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Russia Against Napoleon: The True Story of the Campaigns of War and Peace

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In this new study about one of the best-known and much-studied periods of history,Dominic Lieven has finally offered us a beautifully-crafted history written from the Russian point of view.It looks like he has combed every possible Russian archive and the result is mesmerizing.
In 1812 Napoleon's army proudly marched and invaded Russia,but only less than two years later,the Russian army was marching into Paris.As the author points out from the very beginning,the personal history of Napoleon during these years,1812-1814,is a "tale of hubris and nemesis".The story contains two of the major battles in European history,Leipzig and Borodino.If at first Napoleon's first army was smashed in the battlefield of Russia, his second was defeated on the battlefields of Germany.To quote,"In the longest campaign in European history,the Russian army pursued the French all the way from Moscow to Paris and led the victorious coalition into the enemy capital on March 21,1814".
Prof.Lieven adds that he is an old-fashioned- historian who has always wanted to tell this story and came to the conclusion that the "story as told in Western Europe and North America was very far from the truth".Thus he set out to correct things and decided that the best way to do it was to write about this era from the Russian perpective.We are also told that three of his direct ancestors were generals in the Battle of Leipzig! The Napoleonic wars occurred at the dawn of modern nationalism and the result is a national bias in the writing of history which exists in all countries especially when it comes to writing about war.
One area of Napoleonic warfare which has attracted too little attention from historians of every nationality is that of logistics,namely the equipment and feeding of armies.One of the key triumphs of the Russian effort was its success in feeding and supplying more than half a million troops outside Russia's borders in 1813-1814.Another factor which is discussed in the book is one greatest hero of the war effort.This was not a human being but an animal:the horse.The horse fulfilled the present-day functions of the tank,the lorry,the aeroplane and motorized artillery."It was the weapon of shock,pursuit,reconnaissance, transport and mobile firepower"(p.7).Napoleon lost almost all the horses with which he invaded Russia.In 1813 he managed to replace the men but finding new horses proved a far more difficult and in the end disastrous problem.It was the lack of cavalry wgich stopped him from winning decisevely in the spring of 1813 campaign and persuaded him to agree to the fatal two-month summer armistice,which contributed so much to his ultimate defeat.The study of the Russian horse industry is discussed here for the first time and is the key part of the present book.How and why Russia overcame the enormous challenge presented by Napoleon is another main feature of this book.Military operations,strategy and diplomacy constitute the core of the book and the basic approach of it is chronological.The author starts with the negotiations at Tilsit 1807 and then commences with the Franco-Russian deal to run Europe until Napoleon's invasion of Russia.In the summer of 1810 the Russians, who were far from trusting Napoleon,sent a number of young and competent officers to Germany in order to gather intelligence.The reasons for this were the words spoken by the French minister of war who boasted that Napoleon's army had never been so well equipped.
The next chapter gives a very long and informative description of Russia's generals and minister of war Aleksei Arakcheev.There are four chapters devoted to 1812 and Borodino and four more chapters on 1813 while the year 1815 gets two chapters.Prof.Lieven discusses in detail the main differences between the two armies.If the Russian army under Alexander the First and Kutuzov was deeply religious and imbued with patriotic themes,the French adversary was
secular and never spoke about patriotism.There was also a partisan warfare in 1812 and the reader is informed that this movement was not the same as the partisan one during the Nazi occupation in 1941-1945.
Another myth dispelled here in the best possible convincing way has to do with the Russian winter-the factor which was regarded so far as responsible for Napoleon's defeat.This was not true and is nonsense, because it was only in December,after the French army had already been destroyed, that the winter became unusually and "ferociously cold"(p.265).However,not only Napoleon's troops suffered tremendous losses.Kutuzov reported to Alexander in December 1812 that the army's losses had been so enormous that he was obliged to hide them not just from the enemy but also from his own officers.A new enemy was at the gates of Russia at the end of 1812:typhus.The disease was rampant among the prisoners of war whom the Russians were capturing in droves and it spread quickly.The main factor which contributed to Napoleon's defeat in 1812-1814 concerns the Russian soldier and officer.The Russian army showed great heroism and suffered immensely in 1812,and the year after the Russian army fought with more skill because of the experience it had gained in 1812.The Russians were skilled and intelligent enough in order to arrive at the conclusion that to remove the enemy threat required taking the war beyond the
country's borders.This was to achieved by recruiting allies.The kudos goes to Alexander, who managed to grab his allies by the scruff of the neck in order to get them to serve their own and Europe's interests.Russian and European security depended on each other.Napoleon's final chance and hope to be the master of Europe by controlling Germany were dashed by the mistakes he and his generals made on the battelfield of Leipzig.Though the allies lost 52000 men at this battle,they fought with more courage and tenacity than their counterparts.Napoleon got back to the Rheine with 85000 men but thousands of them succumbed ,again,to typhus.
How Russia's home front was mobilized against the enemy is discussed in detail.The book also contains sixteen maps-some of them extremely detailed and informative.Although there are many details on each aspect of the Russo-French campaign,the reader never gets bored and has the feeling of actually being on the battlefielld or present during the relevant diplomatic talks. Fresh analysis and insights and a very good and intriguing narrative make this one of the best books written on this fascinating era.

