Customer Reviews

Russia's War: A History of the Soviet Effort: 1941-1945

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3 star:		(5)
2 star:		(2)
1 star:		(1)

 

 

I am a confirmed fan of Overy's work, especially after reading his tome on "Why the Allies Won", in which he carefully examines the real reasons the Allies succeeded in a war that was much more closely contested than many observers appreciate. Here he concentrates on what has to be considered the most unlikely reversal of fortune in 20th century war history, the catastrophic yet also heroically successful defense, repulsion, and vanquishing of the Wehrmacht along a war front that was literally thousands of miles long. Against all odds, losing army after army in the prosecution of the war, with millions of combatants and non-combatants killed, woundeded, or captured from the moment of the opening salvos in the summer and fall of 1941, the Russians' capacity for absorbing unrelenting and murderous punishment at the hands of the brutal assaults of a supremely confident and well-equipped Nazi army stunned the world.

By every account Hitler made exactly the right move at the right time; he had just whipped the French and British armies in western Europe without raising a sweat. Just months before the invasion the Russians had been stopped successfully and quite unexpectedly by a much smaller and more poorly equipped Finn army. Thus, no one expected the Russian army to be able to stop or stem the smashing successes of the Germans some 200 divisions strong as they literally flooded through Poland into Russia in Operation Barbarossa, destroying everything in sight. Yet, with unbelievable determination and equally incomprehensible losses, the Russians eventually began to halt the Wehrmacht advance. Finally, with newly established and quickly trained armies raised even as the Nazis drew near Moscow, Stalin and his armies began the long, tortuous, and painstaking turnaround that eventually helped to save the world. That they did so is without question an accurate summation of the situation. Throughout 1941, 1942, and 1943 the rest of the Allies were simply in no position to seriously challenge Hitler's stranglehold in Europe.

It is clear that without the Soviet prosecution of the war along the Eastern front, an Allied invasion of Europe would have been much more difficult, if not impossible. The war would have been extended by years. Yet the story Overy tells here is not a simple story of unexpected Soviet courage and success in the face of unbelievable odds; it is also a tale that details decades of wanton brutality within Russia itself, a nation hampered by its own trail of wave upon wave of murderous progroms and purges. The antiquated Soviet army was so devastated by the systematic extermination of the upper echelons of the Officer core that almost no one with any combat experience remained in leadership positions by the time the German blitzkreig began. Under such circumstances, the ability of the Russians to stem the tide of battle and turn it to their advantage becomes a much more interesting and complicated phenomenon to watch and understand. This is a carefully crafted and well-documented narrative that deserves your studious attention. For any serious student of the second world war, this book is a must-read. Enjoy!

Richard Overy is a professor of modern history at King's College, London. His "Russia's War" is to my (limited) knowledge the first account of the second world war from a Soviet perspecive after the opening of Russian archives. The book is notable for three reasons:

1. Overy's history finely balances detail and overview. He neither clutters the story with endless tales of carnage and missery nor is the brutal horror, unleashed by the Nazi aggressors as well as the Soviets' own regime, missing from the book. On the strategic level, Richard Overy manages to make the reader grasp the few really decisive campaigns in this long and complicated conflict.

2. The key Soviet players come to live. It's not just Stalin (on whom he offers insights, which were new to me) or Georgi Zhukov but also the second tier of national and military leaders. The human side of the Soviet key players and the psychological climate in the Soviet Union comes back to life. He shows what Stalin, Zhukov and the others did to reverse the odds within 18 months.

3. The book doesn't start on 22 June, 1941 and ends on 9 May, 1945. Richard Overy devotes a substantial part of the book to the civil war and the period leading up to the war in Europe. He dicusses to early problems of the regime in the Soviet Union, the foreign aggression against them (e.g. Poland's invasion of Soviet territory in 1920) and the terror of the Stalinist regime before the war which consumed the lives of many millions of Russians, Ukrainians and other nationalities. Also, he describes the immediate period after the war, when Ukrainian rebels continued a bloody campaign into the Fifties.

