Customer Reviews

The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations (Cambridge Studies in International Relations)

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Drezner does an outstanding job of making a relatively sound, lucid, and parsimonious argument that explains the use of economic sanctions by examining the conflict expectations between states. There is some game theory at the beginning of the work, but it is not absolutely necessary to grasp the main arguments. Simply put, the concessions that can be garnered from the use of economic sanctions are higher when the conflict expectations are smaller, though the likelihood of the use of sanctions is less. When conflict expectations go up, economic sanctions are more frequent, and less fruitful. Drezner uses a case study method to illustrate his simple and novel theory, and does a great job providing international relations context and relating it to his theory. The main shortcoming I spotted in his work is that he does not adequately address how the nature of a regime may lead it to alternately frame "relative gains." But this is to be expected from a work that takes a somewhat realist point of view of international relations in general (in other words, playing down "second-level" domestic explanations). This would make a great text for Master's level courses concerned with economic sanctions.