This very good book is a successful revision of the history of the Napoleonic campaign against Russia in 1812 and the ensuing campaigns that led to Napoleon's expulsion from the throne of France. An expert on the the Russian empire, Lieven's reinterpretation is based on what appears to be considerable research in Russian archives and extensive analysis of Russian secondary literature not used in most prior English language books. In contrast to most prior accounts that focus on Napoleon and tend to view the Russians as relatively passive reactors to French actions, Lieven emphasizes the actions and foresight of the Russian leaders, particularly the emperor Alexander I. Lieven argues well that the 1812 French invasion was the result of deliberate Russian decisions to pursue a war that would eventually allow formation of a Prussian-Austrian-Russian alliance against Napoleonic France and that the Russians anticipated and sought a war of attrition on their own soil.

Lieven is particularly good on the complex role of Russian internal politics, the limits on Alexander's freedom of action, and the considerable limitations of the relatively primitive Russian state. In many ways, the best parts of the book are the accounts of how Alexander and his advisers pursued military reform and the administrative apparatus to logistically support the huge effort required by the decision to pursue war with the French. The descriptions of the remarkable efforts undertaken by the Russian state to defend Russia and then to support a large army that moves across much of Europe provide an outstanding look at the power and limitations of European states in this period. Lieven is also very good on the complex diplomatic history, focusing on the difficulties of coalition building among the Russians, Prussians, and Austrians. Alexander I is presented as an intelligent and relatively farsighted diplomat with firm ideas about his ultimate goals and considerable skill in adapting to circumstances. This is particularly well demonstrated by Alexander's key role in assembling and maintaining the coalition for the 1813-1814 campaigns.

Much of this book is solid narrative of the military campaigns and high level diplomacy. The narrative is generally done well and doesn't overpower the more analytical aspects of the book. The narrative of the 1813-1814 campaigns will be unfamiliar to many readers and is particularly informative. The quality of writing is good.

There are some limitations. Much of the book is campaign history and the maps are simply not adequate to adequately complement Lieven's narrative. Lieven tends to write of the efforts of Alexander and other leaders in the language of a conventional balance of power calculus. As he points out, however, these were not modern nations and this is the beginning of modern nationalism. What does national interest mean in such contexts? How did dynastic figures like Alexander, his fellow monarchs, and Napoleon himself think about such things? Its rather unlikely that the illiterate serfs who comprised the Russian armies, men conscripted for a period of 25 years, thought about the conflicts in anything like the terms employed by Lieven. Lieven's terminology is somewhat anachronistic and renders these events more familiar, and perhaps less interesting, than they should be.

As a history buff whose favorite novel is War and Peace, I found this scholarly study, based primarily on recently opened Russian archives, fascinating and enlightening. As the author states several times, our view of the 1812 campaign is heavily influenced by Tolstoy's view of history as a clash of impersonal forces. In fact, as Lieven demonstrates, the Russian conduct of the 1812 campaign was part of a carefully thought out strategy, based on previous experience with Napoleon by Alexander I and Marshall Barclay de Tolly (the leading Russian general at the outset of the campaign, not Kutuzov, who arrived late on the scene). The success of this strategy and the often neglected campaigns of 1813 and 1814 brought about Napoleon's downfall, not the Russian winter.

The author's detailed descriptions of the 1813-1814 campaigns also helps explain the subsequent Vienna settlement. The Congress of Vienna is often described as if the map of Europe were redrawn on a blank sheet of paper. In fact, as Lieven shows, the territorial settlement in Poland, Norway and Germany very much reflected the military situation at the end of the conflict, which resulted from the strategy of Alexander, Barclay and their Prussian, Swedish, and Austrian allies.