Last but not least I would like to mention the moderate price. It's imperative reading for the professional historian as well as anybody interested in the subject. Very recommendable indeed!

One can't help but compare this book with David Glantz's and Jonathan House's "When Titans Clashed". Both of these works are fairly new, based on newly available material, and attepmpt to capture the Soviet experience in WW2 in one volume (which is hopeless, the conflict was too large for that). The main difference is that where Glantz's book focuses on the military aspects, Overy spends more time on the political and human side of the story.

Apparently, Overy did not spend any time in the archives. You will not find any documents or references to them in this book. It's based mostly on secondary sources. The entire narrative seems to rely too much on various memoirs and biographies, which makes the point of view rather skewed in favor of those players whose memoirs Overy had read.

The resulting quality of the work is uneven. Overy does use new research extensively and dispels many myths. For example, Soviet casualty figures and the number of GULAG's prisoners come from reliable sources based on declassified archival data. On the other hand, Overy puts too much stock in works of dubious revisionists like Boris Sokolov, who provided an alternative view on Soviet casualties and significance of Lend Lease. Where Overy's sources pre-date the opening of Russian archives, old incorrect stereotypes abound.

The books is full of minor and not so minor errors. At first glance it seems there is a mistake every 3-4 pages. For example, Overy claimed that the main attack in Op. Bagration was to come from the 2nd and 3rd Belorussian fronts, when in fact the main blow was delivered by the 1st Belorussian front. There are numerous other military mistakes. There are also many errors related to politics. For some reason he assumed that there was no Soviet partisan movement in Ukraine because the nationalist partisans did not let them penetrate (p. 150). In fact, nationalist guerillas controlled only a small portion of the Western Ukraine, the rest was controlled by Soviet partisans. Then there is also a matter of him consistently calling Lvov a Polish city -- I don't think Ukrainians will appreciate that.

Overy also allows himself to theorize about the differences between Russian and Western societies. His conclusions are too simplistic.

Other minor details: Maps are too few and with some errors. Photos are of low quality (too dark) and with errors in their captions (e.g. a procession of supposed Ukrainians with a banner written in Belorussian). Many Russian last names are misspelled.

In short, if you're interested in military aspects of history, this book is not for you. "When Titans Clashed" is a lot better than this. I'm giving it 3 stars only because it does contain some new and valuable information not available to regular readers of military periodicals.

In his introduction to Russia's War the author notes: "In twenty years' time it may be possible at last to write something approaching a definitive history. Current writing has a provisional air to it, and this book is no exception." Therein lies the problem for the reader wishing to devote one books worth of reading time to arguably one of the most important historical events of the last hundred years. Where should one start?

Overy himself recognizes the contributions of John Erickson and David Glantz, "who have done more than any other Western scholars to communicate to the non-Russian world the fruits of Soviet and post-Soviet research". Knowing this I assembled the following list of candidates: Russia's War (1997) by Overy, When Titans Clashed (1995) by Glantz and House, The Road to Stalingrad (1975) and The Road to Berlin (1983) by Erickson, and the classic Russia at War 1941-1945 (1964) by Alexander Werth (who was a correspondent in the Soviet Union from 1941-1948). While I was considering my decision I encountered an exchange of letters in the New York Review of Books between Anthony Beevor, author of Stalingrad, and a reviewer over the accuracy of his book in light of recent work by Glantz. In the end I chose Russia's War. If there was no definitive work at least I wanted the book that had access to the latest sources.

First the positive. Overy is very good at bringing recent evidence to controversial and muddied (often by Stalinist and Soviet propaganda) issues. An example is the effect of Lend Lease. For years its importance was denied. Overy notes a bugged conversation of Marshall Zhukov recorded in 1963 but released in 1993. Here, according to Overy, Zhukov "endorsed" the view that without Lend Lease the Soviet Union 'could not have continued the war'. He is also good at identifying where there are holes in the evidence, making possible only tentative conclusions or future mysteries to be solved.

