Product Details
Would you like to update product info or give feedback on images?
|
|
Share your thoughts with other customers:
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Most Helpful Customer Reviews
29 of 31 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
The Russo-Japanese War; More than just a footnote,
By A Customer
This review is from: Russia Against Japan, 1904-1905: A New Look at the Russo-Japanese War (Hardcover)
The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 would hardly be more than a footnote in most history books were it not for the momentous events that occured after it. This conflict provided glimpses of the causes and carnage of both World Wars I and II. Westwood calls his book a "new look" so presumably there are new interpretations and conclusions for the reader to discover. By his own admission this is not the definitive book on the war nor is it meant to be "scholarly." Perhaps his most interesting idea is the mistake the Russians made by negotiating for peace to quickly. The war started because Russia's terriotorial gains in Manchuria threatened Japan. Like all of the great powers at the end of the 19th century Russia took whatever she could from the decrepid Chinese. After occupying Port Arthur, a natural naval base at the end of a pennisula in the Yellow Sea, the Japanese decided that such an occupation could lead to further gains in Korea. Korea was truly the "dagger aimed at the heart of Japan." When it became clear that the Russians were there to stay the war became inevitable. The Japanese leaders realized that they could not prevail in a long war against a major European power like Russia. Japan's navy, though modern and well-trained, was inferior to the Russians and her ships could not be replaced. While there were many land battles in the war the critical strategic objective for both sides was to control the Yellow Sea and the narrow strait between Japan and Korea. If the Russians could maintain a fleet in Port Arthur and Vladivostok they could prevent the landing or at least the resupply of Japan's army in Korea The war opened with surprise attack by the Japanese on the Russian ships in Port Arthur. Just as she was to do in World War II, Japan needed to strike quick and hard to avoid an unwinnable long war. The Russians were handicapped throughout the War by a lack of support at home and especially by poor admirals and generals. The most capable admiral was killed early in the war and his successors allowed the ships to rot in Port Arthur (after one half-hearted attempt to escape) where they were eventually sunk by Japanese land-based artillery. A relief squadron of brand new but untrained and uncoordinated battleships sailed from the Baltic to break the Japanese strangle-hold but the entire Russian fleet was destoyed in the incredibly decisive battle of Tushima. Peace negotiations began shortly thereafter. Westwood's conclusion that the Russians were in a better position after Tushima and the reverses that she suffered on land is hard to believe. The Russians had lost every single major land and naval battle of the war and there is no reason to believe that she would have prevailed in another. The Russian armies in Manchuria were driven back by the Japanese and could only be supplied over the Trans-Siberian Railway, a 50-day journey from Moscow. No Russian naval ship of any size was within 10,000 miles of the conflict after Tushima. Westwood's conclusion would be more believable if the Russians had shone more military prowess both on land and at sea. Certainly the Japanese were ready for hostilities to end for financial and man-power reasons but their strategic position was far superior to the Russians. Unlike the First World War, this was not a fight to the death. Westwood is correct though in saying that the Russian Baltic Fleet would have been better served if it had been held back as a "fleet in being" and not sacrificed. This lesson was not lost on the naval leaders of the Central Powers ten years later. The War exposed Russia to be an aging and incompetently-led empire. Shortly after the war there were strikes and mutinies and the Czar was forced to relinquish some power to the Duma. Russia's poor performance in the War greatly fueled the fire of developing Bolshevism. The Japanese became a quasi-great power after the war although recognition of this was slow in western political and military circles. Her victory over a major European country increased her appetitie for military aggresion and expansion which was tempered only by her lack of resources and a quickly diminishing dependence on western military technology. The strategic and tactical lessons of the Russo-Japanese War were put to test again by the Japanese in World War II.
1 of 2 people found the following review helpful:
3.0 out of 5 stars
Satisfying read.....for the most part,
By Ricky (Omaha, NE United States) - See all my reviews
This review is from: Russia Against Japan, 1904-1905: A New Look at the Russo-Japanese War (Hardcover)
Before reading J.N. Westwood's book, Russia Against Japan, 1904-05: A New Look at the Russo-Japanese War, my knowledge on the Russo-Japanese war was minimal at best. I knew that Japan had won the war, and in doing so became the first Asian nation to defeat a major European power; other than that I knew next to nothing. In that respect I had much to gain by reading Westwood's book. I have always had a slight interest in this topic, however never enough to hit the stacks to soak in all the knowledge I could. A broad overview was what I was searching for and that is precisely what Westwood provides. His book is short, to the point and well organized, making it an excellent introduction for the layman to pick up and read in a day or two. I did, however, have some issues with how Westwood presented his material and found myself arguing with him quite often. But perhaps that is why I found his book so engaging.
