Customer Reviews

Running the War in Iraq: an Australian general, 300,000 troops, the bloodiest conflict of our time

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In my army, Jim Molan had the reputation (reinforced by brief acquaintance in my case) of being a somewhat original thinker by the standards of his peers amongst Australian generals, but of being impressed by his own brilliance to an even greater degree. His account of what was - for an Australian senior officer of the time - a somewhat unique experience in a senior staff appointment (not exactly command as he implies) in Iraq in 2004-5 is informative and straightforward and will be of some interest to those seeking an insight into higher command in modern military operations. He is forthright in describing the issues and pressures faced at the operational level of war, although somewhat too eager to describe his own role in glowing terms with little reflection or admission of failure on his part (unless you count his regret at not sacking a relatively junior officer earlier) - the reader expecting a level of honesty and humanity found in, say, Slim's Defeat Into Victory: Battling Japan in Burma and India, 1942-1945 will be sorely disappointed. At least he does not adopt the parochial tone of a lot of Australian military writing and take cheap shots at US practice or personnel from a safe distance - Molan is forthright and accurate in acknowledging the burden carried by US soldiers at all levels in Iraq and the adaptability of US forces, and equally forthright in describing what he considers Australian shortcomings in comparison.

Molan's views and "lessons learnt" on modern warfare and COIN are generally sensible if unremarkable, and unlike some outstanding works by senior officers there is probably little for the junior officer/NCO or interested civilian to take away - with one exception that makes a chapter of this book of interest to a much wider audience. His discussion of the principles and application of rules of engagement and the process for deciding how and whether to target significant individuals (eg insurgent leaders, the most notable in the case being Zarqawi) before and during the November 2004 assault on Fallujah is extremely candid and accurate (if my experience with similar issues elsewhere is any guide). I would recommend this as the best "layman's" account of these activities and an almost essential read for anyone wishing to enter an informed discussion on the pros and cons of targeting insurgent or terrorist leaders with UAV's, airstrikes or Special Forces.

Whatever the merits of the book, the title is appalling hyperbole and I shudder to think what my US Army and USMC colleagues (some of whom were a bit closer to the sharp end at Fallujah and elsewhere than the author) would think of it. Hopefully they are too polite to tell me...