Another strength is the scope of the book. The coverage is vast. He literally seems to deal with everything. Particularly valuable are the last chapter, The Cult of Personality: Stalin and the Legacy of the War, and the epilogue, Russia's War: Myth and Reality. By continuing the story past 1945, after having started the story during Civil War, Overy situates Russia's War in the middle of our historical consciousness and it is here that I begin to have a problem.

One of the reason I would recommend that everyone study this war is its shear horror and the magnitude of that horror. There are certainly heroic actions and temporary heroes but in the end everyone is doomed: the fascists and the communists, the losers and the winners, the guilty and the innocent. Most of all it is the ordinary people: the Poles, the Jews, the Ukrainians, the other Nationalities, the Germans. the Russians. There was no place to hide. After the war, Stalin actually purged the generals who won the war.

All this is included. But I can't help feeling that something is missing. The wealth of information often seems like it is being presented by an accountant. The human element seems lost. Perhaps it's unfair to ask this of the author when he's done so much. Perhaps I've just become numb. Secondly, there was one survivor: Stalin. Though detailing many of individual events of his reign of terror, Overy refuses to connect the dots. Stalin's presence looms so large that the book could have been called Stalin's War or Stalin's Russia, yet we are left to draw our own conclusions, search for our own meaning.

Overall this is a good book. I don't know if there is a better one available. I will certainly use its fine notes and bibliography as a reference. But I will continue to look at the other candidates on my list for greater understanding and to see if it's possible for a non-fiction work on this subject to do what I have asked it to do. I will also turn to Life and Fate by Vasily Grossman. Written by 1960 and finally published in the Soviet Union in 1988, Overy calls it "one of the greatest novels on war in any language". Maybe here I will find what seems to be missing.

Richard Overy is the author of the interesting and provocative work "Why the allies won". Which is an examination of the broader issues around the comparative strength of the Germans and the Allies at critical points in the Second World War. He is thus no fool a deep thinker and a person with an encyclopedic grasp of the period.

This book is however a companion to a series of film documentaries which were produced by British Television to dramatize the course of the war on the Eastern Front. The book as such reflects this and it has a strongly narrative structure rather than an analytical structure. The illustrations in the book interestingly enough are freeze frames from newsreel footage.

The books promotional material suggests that the book is the first full length portrayal of the war from the Soviet side. This in fact is not the case Erickson's "The Road to Stalingrad" came out in 1985 and Glantz's "When Titans Clashed" came out in 1995. Both are superior works using extensive Russian material. The promotional claim is odd as both these books are cited in the bibliography.

The main focus of the book is on three main battles, Barbarossa, Stalingrad and Kursk. Backhand Blow, Operation Mars are not really discussed and the battles from 1944 on are discussed in a summary way. The book is about the same length as Glantz's but were as Glantz uses words in a sparing way this books use of description means that it has far less content.

The narrative structure tends to state points simply and to try to say things in a dramatic way. This may contribute to its readability for some. All in all a readable book but in reality it is a film companion and nothing much more.

`Russia's War' is a riveting, fact-filled history of the Russian experience in WW2. British historian, Richard Overy takes the reader first through the pre-war years in Soviet Russia, and continues with a chronological account of the war on the eastern front. This is a military as well as a political history. Not only does he thoroughly describe all the major battles such as Barbarossa, Moscow, Leningrad, Stalingrad, Kursk, and Berlin, but he also highlights the internal workings of the Soviet state from it's inception until the end of the war. The terror, collectivization, consolidation of power by Stalin and the Bolsheviks, the gulag system, the role of the NKVD, relations with the western allies, and the general plight of the average Russian under communism are all explained in detail. The book is ten years old, but the only implication would be to consider that new information is continuously being released from once secret Soviet archives, thus a few minor details could be subject to change.

