Customer Reviews

The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command

5 star:		(7)
4 star:		(0)
3 star:		(0)
2 star:		(0)
1 star:		(0)

 

 

I have copied my review from the 2000 paperback edition. It's curious that Amazon does not carry them over.

I have read many books of military history covering a variety of campaigns, but never have I read one with such breadth and insight as this. The enormity of the drama embodied in the moment the fleets met at Jutland is for the first time matched by an author's ability to depict a context rich enough to help us understand the influences which fed this cataclysmic misfire of naval strength.

Gordon focuses on the tension between doctrine's role as a useful tool for helping a widely flung set of commanders act in concert when distance, smoke, and angst prevent their communication and how a careless search for practical doctrine might invite a stifling dogma in its stead. As Gordon so fluidly writes of the malaise gripping the "fleet that had dozed unchallenged in the long calm lee of Trafalgar", the trust Nelson placed in subordinates had not long survived his death in that battle and its heir was an officious busyness centered on sparkle and conformity.

Particularly delightful in this work and an aspect not to be missed is the benefit to be realized by using two bookmarks when reading it, with the second preserving your spot in the end notes. Its 100+ pages of notes manifest a stringent and complete attribution of his borrowings, but a great many of the notes are not simply citations of others work but illuminating tidbits well worth savoring as you plow along the main text.

A new reader will also find that color has not been sacrificed in the rush to meet the obligations of covering so large a battle. My favorite anecdote was one of an untroubled officer on HMS Lion who, unaware that the Germans had truly been sighted, calmly finished preparing his sandwich as action stations were rung. The mental picture formed of his arriving on the bridge with mouth full and hoagie in hand is not unlike someone doing "the wave" in the audience at Ford's Theatre as Lincoln takes his seat.

I mean the 5 stars. I have given 5 copies of this book to people I know, simply to ensure that they might understand the mania for naval history it has fanned in my heart. If there is any justice in this world, this book will enjoy a massive new print run.

This has to be the definitive account!. This brings a new and refreshing perspective on the Jutland controversy, and has caused me to re-revaluate my own idea's on the subject. Be warned though that this is no light account, though it reads very well, the subject matter is for the die-hard naval fanatic, not for the casual reader.

I have always been fascinated with the battle of Jutland and cannot imagine a more in depth and thorough study of it than this. Mr. Gordon not only delves into the historical culture clash and the personalities of the prime actors within the Royal Navy, but he also goes into great depth regarding such technical issues as maximum vessel speeds, gunnery targeting methods and problems, etc. However his primary focus is on the RNs bondage to the Signal Book and the resultant impact on individual initiative and co-ordination in battle.

I agree with much of what the previous reviewers have said, however I take issue with "Jeremy's" assertion that Mr. Gordon "tries hard to defend Beatty". I came away with just the opposite impression. While Mr. Gordon does give Beatty credit where credit is due he takes great pains to lay much of the blame for the mistakes made and the losses incurred directly at Adm. Beatty's feet. He points out that Beatty inexplicably failed to meet with Evan-Thomas (RA5BS) prior to the battle when such a meeting was not only crucial to the two admirals understanding each other, but primarily Beatty's responsibility as the overall commander. He also failed to even supply Evan-Thomas with a copy of his standing fleet battle orders, an incredible oversight. Beatty's positioning of the 5th Battle Squadron (under Adm. Evan-Thomas) as he approached Hippers battle cruiser fleet as though he were on peace time exercise probably cost the loss of the British battle cruiser Indefatigable who would not have had to bear the brunt of so much German gunfire had they had the 5BS battleships to contend with sooner. Beatty's retention of an incompetent and sycophantic signals officer, even after he caused serious problems through signalling mistakes in two prior battles, was one of the prime causes of Evan-Thomas's tardy turn to the north. And finally Beatty's less than stellar handling of his fleet when Jellicoe finally did arrive with the Grand Fleet in no way sheds a good light on him. So I find it hard to agree that Gordon tried at all to defend Beatty. I am not a big fan of Adm. Beatty who I view as a WWI Royal Navy version of WWIIs Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery; more interested in self promotion than good results. However that does not mean that he was without abilities and deserves no credit whatsoever.

In any event I highly recommend this book to anyone who is a serious student of history. For those of you who only have a casual interest you will probably find the book too detailed and wearisome. But that very detail is what I found so absorbing about this book

The only major fleet engagement of WWI was the Battle of Jutland between UK Grand Fleet and the Imperial German High Seas Fleet on May 31st 1916. The battle was a strategic victory for the UK by virtue of the fact that the Royal Navy didn't lose it. Yet the battle was very costly especially for the UK and considered tactically indecisive. The failure of the quantitatively and qualitatively superior Grand Fleet to decisively defeat the Germans been the stuff of controversy and second guessing since the battle. More than a score of really good books have been produced on Jutland and numerous articles have been written: some impartial and others having specific positions on the different sides of the controversy (usually Jellicoe versus Beatty).

This book stands out however in that it takes a fresh look not only at the battle itself, but at the Royal Navy as a cultural institution. It is Gordon's contention that the senior leadership and command and control system displayed at Jutland directly reflected a peacetime navy culture. In his view, the Royal Navy more or less unchallenged for almost 100 years (1815 to1914), developed a mentality that encouraged spit and polish, equated seamanship with quick sail and rigging work, and insisted on absolute obedience to superiors for all personnel. As steam replaced sail good seamanship came to be defined as maintaining accurate station keeping and being able to execute synchronized maneuvers promptly on command. Precision fleet maneuvers (steam tactics) were made possible by establishing a highly centralized command (the aptly named 'flag ship') and the excessive use of signal flags (RN Signal Book) to direct every ship's movements under virtually all circumstances. Precise fleet maneuvers, spotless ships, and prompt obedience to orders were valued over accurate gunnery. The individual initiative and flexible response to changing situations that characterized Royal Navy officers of Nelson's time were not only forgotten, but actively discouraged.

