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2.0 out of 5 stars
silly book; interesting, but not serious, April 3, 2004
This review is from: Sacred Trust: The Medieval Church as an Economic Firm (Hardcover)
Although "Sacred Trust" is a fascinating idea, it is not carried through in a useful or meaningful way. Perhaps, it is an interesting example of how contemporary economic models might be used to investigate organizations with stated non-economic purposes, but it definitely does not come to any useful conclusions with regard to the Catholic Church in the medieval period.
The authors state, on page 6, that they intend to "model the Church as a corporation that marketed and 'sold' a set of indentifiable 'products' in a rational, cost-concious, 'profit'-maximizing manner. ...[on the theory that] it improves our understanding of many complex (and seemingly irrational) historical events."
In this model, the "product" sold is "salvation", which the authors define as a "credence good", which apparently is an economic term for a product which the buyer purchases without there being an objective confirmation of its value. The Church is a so-called "M-firm", which means that it is a franchising corporation, more or less.
All fine and good, although one might argue that there is considerable value to peace-of-mind, which purchasers might know they've received or not, and which, today, represents a considerable portion of our economy in the form of Psychoanalysis, and thus we can derive a cost-comparison. However, the silliness of the book is not revealed in this moment.
First of all, although the book defines the Church as an M-firm, it does not make a consistent discrimination between "downstream" franchise profits and "upstream" profits. Indeed, in one of the very few moments when the authors actually produce numbers, they assert that the income of the "Church" was 200,000 florins in the early 15th century, plus 100,000 from control of the alum monopoly.
This is nonsense. To begin with, if this were so, it would mean that the Church, as a whole, in possession of fully 1/3 the land of Europe, had an annual income equal to 1/5th that of the Venetian Republic, and 1/3rd of that for France and less than 1/2 of that for England for the same time-period. This strikes me as highly unlikely.
What, in all likelihood, is going on here is that the authors took note of the liquid-income stream to Rome itself per annum, which, of course, was quite a bit less than the annual receipts for the entire Church. For example, it was illegal in England in the 15th Century, for specie to be exported. Therefore, all funds collected by the Church in England would not be transferred to Rome except through bills of exchange and no merchant house would likely be able to meet all the Church revenues in England, nor, given the regulation, would they be likely to want to. Moreover, it does not include all those immoveable assets like buildings, land and the commodities one can derive from land that were accruing to the Church. Since these lands were not the property of the local ecclessiastical authorities--although the usufruct of them might temporarily be--but rather really that of the Papacy, it would seem that with some research, one might be able to come to an average income of the Papacy in order to make later economic deductions. The authors make no such attempt.
Beyond this, the authors make no attempt to determine the value of the Church brand, being so important to purveyors of credence goods, as opposed to their other income-producing efforts like the products of lands, court services such as contract disputes, broadcasting (in the medieval period with low literacy rates, the church was the most effective disseminator of information or disinformation), and banking.
The authors furthermore regard the Church as a monopoly organization, and speak to its conflicts with secular authorities in this vein. While it is absolutely true that the Church came into conflict with secular authorities, the authors decide to sidestep the two most important historical events in this regard: the investiture controversy and the establishment of the Hospitallers and Knights Templar. How they could decide to ignore the two most important examples of the conflict in their study, I have no idea.
An investigation into the investiture controversy, for example, might have helped the authors deal with the question of the Church's regulation of marriage. The authors state that the 6th century Church extended the prohibition of endogamy to "marriages between fifth cousins--at a time when secular law contained no prohibitions against marraige between first cousins." (p. 93) True, but then, in the 6th Century the Church was an arm of the State, and remained so well into the investiture controversy (and in certain instances arguably until well after it). The distinction implied, therefore, between secular and ecclesiastical, only really applied to those subjects or citizens who were not Catholic. Perhaps it served to benefit Church revenues, but absolutely not at the expense of the State, which the authors define as a competitor. Indeed, in all likelihood, the prohibition was imposed at the behest of the State.
There are too many examples of this type of unseriousness to mention here. I seriously doubt whether the authors submitted their manuscript for review by a serious scholar of the medieval period or, if they did, I imagine that they decided to publish without taking into consideration his observations. They explicitly state that the work is not exhaustive, but, if Henri Pirenne could put together a serious work about the economy of medieval Europe in under 200 pages, I imagine they could about the economy of the Catholic Church.
In short, should you have the time for a mildly entertaining short work which suggests a number of irreverant ways of looking at the Church's economy without providing convincing cases for any of them, this is the book for you. I wish that a serious economic historian, someone as astute as Carlo Cipolla for example, would take a look into the issues presented by Sacred Trust, because they are certainly worth serious investigation. The authors apparently did not feel it was worth the effort.
It does contain a fairly useful bibliography, on the other hand.
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3.0 out of 5 stars
VALUE OF THE CONCLUSIONS ARE LIMITED, August 22, 2011
This review is from: Sacred Trust: The Medieval Church as an Economic Firm (Hardcover)
The Sacred Trust is interesting in its approach and execution. Unfortunately, the analysis starts with the train already rolling in the Middle Ages. In order to understand the force of religion, economists must start at the very beginning and study its economic doctrines and outcomes through time. To do this, a significant rewrite is necessary because much of the extant material is fraudulent. This is very difficult and prone to new errors. When I look at the conclusions in the Sacred Trust, Islam is staring at my face that there must be a paradox in claiming the Catholic Church as a driver in economic growth in its self interest to protect and expand its mercantile monopoly. It is like a husband beating up his wife and then claiming to having positively contributed to her growth by bringing her to the hospital. Hence, the value of the conclusions in Sacred Trust is limited.
After exhaustively going through Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, The Great Leap-Fraud (my publication) comes to the conclusion that the economic growth was collateral damage from an increasing loss of authority. The church jump started the economy unintentionally and at a very specific time. I do not know whether this theory is closer to reality. Economists have a minefield ahead of them to explore.
AJ Deus, author of the Great Leap-Fraud
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