I've always taken for granted the fact that the Red Army was every bit as cruel as the Wehrmacht, and that the entire Soviet state was just as "bad" as the Nazi state. The NKVD in particular, was guilty of unspeakable atrocities-on their own people as well as their enemies-that make Abu Ghraib look like a day at Disneyland. There seems to be a significant group of people who resent this comparison though, and would have us believe that Stalin, and by extension the whole Bolshevik movement, was somehow morally superior to Hitler's invading armies. Richard Overy knows better. This is not to say that the intent of `Russia's War' is to demonize the Red Army in any way; in fact it is an excellent example of objective history that duly describes the positive and negative characteristics of the Soviet war machine. In regards to fighting ability and effectiveness, Overy actually gives much more credit to the Red Army than many previously have. He's skeptical of the conclusion that the Russian victory was merely a result of more plentiful resources and numerical superiority, and describes how the Red Army dramatically improved their tactical and strategic effectiveness as the war went on. This evolution, according to Overy, together with the well-known tenacity and fanatical resistance of the Russian soldier, is what won the war on the eastern front. That being said, the American Lend-Lease program is also described as a much bigger contributor than the Soviets admit.

The book appropriately ends on the note of Stalin's legacy and his cult of personality. Although Overy praises his skill as political and military strategist, he describes the horrific consequences of his paranoid and vengeful mentality. Despite the brief glory and jubilation of the immediate post-war victory, the plight of the Russian people under Stalin became even worse after the war, as Stalin plunged the country into a "second dark age." Overy really captures the enormous sacrifice and suffering of the Russian people. As someone who has little sympathy for anything Soviet, I have to concede a grudging respect for the Russian people in this regard. He is also convincing in describing how the Red Army is primarily responsible for the defeat of Nazi Germany, a fact that the Russians felt was not properly acknowledged by their allies in the west. Overall, although some of his conclusions are certainly debatable, his general analysis and description of events is outstanding. So if you are looking for a concise, objective work on the Soviet experience in WW2, look no further than `Russia's War.' Five stars.

Overy's book is more about the Why of the Soviet War with Nazi Germany and its allies, than any kind of detailed picture of day by day or even month by month events in the war. Nor does it focus solely on military activities in the way a book oriented to what I consider hideous "war buffs" would. So for those with an almost pornographic desire to learn the minutiae of military operations, weapons, etc, this book will be a disappointment.

Bigger questions were involved in the war, and this is Overby's concern as in his masterpiece that I high recommend _Why the Allies Won__

This is a book that examines the question of war and especially the Army in the Stalinized Soviet Society and discusss how the Soviet Union functioned during the war, as well as what the Soviet Union did, but its real riches are why things happened as they did, even if you are like myself and do not share his analysis of Soviet Society.

Overby takes advantage of the release of many Soviet paper, memoirs and statistics since the fall of the Soviet Union to answer a number of the pending big questions of the Soviet-German war. For example, he verifies from secret documents of both the Poles and the Soviet leadership that it was not any decision by Stalin to see the Polish nationalist revolution Warsaw crushed in 1944, but the exhaustion of the Soviet Offense that had been only designed to advance through BeloRussia but had been able to enter Poland, and the desire of the leaders of the Polish rebels NOT to cooperate with the Red Army. Likewise, he records statements by both Stalin Zhukov that allied economic and military aid was decisive in the USSR's ability to survive against Hitler.

By mapping military power in the Soviet Union starting with the seizure of governmental power by Stalin and his clique in the 1924, Overby provides a summary history and discussion of basic questions not only of Soviet History, but Soviet Society. He continues that discussion after the war with a discussion of the results of the war on the peoples of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union's role in World power. Inas much as he focuses on Stalin's role in all of this, he continues that discussion until Stalin's death in 1952.

