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Most Helpful Customer Reviews
13 of 14 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Excellent resource for learning how to analyze arguments,
This review is from: Science, Reason, and Anthropology: A Guide to Critical Thinking (Paperback)
This book is "about the epistemological foundations of anthropological theory, or the essential nature and ultimate source of anthropological knowledge." It is not "a history of anthropological thought... a catalogue of paradigms... a prospectus for a particular theoretical perspective... or a treatise on research methodology". (p.xiii) Lett's goal is to detail the process of rational inquiry. He is using interpretive anthropology to illustrate his points since he feels it often violates basic principles of rational inquiry. Lett admits he will be using more extreme examples from interpretive anthropology, and not accurately representing it. In the opening chapter, Lett discusses the science vs. non-science debate in anthropology, briefly discussing the origins and goals of interpretive approaches, accusing it of producing irrational arguments. The strength of the book lies in chapters 2 (The Nature of Knowledge) and 3 (The Scientific Approach to Knowledge). In chapter two, Lett discusses the differences between analytical and sythetic propositions, subjective and objective statements, and falsifiability. In chapter 3, Lett presents a detailed definition of science, and outlines methods in which to analyze and evaluate arguments. The remainder (and weaker portion) of the book is devoted to a citique of interpretive anthropology's contributions, and the future of anthropology as a discipline. This is an excellent manual for learning how to construct and evaluate arguments. However, my two problems with the book are: (1) Lett's insistence on evaluating the truth claims of religious beliefs, that science can and should be used to test the claims of religious beliefs. Rather than focus on the function of religion, Lett believes that anthropologists should evaluate religious beliefs in terms of their accuracy. He seems to have a partisan ax to grind, exemplified when disproving the statement "God exists" (p.53), violating his own logical principles that he just outlined. (2) Lett's use of the most rediculous (i.e. Sasquatch example that is constantly used) and extreme examples of interpretive anthropology is weak. Although he himself admits he misrepresents the field in his examples, a more balanced approach could have been taken. It is easy to prove the illogical argumentation of an individual maintaining that Bigfoot is alive and well, running through the Pacific Northwest. Overall, Lett is a clear and concise writer, and has produced a highly readable and useful volume for the study of scientific reasoning in anthropology. Other similar books: Reclaiming a Scientific Anthropology by Lawrence Kuznar
3 of 3 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
A Call for a Scientific Anthropology,
By Rodolfo Tello (Washington, DC) - See all my reviews
This review is from: Science, Reason, and Anthropology: A Guide to Critical Thinking (Paperback)
This book discusses the epistemological foundations of anthropological theory, including the essential nature of science and anthropological knowledge. Its aim is to identify the means by which anthropological knowledge can best be achieved. For theory, the author understands the set of assumptions underlying the acquisition of knowledge. Thus, the author aims to elucidate the essential principles of rational inquire.About the contents of the book, the author reviews the historical context of the contemporary debate between the scientific and humanistic approaches in anthropology, defining the nature of reason and proposing its logical and moral preeminence in the search for knowledge. He examines the basics of epistemological analysis and the acquisition of reliable knowledge, discussing the general assumptions of science. He then applies the fundamental principles of reason to contemporary anthropological theory, discussing the epistemological limitations of interpretive anthropology. Finally, he analyzes the relationship between science and humanism, identifying what he considers to be some promising approaches in anthropology that apply the fundamental principles of rational inquiry. In a more practical sense, however, the book can be considered mainly a reaction against interpretive anthropology, which he believes to have betrayed its promise towards the search for scientific knowledge, and moving distinctly in the wrong direction. The wrong direction in this case meaning its rejection of the scientific principles of rational inquiry. This is evident because the discussion of interpretive anthropology is a topic that goes on and on throughout the book. The author not only outlines the principles for scientific anthropology, but also seems to build his arguments based on the limitations he identifies in the assumptions and practice of interpretive anthropology. The author defines anthropology as the scientific study of human evolution. He argues that since human evolution has been distinctively a biocultural phenomenon, the discipline of anthropology is necessarily divided into the subfields of archeology, ethnology, linguistics, and biological anthropology. Given this conception, he claims that interpreter ethnographers would be able to evoke and interpret cultural variability and still call themselves anthropologists, as long as they explicitly adhered to the scientific principles of rational inquiry. He opens this possibility as theoretically possible scenario. However, the author goes on to state that interpretive ethnographers are not likely to embrace an