Gordon maintains that the Grand Fleet (including its more racy Battle Cruiser Fleet) that steamed into the Battle of Jutland, in spite of its modern ships, carried the cultural baggage of the Victorian era . And that its Admiral, Sir John Jellicoe, was very much a product of the peacetime navy who valued tight control and strict discipline coupled with risk avoidance over a probable, but uncertain decisive victory. Admiral Sir David Beatty did demonstrate some command initiative in opening the battle, but failed in his essential mission of keeping Jellicoe informed of the locations and directions of the German High Seas Fleet. In the end keeping the Grand Fleet in being as an overwhelming naval force was probably the best that could have been hoped for in this battle. And this Jellicoe did.

This book is truly the only book you will ever have to read if you ever wonder what happened on that late afternoon in 1916. It reads as a novel, it is razor sharp in its analysis, it will be absolutely impossible to put down once you have started to read. If only all books were as well written, I tend to say. Few books in my life has taken me as a reader so fatherly, so gently and with such warmth and led me through a historical event as this title has, it is an absolutely stunning performance in historical narrative. To simply say "it was a good read" is an understatement. I have read it many times, and I have just started to read it once more. There are a few books in ones life that can be of that callibre, like Dickens "A Christmas Carrol" at Christmas or Hellers "Catch 22" or even Homer, but just once in a while you as a reader stumbles over and find that gem, that shining pearl, that will then follow you as a companion, a friend, as you live your life. For me this is just that kind of a book, a companion and friend you just love to spend some time with and just love to meet again. I just love this book, and I truly believe that you will as well, and if you only find the book half of what I found it to be, you will still be able to say; that was a good read!

There are four major points in this book that neither the publicity prose nor the earlier reviewers emphasize, and I focus on these because they are the heart of the book and the core of its value:

1) Peacetime breeds officers, systems, and doctrine that are unlikely to stand the empirical test of war. As the author notes, every incompetent in war has previously been promoted to his or her high rank in peacetime. Systems are adopted without serious battle testing or interoperability (and intelligence) supportability being assured, and doctrine takes a back seat to protocol and keeping up appearances.

2) Technologists are especially pernicious and dangerous to future warfighting capability when they are allowed to promulgate new technology under ideal peacetime conditions, and not forced to stand the test of battle-like degradation and the friction of real-world conditions.

3) Doctrine based on the lessons of history rather than the pomp of peacetime is the ultimate insurance policy.

4) Robust--even intrusive and pervasive--communications (signaling) in peacetime is almost certain to denigrate healthy doctrinal development, has multiple pernicious effects on the initiative and development of individual commanders, and can have catastrophic consequences when it is severely degraded in wartime and the necessary doctrinal foundation and command initiative are lacking.

Other books I recommend for those who wish to have effective militaries:
House of War: The Pentagon and the Disastrous Rise of American Power
War is a Racket: The Antiwar Classic by America's Most Decorated Soldier
The Fifty-Year Wound: How America's Cold War Victory Has Shaped Our World
Defense Facts of Life: The Plans/Reality Mismatch
Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War
On the Psychology of Military Incompetence
Modern Strategy
Uncomfortable Wars Revisited (International and Security Affairs Series)
Wars of Blood and Faith: The Conflicts That Will Shape the 21st Century
The Transformation of War: The Most Radical Reinterpretation of Armed Conflict Since Clausewitz

These and many other non-fiction books and related images are linked back to Amazon but the reviews are much more easily sortable and searchable, a service Amazon has declined to provide for year. Search for Public Intelligence Blog.

As thoroughly as I have read about Jutland and dreadnought-era ships, fire control and strategy, yet I found so much in this book that was new to me. As Gordon himself admits, he was surprised to find untilled soil.

Gordon takes more of a biographical/interpersonal perspective. He shows how two completely different schools of thought grew up almost side-by-side in the RN, but not able to understand each other. One school emphasized absolute, unconditional obedience, the other emphasized independent action. Gordon explains how this massive disconnect lead to Evan-Thomas (5BS) going the wrong way as Beatty (BCF) turned into action at the outset of Jutland, leading immediately to 2 of the 3 battlecruiser losses while the 5BS were on the horizon.

Much time is spent tying Jutland to the infamous sinking of the old battleship Victoria, and the loss of her admiral Tryon. I was familiar with the episode but not the considerable back-story of how Tryon attempted to put the Navy on the road to independence of action, rather than (as Jellicoe tried to do) control two dozen dreadnoughts in detail across miles of smokey sea using flags.

In between the (occasionally long-winded) life stories, Gordon gives us a fresh technical analysis that ties contemporary navigation logs to incontrovertible waypoints (the location of wrecks). The results are surprising.

Overall, Gordon's book is very unforgiving of Scheer, who (in Gordon's view) blundered twice into the "T" of the Grand Fleet. Hipper comes off very well. Gordon tries hard to defend Beatty, but his stationing of Evan-Thomas on the horizon is hard to forgive, and precipitated the BCF's problems for the whole afternoon. He shows that Jellicoe arranged his fleet to prefer a deployment to port, thus diminishing the one really important decision that JJ made.

For battle trivia, of which there is an enormous quantity, I enjoyed "Jutland 1916" more. "Jutland, the German Perspective" is also worth reading.