Overy rejects both the evil-empire demonification of the Stalin regime popular in some writing about the War, and also rejects the gloriciation of or ignoring of the STalinist tyranny. Armed with recent revelations, Overy surveys what a disaster the Stalin regime was starting with its force collectivation and superindustrialism and how the same dictatorial regime that carried out the purges continued during the Soviet-German War.

While Overby seems to be quite knowledeable about revelations about the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany during the war, there are a few things that he seems to be unaware of in regard to the pre-War Stalin regime. He seems to have no understanding how and why the purge trials began beyond paranoia on the part of Stalin.

We now know that Leon Trotsky's analysis of the purge trials when they happen was exactly right. In fact, Stalin began his purges when he learned that even within the bureaucratic elite in the Communist party tops, his rule was despised. At the famous Congress of Victors, Sergi Kirov, not Stalin was elected as General Secretary. This insured Kirov's assasination and a war of persecution against any section of Soviet society that could gather in opposition, starting with the Communist Party itself.

Overby is good at assessing the disasterous role Stalin's attempts to run the Soviet war effort were in the first two or three years of the war. Since he isn't pilloring Stalin, but trying to find the truth, he is honest enough to point out that by late 1943, Stalin had learned the error of his ways and began listening to his commanders and allowing them to make more and more decisions.

Overby also tells us that the victory of the Soviet Union was not inevitable and that the idea that the USSR won only because of overwhelming numbers of Soviet Solders were availble is also a myth. I won't tell you his answers to these questions, because I believe you should read his book and learn the answers.

Even though I disagree with much of his analysis, this book is essential because of the questions he tries to deal with. Overby is also modest enough to say that the amount of information that has been released since the opening of the Soviet archives is so vast, the amount of material still kept secret by the successors to Stalin still drawn from the bureaucracy still hides is still so great in concentrated questions, and the historical questions so large, that real answers will not be avilable for years. His book also serves as a succint and correctly prioritized summary of the war with the most important social, economic, political, and military issues linked. It is a good introduction for someone beginning to study this issue criticially.

I also recommend his book Why the Allies Won.

Richard Overy argues the USSR persevered in a war that by all accounts, it should have lost. By all appearances, the Soviet Union in 1941 suffered from backwardness both economically, as well as, militarily. At least this is what Hitler was counting on when he decided to undertake the enormous task of invading the Soviet Union in June. Overy argues it was the combined factors of economic mobilization, a flexible military command structure, and, most importantly, the enduring spirit on the Russian people that enabled Stalin's Russia to emerge victorious. A central theme throughout the book is Russia's ability to bounce back after a series of initial demoralizing defeats. Nowhere, says Overy, is the term "total war" more applicable than to the Russian people during what became known as the "Great Patriotic War." The author takes a narrative approach incorporating social history with military accounts. Paradoxically, however, the social aspect of this work outweighs the military analysis. In essence, this contradiction in methodologies from what one might expect from an actual military historian provides the book's strength. The book is intended to be a companion volume to a ten-part film documentary produced by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). Accordingly, the book's ten chapters correspond to the video titles. In keeping with the film's structure, Overy seldom strays from the Russian perspective. The result is a refreshing treatment of the Eastern front in the Second World War.                 The author mainly consults secondary sources and scholarly journal articles throughout the text. At the same time, he makes every attempt to utilize the most recent publications. Surprisingly, however, Overy fails to consult Russian language sources. Instead, he gleans from other's research into the recently opened archival material. This second-hand gathering of information is also apparent with regard to casualty figures for which he has come under some criticism. Unfortunately, his reluctance to consult Russian language sources reinforces the fact that Russian scholarship perhaps lies beyond the grasp of his expertise. Overy also incorporates interviews from Russian participants, an obvious reflection of the film documentary.                 It is difficult to convey the causes and affects of as vast a topic as the Great Patriotic War in a one-volume treatment. Within these limitations, however, Overy has accomplished his task admirably with a clear and engaging style. Overy attempts to dispel some popular myths utilizing new evidence, which, as already mentioned, he acquired second hand. For instance, the author suggests Stalin's military purges of the 1930's did not undermine Russian military effectiveness as commonly believed, but rather, cleared much dead wood and made way for a younger professionally trained officer corps. Secondly, Overy shows how Stalin was prepared to intervene militarily if Hitler invaded Czechoslovakia. Lastly, Overy contends the second Molotov pact actually proved advantageous to Stalin allowing him to buy time for what he perceived as an inevitable war with Germany. Again, owing to limited space, only the most prominent battles such as Moscow, Stalingrad, Leningrad, Kursk, and Berlin are examined within these pages. As a result, the book contains an imbalance of battle narrative and engaging military analysis found in other works as: John Erickson's seminal two-volume standard "The Road to Stalingrad" (1975; 1999) and "The Road to Berlin" (1983; 1999) and, more recently, David M Glantz & Jonathan House "When Titans Clashed" (1995. See my Amazon review). It is the seldom-covered aspects of the war, on the Eastern Front however, that shine in Overy's book. The chapter describing "The Fight from Within: Collaboration, Terror, and Resistance" (pp. 159-189) is the strongest component. Overy's coverage of mounted Cossack bands fighting alongside the Germans against their own countrymen; the Kaminsky Brigade slaughtering Polish civilians; Andrei Vlasov's change of ideological heart to form and lead an ill-fated Russian Liberation Army are topics not usually found in other treatments of the Russian front. Overy also includes the plight of the Polish Jews and Partisan warfare and the German reaction to it. Overy's description of Partisan bands (otriad) roving the countryside, living off the land at the expense of starving Russian peasants adds yet another dimension to this complex and bitter struggle. It is this social element, and friendly readability that makes this volume a significant addition to the history of the Soviet Union in World War II.

