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63 of 74 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
When Will We Finally Learn?, May 18, 2002
For non-scholars such as I who have a keen interest in U.S. military history, this book provides information and analysis which are probably not available in any other single volume. Boot tracks various "small wars" during the rise of America's global power from the Barbary Wars (1801-1805, 1815) until the application of the "Powell Doctrine" during the Gulf War in the 1990s. In the final chapter, he then provides what he calls "In Defense of the Pax Americana: Small Wars in the Twenty-First Century." Boot identifies four (among several) distinct types of small wars: Punitive ("to punish attacks on American citizens or property), Protective ("to safeguard foreign territory"), Pacification ("to occupy foreign territory"), and Profiteering ("To grab trade or or territorial concession"). For me, one of the book's greatest strengths is comprised of Boot's analysis of lesser-known but uniquely important historical figures such as Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy, Smedley D. Butler, Stephen Decatur, William Eaton, William Edmund ("Tiny") Ironside, Victor H. Krulak, Augusto C. Sandino, and Littleton W.T.. Waller. Within his narrative, he also analyzes the role played by each of various U.S. Presidents, notably Jackson, Cleveland, Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, Lyndon Baines Johnson, and George H.W. Bush. I also wish to commend Boot on his brilliant analysis of the pivotal (often decisive) role played by the Marines Corps throughout more than 200 years of U.S. military history and, especially, his explanation of the importance of the The Small Wars Manual which the Marines created in the 1930s. This handbook grew out of the their own experiences in the early years of the 20th century as well as Britain's colonial involvements. Here are two brief excerpts from the manual: "As applied to the United States, small wars are operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as are determined by the foreign policy of our Nation." "In a major war, the mission assigned to the armed forces is usually unequivocal -- the defeat and destruction of the hostile forces. This is seldom true in small wars. [The more ambiguous mission is] to establish and maintain law and order by supporting or replacing the civil government in countries or areas in which the interests of the United States have been placed in jeopardy." Thirty years later, as the war Viet Nam continued, it became obvious (at least to some) that the lessons to be learned from The Small Wars Manual may have been validated but, for whatever reasons, were either ignored or forgotten by President Johnson and others in his administration. With a new century underway, given the events of September 11th, it will be interesting to see to what extent (if any) the Marines' Small Wars Manual will guide and inform the allied response to global terrorism. With regard to "the lessons of history," Boot offers this advice in his book's final chapter: "In deploying American power, decisionmakers should be less apologetic, less hesitant, less humble. Yes, there is a danger of imperial overstretch and hubris -- but there is an equal, if not greater, danger of undercommitment and lack of confidence. America should not be afraid to fight `the savage wars of peace' if necessary to enlarge the empire of liberty.' It has done it before."
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