anthropology that defines itself as the scientific study of biocultural evolution, because accepting such a definition exposes the comparative triviality of their interests and activities. This last statement is controversial, not only because of its implications to the discipline, but also because of the lack of evidence to make such statement. Promoting one type of topic that anthropology should focus, in his case human evolution, only based on the fact that this is the area where most scientific contributions of anthropology have been done in the past, in my opinion is a not valid enough criterion to dismiss the prospective new directions in anthropology. In this respect, his own statement that interpretive ethnography could be still called anthropology as long as it adheres to the scientific principles of rational inquire sets the basis to reject his controversial claim. It opens the possibilities to alternative scientific approaches to understand sociocultural phenomena without being necessarily defined as human evolution. It opens ways in which anthropology could set its focus in other directions, without being less anthropological for doing so. In this sense, the author's definition falls short not only of grabbing the complexity inside the multiple paradigmatic trends in the discipline, but also of capturing the interplay between stability and change in sociocultural dynamics. From my particular perspective, the main contribution of the book is its claim for an anthropology that is scientific, outlining the philosophical foundations that are required to conduct scientific inquiry. The author identifies the two basic assumptions of science. The first of them is that objective reality exists independent of perceptions, interpretations, motivations, feelings, desires, wants, or needs of human beings. The second assumption is that objective reality is amenable to human inquiry, meaning that human beings are able to comprehend and understand the reality beyond their own minds. These assumptions set the basis with which to understand the main characteristics of scientific enterprise, which is required to be objective, logical, and systematic. By objective, the author means the possibility of testing the truth or falsity of any propositional claim in a reliable fashion, independent of the claimant's predispositions and prejudices. A propositional statement is therefore objective in the scientific sense of the term if it is both publicly verifiable and testable. Thus defined, objectivity does not guarantee certainty, but it does guarantee a higher degree of certainty than any non-objective approach to propositional knowledge. Its virtue lies in its comparative superiority, rather than on presumptive omniscient claims. Thus, being a procedure rather than a product, objectivity is an ideal possible to approximate to, even if complete objectivity cannot be achieved. In a similar way, the author states that the scientific method requires logical consistency. Logic is defined as the set of rules governing the validity of inferences, and its principles are used to evaluate the legitimacy of arguments. An example of this is that two conflicting accounts of objective reality cannot be correct at the same time, because it is logically impossible for both arguments to be correct. An argument is a group of statements in which the premises constitute the evidence from which the conclusion can be derived. Establishing the relationship between premises and conclusions is related to the causes that might be present in order for the effects to occur (necessary conditions), and also to the causes that are enough by themselves to make the effects occur (sufficient conditions). Thus, logic allows preventing errors in reasoning, bringing consistency to scientific enterprise. In addition, science is also systematic, which means that there is a method to conduct scientific research. The use of the scientific method allows the production of a body of knowledge that is continually expanding, with its different moments being mutually compatible (cumulative). It also allows producing a corpus of theories that identify lawful regularities, each one of which is expected to have predictive power (nomothetic). As a broad outline, the research method that has evolved in contemporary science consists of an orderly sequence of six procedural steps: define the problem, review the literature, formulate the hypothesis, collect the data, draw the conclusion, and publish the results. Even if these steps are not always necessary or sufficient in practice, they contribute to the pursuit of scientific knowledge in a systematic way. In summary, the author succeeds in elucidating the foundations of scientific anthropology. He demystifies the general principles involved in objective, logic, and systematic inquiry, as they are expected to be experienced in the practice of anthropology and of science in general. However, the book also presents shortcomings, mainly referred to the emission of claims that go beyond his discussion of the means to achieve scientific knowledge. They basically refer to the qualification of other styles of conducting cultural analysis as non-anthropological, either because they do not fit his particular definition of anthropology, or because they do not follow the basic principles of scientific inquiry. In my opinion, these conditions do not enable the author to either make judgments about the disciplinary value of alternative, non-scientific, contributions in anthropology, or consider them as trivial. However, the challenges discussed in the book are inspirational and encourage further debate, which is an important factor in the search for anthropological knowledge.
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