The book is very well written and carefully indicates sources without letting the scholarly citations get in the way of the narrative.

Dominic Lieven is perhaps the best, mostly deeply learned historian of imperial Russian politics now practicing in the English-speaking world. This marvelous book offers many insights into Russia's war with Napoleon: it illuminates the personalities of leading Russian statesmen and casts light on the nature of the strategic choices they made between 1812 and 1814 that contributed to Napoleon's defeat; it evaluates fully for the first time the Russian army's tremendous logistical feat in provisioning troops far from Russian borders in 1813 and 1814; above all, it helps us grasp clearly the need to carry the tale of Russia's encounter with Napoleon all the way to his defeat in 1814, rather than stopping the narrative with Napoleon's expulsion from Russia itself in 1812 (as so many previous books have done). Besides all that, Lieven's book is a rollicking good story, told in the style of a master craftsman unafraid to exhibit a sense of humor or to express astonishment over the pivotal events of these bloody years.

This book is well researched and brings many new facts to light. It is likely to remain the reference for a long time on the Russian effort to topple Napoleon from 1812 until his downfall in 1814.
However it reads like a textbook, it's very dry. It did not make me feel the horror of 1812. It did not make me connect with the various characters introduced by the author. The amount of detail was sometimes overwhelming.
It also lacks good maps.
I enjoyed Michael Adam's Napoleon and Russia, which covers the same topic, much better. I also plan to read Adam Zamoyski's Moscow 1812 which I expect to be a good read.
I have the hardcover edition (american edition)and was shocked by the quality of the paper. It's the same as the paper you find in cheap paperbacks. The British hardback edition (which I also own) is far superior.
In conclusion if you have a real interest in the period this book is a must, but if you want to be entertained look elsewhere.

For a History buff, there is simply no greater pleasure than to come across a wholly original treatment of subject matter that has heretofore been overlooked, under-researched, or otherwise neglected, and this book is just such a treasure. Author Lieven brings to our party an undisputed reputation as a Russian history scholar and also just happens to possess an enviably direct writing style that perfectly suits the daunting complexities of the story he tells. And what a story. Just about any one of us bookworms could tell fascinated grandkids the tale of Napoleon's invasion of Russian quickly going awry because of supply and communication problems, fatally complicated by Czar Alexander's decision to fight a defensive war and avoid decisive battles by moving further and further East until the Big Guy just gave up. And then, of course, Providence intervened in the form of the Russian Winter, aided and abetted by pursuing Cossacks and vengeful peasants, making the French Army's return journey something less than a victory lap.

All that we know, and it's from that point that Lieven really takes off and delivers a simply fascinating account of how Alexander decided to pursue Napoleon and improbably persuaded both Prussia and Austria to join in the hunt. There are enough thoughtful reviews for me to add only that I was particularly impressed by Lieven's ability to describe the bafflingly complex troop movements and battle scenarios as the allies chased Napoleon across Europe and to present brief but meaningful portraits of the allied generals and others in ranks to as a means to complete his entirely satisfying portrait of the events and their major players.

I have only a couple of quibbles. First, the maps provided are essentially useless because they are just that: maps of the chosen areas on which are displayed no military force deployments or maneuvers. One wonders why they were included at all. Second, at least I would have liked to read more about the difficulties faced by the retreating French Army on their way out of Russia. Perhaps my curiosity is a bit too morbid, but the story of how a 500,000-man army was reduced to a few thousand stragglers never grows old, not only because of the terrible retribution exacted by the Russians, but also the close to utter indifference of Napoleon to the suffering of his men. That he was able to put together another formidable army within a matter of months goes a long way to explaining the almost mystical power he had over ordinary Frenchmen.

Finally, and to me at least, this book has two `heroes,' Czar Alexander and the anonymous, famously long-suffering Russian soldier. Among the many, many things I acquired in this reading was a new-found appreciation for Alexander. It is true, as I've long understood, that his defeat at Austerlitz bred in him an unshakeable reluctance to assume command of his forces at the several times both his generals and the situations at hand suggested it would be appropriate. But it did not prevent him from making key decisions throughout the years 1812-14 which shaped both the military initiatives of the Allies for the better and formed the basis of their cohesion which eventually resulted in Napoleon's all-too-brief Elba vacation.