About a year ago I read an excellent book by Mr. Overy, entitled "Why The Allies Won." I was very impressed by that book so I decided to take a chance on this one as well. I was not disappointed. Whereas the earlier book stepped back and gave a broader view of the European conflict, "Russia's War" zooms in on the life and death struggle between Germany and Russia. If you have already read a few books on the Eastern Front, this book is probably not for you....it is meant only to provide a general outline of the war in eastern Europe. However, if you haven't read much about WWII, or if your reading up until now has concentrated on the Western Front, you might just find this book to be an eye-opener. I consider myself to be a fairly well-read person, but I am a bit ashamed to admit I didn't know much about the 1941 attack on Leningrad. I knew there was a siege that lasted about 2 1/2 years, but I didn't know much else. Mr. Overy explains Hitler's intent wasn't something as mundane as just getting Leningrad to surrender. He wanted to wipe Leningrad from the face of the Earth. Peter The Great had made it his capital, and so it had great importance to the Russian people and also to Hitler. The start of the siege in 1941 is horrible to read about and not for the squeamish. The city was surrounded and, besides being pounded by German artillery several times a day, for all intents and purposes was cut off from the outside world. What the population of Leningrad went through in the winter of 1941-1942 is unbelievable. Many people starved or froze to death or became so weak that they succumbed to sicknesses that, in normal times, would not have been fatal. But the survivors carried on and finally managed to get supplies thru by finding a gap in the siege lines that involved crossing a large lake. Leningrad managed to hold on until Russian advances in 1944 finally broke the siege. Mr. Overy also tells about how the Russians dismantled entire factories in the western part of the country right after the German invasion in June 1941 and moved everything by rail to the east. Factories were reassembled and workers constructed crude huts to live in, or sometimes just dug holes in the ground and lived in those. With the tradeoff of pretty much not producing any consumer goods, the Russian workers under these conditions managed to outproduce the Germans militarily....numbers of planes, tanks, artillery pieces, etc. As difficult as this was to accomplish, it was essential if the Russians were going to survive as tremendous amounts of military hardware were destroyed during the initial German assault in 1941. The author also gives credit to the lend-lease program. Stalin gave this short shrift in public, but in private he admitted that Russia could not have survived without the large quantities of trucks, jeeps, fuel, telephones and telephone wire, etc. provided by her allies. The Russian military also learned from their early mistakes. They adapted strategy and tactics to fight a modern, mechanized war...with concentrated firepower and improved communications. Mr. Overy also gives the Devil his due. At the beginning of the conflict, Stalin thought he could run the show. He thought he knew more than his military leaders. When he was told in early 1941 that if the Germans attacked the attack would likely be aimed to capture Moscow, Stalin refused to believe it. He was sure the Germans would go for the economic jugular....the southwestern part of Russia where the oil was produced. Russian defenses were therefore skewed to fit Stalin's thinking. Of course, Stalin was wrong......and his error was almost catastrophic. Stalin made other mistakes, such as ordering massive counter-offensives when the Russian army, both organizationally and militarily, was unprepared to undertake such actions. These attacks caused many unneccesary deaths and loss of equipment that the army could ill-afford. But the author shows that Stalin learned from his mistakes. He worked long hours and familiarized himself with all the strategic aspects of the conflict. He was man enough to admit, at least to himself, that he was making mistakes. He listened to advice and criticism and he often let the military men have the final say, once he had people in place that he felt he could trust. Of course, after the war, what he did to these same people is a whole other story! But that's another book... Mr. Overy writes well, and is always evenhanded and judicious in coming to his conclusions. I don't think you could find a better book concerning an introductory history of the war on the Eastern Front.

