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The Royal Navy's Home Fleet in World War II (Studies in Military & Strategic History)

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Well, this is the author, and after waiting two years for someone to chime in on my book, I'll tell you what I think. First, despite earlier efforts to correct this, I'm not a lecturer at Kings College, London. Professor Philpott, who edited this series, is alive and well and teaching there. I'm at Hofstra University on Long Island and teach in the School for University Studies and the History Department. Second, the book is a rather good look at the operations of the Home Fleet from the perspective of its four Commanders-in-Chief: Charles Forbes, Jack Tovey, Bruce Fraser, and Henry Moore. It is moderately hostile to Winston Churchill, who has a puffed up reputation as something of a brilliant strategist--he was not, but liked to pretend he was. This "former naval person" was no such thing; he was a cavalry subaltern and never really stopped thinking like one. So, if you like ships and naval battles, and are agnostic about Churchill, you should enjoy this solid little book.

The Home Fleet of the Royal Navy was an important formation during World War II and James Levy tells the story of its history well. Levy reminds his readers of something that is quite easy to forget: naval operations were a critical element in determining the outcome of this war. The Royal Navy could not win the war, but they sure could lose it; if Germany had gained control of the waters surrounding Britain there may or may not have been an invasion of the United Kingdom, but there sure would have never been a D-Day.

This fleet played a key role in protecting Britain and blocking the German advance. Although he is an American, Levy knows the Royal Navy quite well. He earned his history Ph.D. in Wales and is a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society. Naval matters can be quite confusing for land lubbers, but his text is accessible to those of us with a limited understanding of the sea. His prose is strong and engaging. He clearly admires the commanders and men of the Home Fleet and honors them for their work without glorifying the brutality of war. He is less complimentary of the Admiralty, which often kept intervening in tactical and operational matters that were domain of the Fleet Commanders-in-Chief. He also is willing to go after sacred cows and shows that Winston Churchill both as First Lord of the Admiralty and then as Prime Minister made a number of strategic mistakes that complicated the mission of the Home Fleet.

Although he is focused on this one formation, Levy takes into account a number of factors such as other conflicting strategic demands, economics, and the pace of technological innovation. While the history of staff work is hardly the sexiest of topics, he offers gripping accounts of a whole slew of surface engagements that the Home Fleet fought against the German Navy. Although none of them were as famous or as big as Jutland or Trafalger, they were important. The Germans in many cases had better ships with more armor, speed and firepower, but the Royal Navy had 400 years of tradition that emphasized aggressive leadership. Despite its material shortcomings, the British dominated the Germans time and time again and never allowed them to challenge their dominance of the high seas.