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Russia Leaves the War: Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920, Vol. I (v. 1)

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Russia Leaves the War, Volume I of George F. Kennan's history of Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920, describes the chaos that the Bolshevik seizure of power produced in US diplomatic circles in the months immediately following the November 1917 revolution. Kennan, who passed away in March 2005, was a leading authority on Soviet-American diplomatic relations and the author of the policy of containment which served as the basis for American policy toward the Soviet Union from the late 1940s to the 1980s.

In Russia Leaves the War, Kennan provides many valuable insights into the earliest diplomatic relations between the US and Soviet governments. Some examples:

The Tsar was deposed in February 1917 and replaced by the Provisional Government led by Alexander Kerensky. This event appears to have been one source influencing the US decision to enter WWI in April 1917 because it allowed President Wilson to present his decision as one to support the forces of democracy against the forces of authoritarianism. (Naturally, Germany's unrestricted submarine warfare and attempts to incite Mexico against the US were also major factors in the decision.)

The perception of Russia by the US in the months following the February Revolution was based on the wildly idealistic and optimistic view that Russia would rapidly develop into a western democracy sharing our values and goals. In reality, Russia had no heritage of democracy and individual liberty remotely comparable to the one we received from England going back at least to Magna Carta (1215).

The treaties creating the Triple Entente (Britain, France and Russia) contained secret provisions regarding territorial adjustments, spheres of influence, and indemnities to be paid by the Central Powers after their defeat. The US was not a party to these treaties and, in fact, insisted on referring to itself as an "associated" rather than "allied" power after entering the war.

In late 1917, Russia was a defeated power. The army was demoralized both by military defeat and Bolshevik agitation; the troops were deserting. The Provisional Government was incapable of simultaneously continuing to fight the Central Powers and establishing itself as the new government of Russia. The Bolsheviks exploited this situation by openly calling for a general peace without annexations or indemnities, without prior consultation with Russia's allies, and by openly publishing and denouncing the secret treaty provisions as imperialist plots. The Bolshevik goals were to rapidly negotiate a separate peace with Germany, consolidate their power in Russia, drive a wedge between their former allies to prevent them from pressuring Russia to continue the war, and to promote communist revolutions throughout Europe by appealing to the masses to rise up against their governments.

The US diplomatic presence in Petrograd in November 1917 was almost as chaotic as the Russian political situation. The US Ambassador, David Francis, the former Mayor of St Louis, Governor of Missouri, and Secretary of the Interior, had little knowledge of either Russia or diplomatic service. Although Francis was, as ambassador, the official representative of the US President to the Russian Government, President Wilson apparently had sufficient misgivings about his ambassador's qualifications that he designated as many as four additional representatives of the US Government to Russia who were to various degrees independent of the Ambassador. The most striking of these independent representatives was "Colonel" Raymond Robins, head of the American Red Cross mission to Russia who attempted, at every opportunity, to influence and maneuver American policy into recognition and support of the Bolshevik regime. The most complimentary description of Robbins is the one provided by Felix Dzerzhinski, head of the Cheka, the Bolshevik secret police, who described Robbins as "...the only true and faithful friend we had among the foreigners...who understood our aims and fully sympathized with us and was ready to support our government...".

Having destroyed the Russian army, Lenin was in a bind. He reached a truce with the Germans to temporarily halt fighting on the eastern front. In the negotiations of a peace treaty at Brest-Litovsk, the Bolsheviks under Trotsky's lead took a hard negotiating position demanding no annexations of formerly Russian controlled territory. When the Germans refused, Trotsky declared the negotiations ended and that there would be "no war, no peace" in the naïve belief that the Germans would not pursue their military advantage. As the Germans approached the then-capital of Petrograd (St Petersburg), Lenin had to step in to demand that his colleagues accept whatever terms the Germans chose to offer.

In the meantime, the Allied powers had been shipping huge amounts of military supplies to Russia via Vladivostok in the Far East. As the Bolsheviks consolidated their power over other Russian factions while caving in to all German demands, fear grew that these supplies might be seized and transferred to the Germans. The British and French both approached the Japanese, also an allied power, to suggest an allied occupation of Vladivostok and a portion of the Trans-Siberian Railway. The Japanese were only too eager to cooperate but wanted an American approval or, at least, a statement of no objection. After a significant period of dithering in March 1918, in which a statement of "no objection" was drafted and shown to the British and French, President Wilson notified the Japanese that the US could not support an intervention in Russian affairs because it might antagonize the Russian people and drive them into alliance with the Germans. To prevent or delay this intervention, the Bolsheviks were actively hinting through Robins that if the US would keep the Japanese from intervening in the Far East, they might not ratify the Brest-Litovsk Treaty which would result in a Russian resumption of the war with Germany. Kennan leaves no doubt that this was a tactical maneuver without any intent to actually delay ratification. As long as Lenin was leading the Bolsheviks, the US, Britain, and France were viewed as enemies along with Germany. At this point, the Bolsheviks ratified the Brest-Litovsk Treaty and the book ends. Presumably the tale continues in Volume II, The Decision to Intervene.

Kennan is not only a master diplomat; he is also an accomplished historian and superb writer. Russia Leaves the War is a valuable addition to the history of the formation of the Soviet Union and ranks along with Richard Pipes' The Russian Revolution and Russia Under the Bolshevik Regime as essential to understanding this period.

Although everyone recognizes Kennan's historical impact and knowledge, too little is said about his talent and skill as a writer. This book is a reminder of his exquisite talent.