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Russia's War is far from a tale of triumph, as the Russian capacity for resourceful creativity, desperate courage, and raw endurance was matched, if not exceeded, by the brutal oppression of the Soviet system. Overy argues, however, that victory was the result of precisely this uneasy combination. Drawing from extensive archival sources made available in the wake of glasnost, he revises both our conception of the Red Army as a horde that overwhelmed the Germans and the accepted wisdom that Hitler's defeat was the result of strategic bungling and a logistical overreach of the Nazi forces. Perhaps his most poignant contribution is the discussion of the crisis that recent disclosures have provoked in the Russian understanding of the conflict. What was once viewed by the Soviets as the "Great Patriotic War" has become "a crucible of miserable and incomprehensible revelations." In spite of these confusions, Russia's War commences to find significance in a contest that repeatedly disquiets and humbles the historical imagination. --James Highfill
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By every account Hitler made exactly the right move at the right time; he had just whipped the French and British armies in western Europe without raising a sweat. Just months before the invasion the Russians had been stopped successfully and quite unexpectedly by a much smaller and more poorly equipped Finn army. Thus, no one expected the Russian army to be able to stop or stem the smashing successes of the Germans some 200 divisions strong as they literally flooded through Poland into Russia in Operation Barbarossa, destroying everything in sight. Yet, with unbelievable determination and equally incomprehensible losses, the Russians eventually began to halt the Wehrmacht advance. Finally, with newly established and quickly trained armies raised even as the Nazis drew near Moscow, Stalin and his armies began the long, tortuous, and painstaking turnaround that eventually helped to save the world. That they did so is without question an accurate summation of the situation. Throughout 1941, 1942, and 1943 the rest of the Allies were simply in no position to seriously challenge Hitler's stranglehold in Europe.
It is clear that without the Soviet prosecution of the war along the Eastern front, an Allied invasion of Europe would have been much more difficult, if not impossible. The war would have been extended by years. Yet the story Overy tells here is not a simple story of unexpected Soviet courage and success in the face of unbelievable odds; it is also a tale that details decades of wanton brutality within Russia itself, a nation hampered by its own trail of wave upon wave of murderous progroms and purges. The antiquated Soviet army was so devastated by the systematic extermination of the upper echelons of the Officer core that almost no one with any combat experience remained in leadership positions by the time the German blitzkreig began. Under such circumstances, the ability of the Russians to stem the tide of battle and turn it to their advantage becomes a much more interesting and complicated phenomenon to watch and understand. This is a carefully crafted and well-documented narrative that deserves your studious attention. For any serious student of the second world war, this book is a must-read. Enjoy!
1. Overy's history finely balances detail and overview. He neither clutters the story with endless tales of carnage and missery nor is the brutal horror, unleashed by the Nazi aggressors as well as the Soviets' own regime, missing from the book. On the strategic level, Richard Overy manages to make the reader grasp the few really decisive campaigns in this long and complicated conflict.
2. The key Soviet players come to live. It's not just Stalin (on whom he offers insights, which were new to me) or Georgi Zhukov but also the second tier of national and military leaders. The human side of the Soviet key players and the psychological climate in the Soviet Union comes back to life. He shows what Stalin, Zhukov and the others did to reverse the odds within 18 months.
3. The book doesn't start on 22 June, 1941 and ends on 9 May, 1945. Richard Overy devotes a substantial part of the book to the civil war and the period leading up to the war in Europe. He dicusses to early problems of the regime in the Soviet Union, the foreign aggression against them (e.g. Poland's invasion of Soviet territory in 1920) and the terror of the Stalinist regime before the war which consumed the lives of many millions of Russians, Ukrainians and other nationalities. Also, he describes the immediate period after the war, when Ukrainian rebels continued a bloody campaign into the Fifties.
Last but not least I would like to mention the moderate price. It's imperative reading for the professional historian as well as anybody interested in the subject. Very recommendable indeed!
Apparently, Overy did not spend any time in the archives. You will not find any documents or references to them in this book. It's based mostly on secondary sources. The entire narrative seems to rely too much on various memoirs and biographies, which makes the point of view rather skewed in favor of those players whose memoirs Overy had read.
The resulting quality of the work is uneven. Overy does use new research extensively and dispels many myths. For example, Soviet casualty figures and the number of GULAG's prisoners come from reliable sources based on declassified archival data. On the other hand, Overy puts too much stock in works of dubious revisionists like Boris Sokolov, who provided an alternative view on Soviet casualties and significance of Lend Lease. Where Overy's sources pre-date the opening of Russian archives, old incorrect stereotypes abound.
The books is full of minor and not so minor errors. At first glance it seems there is a mistake every 3-4 pages. For example, Overy claimed that the main attack in Op. Bagration was to come from the 2nd and 3rd Belorussian fronts, when in fact the main blow was delivered by the 1st Belorussian front. There are numerous other military mistakes. There are also many errors related to politics. For some reason he assumed that there was no Soviet partisan movement in Ukraine because the nationalist partisans did not let them penetrate (p. 150). In fact, nationalist guerillas controlled only a small portion of the Western Ukraine, the rest was controlled by Soviet partisans. Then there is also a matter of him consistently calling Lvov a Polish city -- I don't think Ukrainians will appreciate that.
Overy also allows himself to theorize about the differences between Russian and Western societies. His conclusions are too simplistic.
Other minor details: Maps are too few and with some errors. Photos are of low quality (too dark) and with errors in their captions (e.g. a procession of supposed Ukrainians with a banner written in Belorussian). Many Russian last names are misspelled.
In short, if you're interested in military aspects of history, this book is not for you. "When Titans Clashed" is a lot better than this. I'm giving it 3 stars only because it does contain some new and valuable information not available to regular readers of military periodicals.
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