Author Lieven spends a good deal of time recounting the exploits of the Russian soldiers engaged in these campaigns, as well he might. His unique research confirmed what the Allies and even their enemies commented at the time: no soldier engaged fought more bravely nor endured hardships more resolutely than the Russian recruit. For more on this subject, and if only to confirm that the typical Russian soldier's fighting ability did not diminish over the ensuing near century and a half, I recommend Catherine Merridale's superb, `Ivan's War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945.' What did change, of course, was the fact that while Czar Alexander and his generals cared very much about the welfare of their troops, Soviet leadership displayed a brutal indifference to their suffering and losses that made Napoleon seem like a mother hen.

All in all, `Russia Against Napoleon' is a book not to be missed by anyone interested in the military history of the period.

Good history, providing a different perspective to the "Napoleon defeated by General Winter" view of his Russian campaigns.

Overall, this is a very readable account, explained clearly, but ruined in the Kindle Edition by complete lack of maps. Honestly, how can anyone make sense of military history without maps?

Alexander I has had a bad reputation as an indecisive leader. This book will do a great deal to rehabilitate this tsar's reputation and will underscore the various strengths and weaknesses of the Russian empire to wage war.

It is important to keep in mind that Alexander was constantly refining his position and determining what would yield the best results. He was a different person in 1805, 1812, and in 1814 as was the Russian Army a different entity as well in all of those years.

The 1805 campaign was a shock to the system of the Russian empire. To face defeat at Austerlitz and the subsequent increase of ties between Russia and France did a great deal to provoke action.

As is the case with Russia (then, during the Soviet period and now), this followed with certain bureaucratic constraints. History has shown that it is very much a function of the leader (be he Tsar, General Secretary or something else) and his ability to pick the right individuals to deal with specific tasks all of which fall within his sphere of coordination. The autocrat proposes and the bureaucracy implements.

Alexander emerges as nothing so much as a juggler of personnel as the Russian empire sought to prepare for the next struggle between 1805-1812. Lieven has masterful command of Russian intelligence work in Paris, the development of key means of waging war, and also the development of strategy and tactics during the period.

The importance of logistics is another matter that has an impact on all aspects of warfare and any person who thinks that the issues associated with logistics can be ignored soon finds himself defeated. This was a major consideration throughout Lieven's narrative. For instance it is a requirement to protect the armaments factories at Tula that informs Kutuzov's decision to allow Moscow to be taken. Large cities can always be replaced with time, armaments factories are more precious than gold during wartime.

Lieven makes no secret of his agenda at the beginning of the book. He is seeking to show just how Russia defeated Napoleon. In demonstrating this process he sets himself against both Tolstoy and Clauswitz on occasion. Lieven shows that it was not just a matter of cold and mud and weather that defeated Napoleon, there was considerable planning before the war that enabled the Russian Army to begin 1812 at Vilna, retreat to Moscow as the French advanced and then to follow the French all the way to Paris in 1814. This does not diminish "War and Peace," the greatest of all Russian novels, as much as it enhances the estimation of the Russian military elite. Shakespeare's history plays are matchless, but poor as representations of actual events.

The story of Russia's defeat of Napoleon can be broken down into several key battles and campaigns. The first is the battle for Russia which includes the battles of Smolensk, Borodino, and finally Berezina. The two crucial factors (which was understood before the invasion) were light calvary and artillery. Here the Russians were fortunate in the first (which included the cossack regiments) and challenged, but ultimately successful in the last.

1813 was about the battle for Germany and was highlighted by the battle of Leipzig, which shattered the notion of Napoleon's invincibility. Driving Napoleon from Poland and Germany also had a negative impact on his ability to restock his supply of horses. Given the necessity of horses in this age of light cavalry this was to have a huge impact on the future of the war.

1814 was the battle of France and this probably was the time of greatest uncertainty in terms of the diplomatic and political objectives, While it appears to be a foregone conclusion that the Bourbons would be replaced on the throne, this, as Lieven demonstrates, was a more complex and fluid situation than one might imagine.

I think that the only flaw in this book is that Lieven does not really address just how the inclusion of the Baltic nobility, whose role in defeating Napoleon is important to his narrative, was viewed by the traditional nobility during Catherine the Great. The fact that Catherine sought to put them on an equal footing was something that was somewhat unpopular is probably something that continues to affect the way historians, both Russian and others, have looked upon their contribution. This is a minor point, however.

Lieven's exploration of the details of conflict is probably one of the best works on the Napoleonic period since David Chandler's definitive studies of the French side. His tireless exploration of archival material does a great deal to change perceptions of the conflict. This is period rich in personalities whose impact continued on beyond just the period of the wars, some maintained positions of responsibility for the subsequent 30-40 year period. This is an excellent book which should interest anyone who takes an interest in the Napoleonic period and the Russian military.