Richard Overy's occasionally chatty "Russia's War" is a useful introduction to the Great Fatherland War, but no more: It was the largest, though not the longest, war ever and can hardly be encompassed in just 330 pages.

The chattiness may derive from the book's function as a subsidiary to a 10-part television series. In any event, the anecdotes, while always interesting, seem to have been chosen at random, as if to break up, briefly, an often grim text.

Overy takes advantage of revelations available since the late 1980s, which do not in any important way change the history of the conflict as it was understood earlier. They merely refine and quantify, perhaps more accurately, perhaps not, a conflict of superlatives. For example, estimates of the dead in the Ukrainian famine of 1930-31 are reduced from a suspiciously round figure of 10 million to less than half that.

Inevitably, a good part of Overy's task is to specify and try to understand Josef Stalin's role. Stalin gets the benefit of all the many doubts and comes out as a great war leader. I remain unpersuaded. Russia did prevail, though, unlike Russia under the czar. Despite the wildly incompetent and inefficient Soviet system, in practice it was not quite as incompetent and inefficient as czarism.

One reason, though Overy does not explore this, is probably the incredible defensive power of the modern industrial state. Russia in 1914 was an industrial state -- its output of steel, coal and similar items ranked fourth or fifth in gross amounts -- but it was in every other respect premodern. Thus it could not benefit from its large industrial output. The Communists were modern, if inefficiently so, and perhaps that made the difference, rather than Stalin's abilities.

However that may be, there are some odd gaps in Overy's book. There is, for example, almost no mention of railroads.

More surprising, almost no mention of German losses. At some point in September or October 1941, while the Red Army was continuing to withdraw into the interior, the German casualty total passed the point of recovery and Russia had won. Nobody realized it at the time and few have understood it since.

In 1941, German losses in Russia came to nearly a million -- though you won't learn that from Overy -- thanks to stubborn resistance by the outclassed Russians. Yet the Germans had not gained any worthwhile objective in exchange. They might have, had the German strategy made any sense, although Russia's greatest advantage -- aside from General Winter and General Mud -- was the fact that nothing really important to the national existence resided in the western districts.

Overy misses this point and advances the defeat of Germany to late 1943 or even later. That this is incorrect was proven by the offensive of 1942, which the depleted Germans cut to half the frontage of 1941. If the full German army had been unable to achieve any important objectives in 1941, it was unlikely that half as much force could do so the next year.