For starters, Westwood is blatantly biased. Throughout his book his makes light of crucial Russian blunders and miscalculations that had disastrous outcomes, causing him to appear more of a Russian sympathizer than a legitimate historian. Staying true to his Russian sympathies, Westwood often describes in great detail what few Russian successes there were, giving odes to Russian heroism. His analysis' of Japanese victories were lacking the same thoroughness, however, and more often then not those victories were chalked up to luck or simple Russian oversights. For example, in his description of the Battle of Liaoyang, which resulted in a Japanese victory, Westwood is excessively critical of Japanese errors: ...it was a close run thing, and the Japanese had no cause for complacency. They had failed to in their main assault on the Russian prepared position. Their units had not always been well-coordinated. Their infantrymen, contrary to the glowing reports sent home by newspaper correspondents, had not everywhere exhibited that highly-praised fanatical courage. Their artillery had been relatively ineffective, and vulnerable to counterbarrage from the Russian guns. (70) Now there is certainly nothing wrong with a little constructive criticism, however I begin to seriously question his objectivity when I compare these statements to those Westwood makes regarding actions of the Russian army during the same battle: ...the gradual deterioration of Russian morale may well have been the decisive factor in the result. As for Kuropatkin's [Commander of Russia land forces] morale, it is clear that he was not at his best when he gave when he gave the order to retire towards Mukden. If he had been more zestful at that time he would have checked the pessimistic reports which reached him. If he had, he would have discovered that the `main position' was still resisting Japanese attacks and likely to do so for some time...Evidently other commanders were under as much strain as Kuropatkin. It has to be remembered that these battles of the Russo-Japanese War placed men and officers under fire for days continuously...(71) So even though Japan won the battle, Westwood apparently believes that this was only possible because General Kuropatkin was simply not having a good day. Perhaps his coffee was not as strong as it usually was, resulting in him not being "zestful" enough to do his job and read the reports pouring in from the front lines describing a dire situation. Or perhaps those pesky battlefield conditions were too much for him and his commanders to bear, after all their Japanese counterparts were not subjected to the same conditions (note the sarcasm). This type of rationale is also contradictory considering that throughout his book Westwood extensively discusses Russian inadequacies of leadership, battle tactics, and weaponry. There are dozens of instances emphasizing Russia's inability to produce on the battlefield. Poor discipline and morale, internal bickering among the field generals, failure to learn from their mistakes (with the exception of the artillery), indecision, fundamental tactical and intelligence blunders, and an "addiction to positional warfare"# are all common themes that underline the inferiority of the Russian military to that of the Japanese. These are the avenues that should have been more thoroughly explored by Westwood rather than attempting to re-write history in a desperate attempt to disprove already established history. Westwood (and many others) cites the ability of Japan to supply the front lines with troops and provisions more efficiently than the Russian as playing the decisive role in ensuring Russian defeat. After reading this book and considering the evidence presented to me, I began to believe that Russian leadership was the cause of more evil then simply passing it off on geography. Certainly Russia struggled with extended supply lines and difficulties in transporting troops over long distances, but these obstacles could have been overcome if the Russian leadership had not underestimated their opponent, displayed flexibility in battle and showed more foresight in preparation for decisive battles. Indeed, after the Japanese surprise attack on the Russian naval squadron at Port Arthur, Nicholas II "shrugged the attack off as a flea bite"# and from the outset the conflict was "regarded by the Russian war ministry as a minor war which did not justify general mobilisation."# Consequently, the most highly trained guard divisions were held back as a safeguard against Polish revolts on the Western borders, leaving reserve troops to handle business against the Japanese. Not only were the reserve troops sent to fight in Manchuria poorly trained, they were often of poor health and unfit for combat duty. Westwood quotes a Russian army doctor: Reservists of the older categories were also mobilized. Before us processed an endless line of rheumatics, emphysematics, the toothless and the varicose. The committee chairman, a brave colonel, frowned and complained that there were so many `protestors.' But what astonished me was the number of the clearly unhealthy who were not `protested' by the army doctors.# Additionally, many of the reservists were "of low morale, vulnerable to seditious propaganda, and liable to suffer heart attacks in mountain operations." These actions by the Russian hierarchy obviously shows a lack of urgency and a lack of respect for the war fighting capabilities of the Japanese army. The decision to use poorly trained, unhealthy troops persuaded me to believe that Russian leadership failed to grasp the seriousness of the situation, thereby ensuring certain defeat. Geography certainly played a role, it was not, however, the decisive role. Although I found Westwood to be delusional at times and frustrating at others, reading his book proved beneficial in the end as it forced me to think about and question some of the statements he makes throughout his book. I likely would not have paid such close attention is it were not for the fact that I argued with Westwood on virtually every page. Although I have a totally different outlook on the Russo-Japanese War than does Westwood, he nevertheless succeeded in keeping me focused in anticipation of what he might say next. Because of this I was provided with an good overview of the Russo-Japanese War and a somewhat educated opinion on the key factors that influenced its outcome.
Share your thoughts with other customers: Create your own review
|
|
Tag this product(What's this?)Think of a tag as a keyword or label you consider is strongly related to this product.
Tags will help all customers organize and find favorite items. |
|
This product's forum
Active discussions in related forums
Search Customer Discussions
|
Related forums
|