Historian Dominic Lieven has produced a masterpiece of a study. Finally the world's armchair historians have a one-volume narrative that accurately presents Russia's vital contributions to the fall of Napoleon and the subsequent stabilization of Europe. In well-documented detail and with many explanatory asides (three of which are entire chapters), Professor Lieven marches us chronologically through the complete Napoleonic war with Russia from the French invasion of 1812 to the colossal battle of Borodino, the occupation and burning of Moscow, the French retreat under Russian harassment, the complex Leipzig campaign of the allies, and the final diplomatic, political and military storming of Paris. Lieven brings to life a vast array of personalities and localities rarely mentioned in other Western European and North American histories. He explains war tactics and complex political and military decisions in a clear, straightforward style that keeps this vast work from becoming overly academic and overly technical. Actually, Lieven's Chapter 15, "Conclusion," makes a great introduction to the book and the arguments he explores. You may want to read it first.

The bottom line is this: Lieven brings to life the Napoleonic Campaign against Russia and its consequences for Europe, and in the process he gives us a scholarly view of a complex, often mythologized event that determined Western history for two centuries. Both Napoleon and Alexander I sparkle in this presentation of an apocalyptic event that Leo Tolstoy magnificently (if somewhat inaccurately) wove into War and Peace.

The author is professor of Russian History at the London School of Economics and descended from Russian aristocrats, one of them a general and division commander during Czar Alexander's campaigns in 1812-1814.

Relentless detail about battles and heroic Russian soldiers. the superiority of Russian light cavalry and particularly of Russian horses.

Executive summary of the 528 pages:
1. Napoleon planned to dominate Europe politically; also economically with his embargo on everyone's maritime trade, particularly with UK. The west German princelings went along. The Poles saw him as a benevolent liberator from Russia, Prussia, and Austria.
2. He hoped for a knock-out blow to imperial Russia, did not succeed. Russians didn't rise against the Czar when Boney occupied Moscow. French army never quite recovered from the retreat from Moscow.
3. Austria continued to waver between making peace with Boney and making war. Metternich up to no good. Generalfeldmarschall Schwarzenberg and Gen. Radetzky very cautious and slow in action.
4. Britain played its own game, dominating the seas, grabbing French colonies, fighting in Spain, furnishing muskets and money to the Czar.
5. The Czar understood that Napoleon had to be defeated decisively and Paris occupied, France limited to its 1792 borders, to ensure a lasting peace. Any half-way peace keeping Napoleon on the throne and allowing France its "natural" borders (Rhine including Holland and Belgium, Vosges, Pyrenees, and Italy, plus repatriation of captured Grande Armee soldiers) would inevitably allow Napoleon to come back 2 years later, when the Russian army was back in Russia, and start 20 years of war all over again, picking off all the German and Austrian states one by one.
Therefore a knock-out blow was needed against Napoleon, but not against the French people per se: reluctantly, that meant restoring the Bourbon dynasty with Louis XVIII.
6. Blucher and the Prussian troops very important to the campaign. Blucher himself was as impetuous as Schwarzenberg was cautious. Bernardotte was a self-dealing and only partially dependable ally who really wanted the crown of France for himself. The invading Russian army was impressed by the appalling poverty of the Polish countryside, prosperity of Saxony (as in 1945), poverty of rural France.
7. The victory in Paris in 1814 was followed by Napoleon's exile to Elba, the "100 days," and finally Waterloo finished the job.
8. During the 1812-1814 campaigns, to support its army Russia bled Poland dry of money, food, vodka, horses etc. The author has no sympathy for the Poles, expresses some surprise at Polish hatred of the Russians. After the war, Czar Alexander granted the Duchy of Warsaw some freedoms (with himself as king.) Poles were not grateful, and Russian nobles led the Decembrist Revolution against Czar in resentment that Poles had been granted more liberty than they.
9. Russia's autocratic political system, lack of population density, lack of railways, coal, and iron industry, caused it to lag British and western European Industrial Revolution.
10. (Not in the book, my after-word: Bismarck united the German states with Prussia, and in 1870 crushed France. We know the rest - given the Industrial revolution and German ambitions, we subsequently had WW1 and WW2.)

The parallel between Napolean and Hitler is inevitable, but Napoleon did not unleash a racial Holocaust. Useful to see what the world looks like from Russia. If you're Polish, I guess it all depends where you stand.