for disaster. Our political focus on humanitarian missions conducted by our armed forces has diverted training and R & D funds and that other scarce resource -- time -- from their intended purposes and prevented implementation of new information age technology. Corum's book demonstrates that, with even minimal support from the political establishment, the U.S. could revive its rapidly deteriorating military capability.

The German Reichswehr - the military of the Weimar Republic from 1919 to 1933 - is far less well known than the Imperial German Army of the First World War or the Wehrmacht of the Second World War, but James S Corum's The Roots of Blitzkrieg goes a long way toward correcting that deficiency. This is not a popular history but rather, a scholarly analysis of how Germany rebuilt its army after defeat in the First World War and laid the groundwork for combat success in 1939-41. At the center of this account is General Hans von Seeckt, commander of the army from 1919-1926 and Corum focuses much of the book on the period of von Seeckt's reforms. After reading this book, readers may wake away with the impression that the harsh restrictions imposed upon Germany by the Allies in the Treaty of Versailles may actually have helped von Seeckt to build a better army than he might have if unrestricted. Not being allowed to keep a huge stock of outdated arms from the First World War forced von Seeckt to seek development of new and better weapons, including those developed in secret collaboration with the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the reduction of the German regular army officer corps from 60,000 to only 4,000 enabled von Seeckt to keep only the very best leaders. The author concludes: "this process of rebuilding the German Army is one of the most impressive and significant military accomplishments of the twentieth century."

The Roots of Blitzkrieg consists of eight chapters and an epilogue. Corum begins with von Seeckt's emphasis to study and learn from the mistakes of the First World War to build a new doctrine for the Reichswehr. As the author notes, the victorious Allies paid little attention to learning from the First World War while the defeated Germans assiduously scooped up all the essential lessons for their new war-fighting doctrine. Interestingly, von Seeckt attached great importance to both tanks and gas warfare, both of which he saw as war-winning tools. The second chapter covers von Seeckt's re-evaluation of German military doctrine. Von Seeckt saw "the key to future victory was mobility" and the answer to the enemy's superior numbers. Despite the demonstrated strength of the defense witnessed in trench warfare, he emphasized an offensive orientation for the Reichswehr. The result of von Seeckt's re-evaluation was the `Leadership in Battle' regulations, written in 1921, that had a strong influence on the development of German tactics up to 1940.

The third chapter deals with debate within the Reichswehr. To his credit, von Seeckt did not enforce orthodoxy but allowed serious professional debate within the Reichswehr about doctrinal development. There were three opposing schools of thought: the defensive school, the psychological school and the `People's War' school. The fourth chapter deals with training the Reichswehr. Since the Allies had limited the Reichswehr to only 4,000 officers but set no limit on NCOs, von Seeckt re-structured the Reichswehr so that more than half the army was composed of NCOs. He created a `Fuhrerheer' - an army of leaders - where NCOs were trained to be future officers and paving the way for future force expansion. Tactical training of officers and NCOs in the Reichswehr was superb. Chapter five covers the development of modern weaponry. The author discusses German covert development of new artillery and tanks using shadow companies abroad and secret training bases in the USSR. The author claims that Germany did not fall behind in any areas of technology but this is not entirely true, particularly in vital areas such as the development of a reliable diesel tank engine. He places considerable emphasis in this section on development of tanks and motorization.

Chapter six covers the development of German armor doctrine. Corum highlights the role of Ernst Volkheim in leading development of tanks. Far from opposing tanks, von Seeckt endorsed them and set the stage for organizing the first prototype tank battalion in 1927. The author points out how Guderian's role in German armor development has been exaggerated. Chapter seven covers the development of the Reichswehr aviation doctrine. Chapter eight covers the Reichswehr's development of war plans and mobilization plans, as well as its multi-division training exercises.

Overall, this is a very well done scholarly analysis. The level of research that went into this is evident in the footnotes and list of sources used. There are some areas that the author did not cover which might have shed more light on the relationship of the Reichswehr to Germany's performance in the Second World War. He does not discuss the Reichswehr's doctrine in regards to logistics or intelligence - two key areas of battlefield weakness. Also, he only compares Reichswehr doctrine to French, British and American doctrine which, considering the military laziness of the democracies during the interwar period, is not exactly fair. Since the real test in the Second World War would be German versus Soviet doctrine, it would have been worthwhile to compare the Reichswehr with its most likely opponent. The author also tends to skip over some of the problems in the early days of the Reichswehr - troops not getting paid for months, lack of discipline, political unrest - that paints perhaps too rosy a picture of von Seeckt's army in 1919-1923 (e.g. no mention of the Reichswehr's role in Hitler's Beer Hall putsch). Up front the author said that he wanted to avoid some of these political issues, but by omitting these complications, he presents a somewhat abstract version of the Reichswehr. Nevertheless, James Corum's The Roots of Blitzkrieg provides a superb examination of how Germany rebuilt its military in the interwar period and laid the doctrinal groundwork for one of the greatest war-making machines of all time.

This book is a good starting point for understanding German military developments in mechanized warfare during the interwar years. Alternately, if you only wanted to read one book on the subject, this would be a good choice. Easy to read, makes clear points, and covers a fair amount of territory.

Good. This book shows how Germany's 'manuvuer focus' in world war 2 came from commanders from the eastern front, chief among them, von seekt. This is contrary to the generous credit that Guderian and British therotical strategists awarded themselves. Corum states that because of success in manuvuer warfare on the eastern front, from tannenberg on, that the german military built on that, and viewed technology as a means to accelerate its tempo. One example of manuver warfare was a small group of soldiers in trucks racing to one of the passes into romania proper. They arrived before the romanians and it took a full division and 3,000 casualties to dislodge them.
Some more things that stick out in memory: Corum asserts that war changed more 1914-1919 than it did from 1919-1945. Ludendorff was good at operations but poor at strategy, the effort expended on operation micheal should have been spent on knocking italy out of the war thus improving its economic situation and leaving it with one less front to worry about.

I have always been intrigued by the Wehrmacht's ability to rise from the ashes of the Kaiserheer so quickly and so successfully and have consequently read about every book I could find on the subject. This is head and shoulders above every similar work. Highly recommended.

Full of common sense. A must-have for anyone interested in the history of the German Army tactics. It is incredible how so many things were left to be put in written on a so-much studied subject.