The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations (Cambridge Studies in International Relations) [Paperback]

Daniel W. Drezner (Author)

Book Description

ISBN-10: 0521644151 | ISBN-13: 978-0521644150 | Publication Date: September 13, 1999

The conventional wisdom is that economic sanctions do not work in international affairs. If so, why do countries wield them so often? Daniel Drezner argues that, paradoxically, countries will be most eager to use sanctions under conditions where they will produce the feeblest results. States anticipate frequent conflicts with adversaries, and are therefore more willing to use sanctions. However, precisely because they anticipate more conflicts, sanctioned states will not concede, despite the cost. Economic sanctions are thus far less likely to be effective between adversaries than between allies.

Editorial Reviews

Review

"The Sanctions Paradox is one of the best books written in the field of international political economy during the 1990s. It offers a simple but clever theory that explains when states are likely to employ economic sanctions and when they are likely to work. Since sanctions seem destined to remain a favorite tool of statecraft in the 21st century, this book is likely to be paid serious attention for years to come." John Mearsheimer, University of Chicago

"...there is much of interest in this book, and the case studies, particularly those concerning Russia and its neighbours, break valuable new ground." International Journal

"Drezner is nothing if not innovative." Jrnl of Ritual Studies

Book Description

The conventional wisdom is that economic sanctions do not work in international affairs. If so, why do countries wield them so often? Daniel Drezner argues that, paradoxically, countries will be most eager to use sanctions under conditions where they will produce the feeblest results. States anticipate frequent conflicts with adversaries, and are therefore more willing to use sanctions. However, precisely because they anticipate more conflicts, sanctioned states will not concede, despite the cost. Economic sanctions are thus far less likely to be effective between adversaries than between allies.

Product Details

• Paperback: 364 pages
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press (September 13, 1999)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0521644151
• ISBN-13: 978-0521644150
• Product Dimensions: 8.9 x 6.1 x 0.9 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.2 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 5.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (1 customer review)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #1,558,323 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

More About the Author

Daniel W. Drezner is professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, a senior editor at The National Interest, and a contributing editor at Foreign Policy. Prior to Fletcher, he taught at the University of Chicago and the University of Colorado at Boulder. He has previously held positions with Civic Education Project, the RAND Corporation and the U.S. Department of the Treasury, and received fellowships from the German Marshall Fund of the United States, the Council on Foreign Relations, and Harvard University. He received his B.A. in political economy from Williams College and an M.A. in economics and Ph.D. in political science from Stanford University. Drezner is the author of four university press books -- most recently, Theories of International Politics and Zombies -- and the editor of two others. He has published articles in numerous scholarly journals as well as in the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Washington Post, The New Republic, and Foreign Affairs. He is an occasional commentator for NPR's Marketplace, and keeps a daily weblog for Foreign Policy magazine. For more about Drezner and his work, visit his website at www.danieldrezner.com.

Customer Reviews

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1 of 1 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars A Compelling Read, July 12, 2010

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Publius (New York, NY USA) - See all my reviews

This review is from: The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations (Cambridge Studies in International Relations) (Paperback)

Drezner does an outstanding job of making a relatively sound, lucid, and parsimonious argument that explains the use of economic sanctions by examining the conflict expectations between states. There is some game theory at the beginning of the work, but it is not absolutely necessary to grasp the main arguments. Simply put, the concessions that can be garnered from the use of economic sanctions are higher when the conflict expectations are smaller, though the likelihood of the use of sanctions is less. When conflict expectations go up, economic sanctions are more frequent, and less fruitful. Drezner uses a case study method to illustrate his simple and novel theory, and does a great job providing international relations context and relating it to his theory. The main shortcoming I spotted in his work is that he does not adequately address how the nature of a regime may lead it to alternately frame "relative gains." But this is to be expected from a work that takes a somewhat realist point of view of international relations in general (in other words, playing down "second-level" domestic explanations). This would make a great text for Master's level courses concerned with economic sanctions.