17 of 17 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
A corporate failure revealed in the crucible of battle, May 23, 2007
I have copied my review from the 2000 paperback edition. It's curious that Amazon does not carry them over.
I have read many books of military history covering a variety of campaigns, but never have I read one with such breadth and insight as this. The enormity of the drama embodied in the moment the fleets met at Jutland is for the first time matched by an author's ability to depict a context rich enough to help us understand the influences which fed this cataclysmic misfire of naval strength.
Gordon focuses on the tension between doctrine's role as a useful tool for helping a widely flung set of commanders act in concert when distance, smoke, and angst prevent their communication and how a careless search for practical doctrine might invite a stifling dogma in its stead. As Gordon so fluidly writes of the malaise gripping the "fleet that had dozed unchallenged in the long calm lee of Trafalgar", the trust Nelson placed in subordinates had not long survived his death in that battle and its heir was an officious busyness centered on sparkle and conformity.
Particularly delightful in this work and an aspect not to be missed is the benefit to be realized by using two bookmarks when reading it, with the second preserving your spot in the end notes. Its 100+ pages of notes manifest a stringent and complete attribution of his borrowings, but a great many of the notes are not simply citations of others work but illuminating tidbits well worth savoring as you plow along the main text.
A new reader will also find that color has not been sacrificed in the rush to meet the obligations of covering so large a battle. My favorite anecdote was one of an untroubled officer on HMS Lion who, unaware that the Germans had truly been sighted, calmly finished preparing his sandwich as action stations were rung. The mental picture formed of his arriving on the bridge with mouth full and hoagie in hand is not unlike someone doing "the wave" in the audience at Ford's Theatre as Lincoln takes his seat.
I mean the 5 stars. I have given 5 copies of this book to people I know, simply to ensure that they might understand the mania for naval history it has fanned in my heart. If there is any justice in this world, this book will enjoy a massive new print run.
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13 of 13 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Superb, I cannot recommend this book highly enough, February 13, 2006
This has to be the definitive account!. This brings a new and refreshing perspective on the Jutland controversy, and has caused me to re-revaluate my own idea's on the subject. Be warned though that this is no light account, though it reads very well, the subject matter is for the die-hard naval fanatic, not for the casual reader.
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10 of 10 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
One of the best historical works that I have read, December 7, 2008
I have always been fascinated with the battle of Jutland and cannot imagine a more in depth and thorough study of it than this. Mr. Gordon not only delves into the historical culture clash and the personalities of the prime actors within the Royal Navy, but he also goes into great depth regarding such technical issues as maximum vessel speeds, gunnery targeting methods and problems, etc. However his primary focus is on the RNs bondage to the Signal Book and the resultant impact on individual initiative and co-ordination in battle.
I agree with much of what the previous reviewers have said, however I take issue with "Jeremy's" assertion that Mr. Gordon "tries hard to defend Beatty". I came away with just the opposite impression. While Mr. Gordon does give Beatty credit where credit is due he takes great pains to lay much of the blame for the mistakes made and the losses incurred directly at Adm. Beatty's feet. He points out that Beatty inexplicably failed to meet with Evan-Thomas (RA5BS) prior to the battle when such a meeting was not only crucial to the two admirals understanding each other, but primarily Beatty's responsibility as the overall commander. He also failed to even supply Evan-Thomas with a copy of his standing fleet battle orders, an incredible oversight. Beatty's positioning of the 5th Battle Squadron (under Adm. Evan-Thomas) as he approached Hippers battle cruiser fleet as though he were on peace time exercise probably cost the loss of the British battle cruiser Indefatigable who would not have had to bear the brunt of so much German gunfire had they had the 5BS battleships to contend with sooner. Beatty's retention of an incompetent and sycophantic signals officer, even after he caused serious problems through signalling mistakes in two prior battles, was one of the prime causes of Evan-Thomas's tardy turn to the north. And finally Beatty's less than stellar handling of his fleet when Jellicoe finally did arrive with the Grand Fleet in no way sheds a good light on him. So I find it hard to agree that Gordon tried at all to defend Beatty. I am not a big fan of Adm. Beatty who I view as a WWI Royal Navy version of WWIIs Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery; more interested in self promotion than good results. However that does not mean that he was without abilities and deserves no credit whatsoever.
In any event I highly recommend this book to anyone who is a serious student of history. For those of you who only have a casual interest you will probably find the book too detailed and wearisome. But that very detail is what I found so absorbing about this book
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